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Abstract 
 
Incentives to manage ecosystem services have been heralded as important 
mechanisms to increase efficiency in biodiversity conservation and to facilitate 
greater equity in the distribution of natural resources. These interventions aim to 
control the use of natural resources by altering resource users’ land-use decisions and 
environmental behaviours. There is relatively little evidence, however, about the 
perceived benefits and societal values of incentives, and the institutional effectiveness 
of incentives to alter land-use behaviours to increase compliance. It is also unclear 
how incentive-based management institutions align with the local biophysical, social, 
economic, and political dimensions of the social-ecological systems (SES) in which 
they are implemented. The thesis examines the ways in which incentives are used to 
manage ecosystem services and their institutional effectiveness to alter landowner 
environmental behaviours in the complex reality of the world 
 
It is important to understand the drivers of land-use decisions and environmental 
behaviours to implement institutions that can address natural resource issues within 
specific contexts. This thesis contributes to the discourse surrounding the use of 
incentive-based management that aim to provide motivation for compliant land-use 
decisions. The research highlights the need to understand the contextual nature of 
societal values and institutional processes that drive behaviours and determine the ‘fit’ 
of natural resource governance mechanisms. The recognition of these values and 
processes enables sufficient ‘incentive effects’ to be provided that can motivate pro-
environmental behaviours. The thesis also illustrates the reality of how incentive-
based institutions can function on the ground makes it difficult to clearly attribute 
outcomes to theoretical assumptions on which incentive-based institutions are 
designed. 
 
Case studies from Lombok, Indonesia and Alta Floresta, Mato Grosso, Brazil were 
used to illustrate the significance of local participation in decision-making, incentive 
design, and landowner perception of the benefits of behaviours on compliance 
outcomes, equity in benefit distribution, and efficient conservation management. A 
mixed methods approach was used to compare different incentives, which included 
legal sanctions, religious beliefs, social norms, and economic rewards. The thesis 
examines institutional function, ‘fit’, and landowner perceptions that can influence 
compliant pro-environmental behaviours. Spatial analysis, semi-structured 
questionnaires, key informant interviews, and focus groups were conducted to 
determine the impact of religious, economic, and customary law incentives on land-
use decisions in communities on Lombok. Spatial analysis was used to examine the 
impact of sanctions in the legal reforms of the Forest Code, Brazil’s forest 
conservation legislation, on farmer land-use decisions in Alta Floresta. 
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This thesis finds that ‘incentive effects’ are strongly determined by landowner 
perceptions of the social and economic cost-effectiveness of compliant behaviour, and 
the ‘fit’ of incentive-based management to SES’s contexts and dynamics. Institutional 
‘fit’ was greater when procedural justice was perceived to be higher. That was driven 
by stakeholder participation in decision-making, closer links to existing institutions 
and social norms, and higher community autonomy over incentives. Positive 
incentives, like religious values and customary laws, were used to generate collective 
action for pro-environmental behaviours at local levels on Lombok, Indonesia. This 
generated greater community cooperation when collective action was built on existing 
social norms, socio-cultural institutions, and ecological dimensions. Incentives for 
collective action had less impact when they were imposed by external organisations, 
did not align to the local SES dimensions, and were only focused on increasing 
efficiency to control natural resource use.  
 
When negative incentives, such as legal sanctions and economic fines, were used to 
increase compliance with pro-environmental behaviours to protect riparian forests in 
Alta Floresta, they were found to, in fact, reduce overall compliance. The cost of 
sanctions and the option to offset illegal deforestation were perceived to be lower than 
the benefit of non-compliant behaviours like continued deforestation. The ‘incentive 
effects’ of these sanctions had limited impact to alter environmental behaviours of 
landowners. 
 
The findings of this study have implications for policies that use incentives as 
mechanisms to alter land-use behaviour. These findings also have clear relevance for 
PES and incentive-based design. They move PES beyond its theoretical application to 
meet the realities of the ‘messy’ world in which they are applied. The application of 
incentives is highly context specific to the SES in which incentives aim to function. 
This approach includes a need for the understanding of local perceptions of equity and 
cost-efficiency, and the impact of SES subsystem dynamics. A more integrated SES 
approach to understand the required incentives of land-use behaviours can enable a 
greater ‘fit’ of incentive-based institutions to local contexts, which may address 
environmental issues that can lead to a more sustainable use and equitable distribution 
of natural resources. 
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1 Equity and efficiency of incentives to 
manage ecosystem services 
 
 
The objective of this thesis is to examine the ways in which incentives to manage 
ecosystem services can influence the efficiency and equity of natural resource use for 
both conservation and rural development interventions. It also addresses how the 
interplay between equity and efficiency affect institutional functions and the 
motivation of pro-environmental behaviours. It focuses on the provision of water 
ecosystem services through the conservation of forests. The thesis used two case 
studies in Lombok, Indonesia and Alta Floresta, Mato Grosso, Brazil to analyse 
institutions that manage ecosystem services and how this governance affected the 
conservation efficiency and equity of resource access and distribution. 
 
The thesis centres on the use of a social-ecological systems approach to address 
conservation and development issues. It is presented in the structure of research 
papers. Each paper highlights specific characteristics and contexts of the case studies 
to explore local perspectives on a number of different institutional initiatives. 
Throughout the research, there is a focus on managing ecosystem services for greater 
equity and efficiency, and the importance to consider context in governance 
implementation to match policy approaches with the complex reality of the world. 
This approach links the overall research study to the broader discourse related to other 
instances of ecosystem services management. 
 
 
1.1. Background and context of the study 
 
The United Nations’ Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005) has driven an 
‘explosion of interest’ in ecosystem services, and how they can be effectively and 
equitably managed (Perrings 2006). Ecosystem services are used as a conceptual 
framework to understand the value of the environment and to guide its management 
(Redford and Adams 2009). The application of this approach aims to reconcile 
disparities between ecosystem services provision and the needs of individuals’ 
livelihoods. It attempts to promote greater equity in natural capital distribution. It also 
tries to recognise the trade-offs between natural resources and resource-users 
(McShane et al. 2010, Wunder 2005a).  
 
Forest ecosystems provide benefits and services at multiple scales. These include 
social, ecological, and economic benefits such as timber and non-timber forest 
1:  Introduction 
 -2- 
products (NTFPs); and, services such as soil, hydrological, and nutrient cycling. 
These support local livelihoods while playing a role in global biodiversity 
conservation. Pressure on ecosystem services and the communities that depend on 
them is increasing with population growth, invasive species, land conversion, and 
climatic change (MA 2005). The loss of ecosystem services and the resources they 
provide has global implications. In particular, for the rural poor, who are 
disproportionately dependent on ecosystem services compared to their urban 
counterparts, the decline in the provision and availability of these services represents 
a direct threat to the welfare and livelihoods of rural communities (Daily et al. 2009, 
Ferraro 2001, Grieg-Gran, Porras, and Wunder 2005, Tallis et al. 2008). Efforts to 
reduce community poverty levels, and local and global demand for ecological goods 
can lead to overexploitation of natural resources. Deforestation, for example, is 
responsible for an estimated 20% of global carbon emissions, and leads to further 
impacts on the provision of water for both agriculture and human consumption 
(Trivedi et al. 2009). Consequently, the protection of ecosystem services in 
developing countries has been identified as a “global social objective” (Ferraro 
2002: 990).  
Historical approaches to protect ecosystem services 
 
Historical attempts to meet this objective to protect ecosystems have been made 
through multiple paradigms and policies aimed at conserving resources for sustainable 
use. These approaches have been driven by the political arena in which ecosystems 
are managed, in particular the links and evolution of environmental and development 
policy (Roe 2008). They have sought to resolve conflict and trade-offs between the 
needs of local communities and those focused on the broader conversation agenda 
(Adams and Hulme 2001, Chhatre and Agrawal 2009, McShane et al. 2010). 
Approaches to conserve and protect ecosystem services aim to provide incentives to 
establish or change resource use behaviours, which have a harmful effect on 
biodiversity. These approaches have been conducted through command and control 
instruments such as protected areas (PAs) and land-use legislation (Keane et al 2008); 
the facilitation of greater sustainable use through Integrated Conservation and 
Development Programmes (ICDPs) and community-based natural resource 
management (CBNRM) (Brandon and Wells 1992); market-based instruments such as 
tradable permits, subsidies, and taxes (Jack, Kousky, and Sims 2008); and, in the 
more recent past, direct payments to individuals or communities for the provision of 
ecosystem services (Ferraro and Kiss 2002, Pagiola et al 2005, Wunder 2005b).  
 
Early conservation programmes often differed from development policy. They viewed 
human activity as key driver of biodiversity loss and, as such, an obstacle to 
conservation practice. Central to many of these programmes was Hardin’s (1968) 
‘Tragedy  of the Commons’ theory. Hardin argued that economic rationale and self-
interest would drive individual behaviour for common pool resources. Resources,  
therefore, that were common property would eventually be overexploited and/or 
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degraded. Programmes sought to restrict access to resources and establish rules 
surrounding resource use.  
 
These command-and-control measures to restrict resource use and the creation of 
PAs, especially in developing countries, were, however, controversial (Adams et al. 
2003, Adams and Hutton 2007, Roe 2008). Such top-down governance was costly to 
implement, the outcomes difficult to predict, and, more often than not, created “paper 
parks” that lacked social and political legitimacy (Balmford et al. 2002, Wilkie, 
Carpenter, and Zhang 2001, Clements 2012).  
 
To establish long-term social and political support, programmes must have greater 
convergence with development policy agendas which seek to increase community 
participation, decentralise power, and encourage sustainable development (Roe 2008). 
Programmes, such as CBNRM and ICDPs, introduced in the 1980s, took as 
assumption that greater community involvement and the development of alternative 
livelihoods would lead to sustainable incomes and alter how resources were used 
(Carlsson and Berkes 2005). The shift in priority, though, was viewed by some as 
inefficient, as it did not lead to significant changes beyond the policy framework 
(Sandbrook 2003).  
 
To improve environmental effectiveness, and the cost-efficiency and social equity of 
conservation initiatives, a more direct approach to conservation has been advocated 
(Ferraro and Kiss 2002, Balmford et al. 2002, Kemkes, Farley, and Koliba 2010). 
This approach seeks to use incentives that combine both biodiversity protection and 
sustainable development through mechanisms such as Payments for Ecosystem 
Services (PES). The success of such mechanisms are, however, difficult to determine 
(Adams et al. 2003, McShane et al. 2010, Travers 2011). Their outcomes are 
significantly dependent on social, political, economic and institutional contexts that 
remain highly uncertain (Adams et al. 2003, McShane et al. 2010, Travers 2011). 
 
Ecological systems are both dynamic and complex. They are interdependent on social 
systems that create adaptive, multi-scale social-ecological systems (SES). These SES 
interactions generate complex social, ecological, and economic issues and feedbacks 
that influence land-use decisions by individual landowners. SES dynamics influence 
the effectiveness of regulation. For example, the drivers of environmental 
degradation, poverty, and underdevelopment are often based on established 
institutions and SES interactions such as property rights, access to natural resources, 
and mechanisms of governance. This creates a challenge to design policies and 
institutions that can effect incentive structures needed to promote behaviours to 
sustainably manage land-use change (Clements et al. 2010, Ostrom 2005).  
 
Motivation alone does not determine human behavioural responses (Steg and Viek 
2009). Biophysical, economic, social, and institutional contexts, as well as the 
interactions between them, also directly and indirectly influence human behavioural 
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responses. Effective governance of these responses must therefore create incentives 
that facilitate behavioural responses to meet social objectives (Hanna 2001). For this 
reason, incentive-based institutions have been advocated as an approach to influence 
the land-use decisions and behaviours that affect the provision of ecosystem services, 
while also acting as a mechanism for poverty alleviation (Robbards et al. 2011, 
Corbera, Kosoy, and Martinez-Tuna 2007, Promberger and Marteau 2013). Incentive-
based institutions work on the principle that the strategic use of incentives will 
influence sustainable resource behaviours (Hanna 2001).  
 
As a basic principle, incentives-based institutions aim to address a more sustainable 
use of natural resources through greater economic and environmental efficiency. This 
is considered to also enable a more equitable distribution of benefits (Jack, Kousky, 
and Sims 2008). The includes, for example, the increased participation of stakeholders 
in decision-making (procedural justice) and a more just allocation of benefits from 
ecosystem management (distributive justice) (Corbera, Brown, and Adger 2007, 
Pascual et al. 2010). Based on an ecosystem services approach, the use of this 
governance mechanism has been viewed by many to generate a ‘win-win’ outcome. 
For example, incentives such as Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest 
Degradation (REDD) use financial payments to compensate the opportunity costs of 
deforestation. Reducing deforestation also sequesters carbon, and therefore decreases 
the amount of carbon emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. REDD 
simultaneously tackles climate change, reduces environmental degradation, and 
addresses local poverty levels (Kosoy et al 2007). The promotion of ecosystem 
commodification, which transforms natural resource goods and services into 
marketable values, is driving the use of incentives in natural resource governance. 
This is occurring at national, regional, and local levels, as economic, social, or 
cultural incentives provide an impetus to alter institutions and practices (Corbera 
2005). These incentives, however, can either support or hinder environmental 
conservation. The outcomes of using incentives to manage land-use change decisions 
also remain inconclusive. 
 
The potential of incentive-based interventions to be applied as a tool to integrate 
conservation and sustainable goals is, as yet, undetermined (Pirard 2012a). In 
addition, the efficiency and equity effects of policies that attempt to alter behavioural 
dynamics to protect ecosystems remains varied and unpredictable (Pascual et al. 
2010). As such, there is limited evidence to substantiate how the development of 
extrinsic incentives can effect collection action to manage communal resources (Kerr, 
Vardhan, and Jindal 2013). The outcomes of introducing incentives is likely to be 
complex (Kreps 1997). Messy or not, however, incentives play an important role in 
conservation and therefore the understanding of their function in conservation 
outcomes and social interactions is important.  
 
This thesis provides opportunities to explore such messy realities within a real-world 
setting. It seeks to examine how these policies emerge and function within their SES 
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context to understand how institutional incentives influence resource-use decisions 
that provide water and forest ecosystem services through the alteration of 
environmental behaviours.  
 
This thesis considers case studies from Lombok, Indonesia and Alta Floresta, Mato 
Grosso, Brazil to investigate how the use of incentives in forest and water resource 
governance affects the equity and efficiency of ecosystem services provision and their 
livelihood benefits. In Lombok, voluntary incentives included positive financial, 
religious, and traditional cultural motivations. In Alta Floresta, negative incentives 
were applied through the regulation of land-use behaviours and the punishment for 
non-compliance.  
 
While these two case studies nevertheless stand alone, both are relevant to the study 
of incentives. Together, they provide a context in which to examine the impact of 
different incentive mechanisms to alter land-use behaviours, and their application as 
an intervention to control natural resource use. The research focuses on social, 
biophysical, cultural, and economic factors that influence compliance behaviours. 
These factors have been examined using data on land cover and land-use, combined 
with socio-economic surveys and interviews collected over nine months in Lombok, 
Indonesia; and, using spatial analysis of land use and deforestation under policy 
reforms in Alta Floresta.  
 
In the subsequent section, an introduction to the current literature surrounding 
ecosystem services and policy implementation is provided. A conceptual framing of 
social-ecological systems and how this will be applied in the research papers is also 
outlined. This is then followed by the specific objectives, research questions, and 
outline of the thesis. 
 
 
1.2. The concept of ecosystem services 
 
Ecosystem services are the functions and services provided from ecosystems that 
directly and indirectly benefit human wellbeing (Kemkes, Farley, and Koliba 2010, 
Nelson et al. 2009, MA 2005). Natural processes and services provide direct and 
indirect benefits that are essential to sustain life. They also support important parts of 
the economy (MA 2005, Nelson et al. 2009). The short-term economic benefits of 
many of the human activities that degrade ecosystems are often eclipsed by the long-
term economic, ecological, and social values that the services provide (Wunder, 
Engel, and Pagiola 2008). 
 
There are four main categories of ecosystem services: provisioning, regulating, 
supporting, and cultural. Provisioning services such as food, water, fuel, and fibre 
often have clear values that can be quantified (Kumar and Muradian 2008, Tallis and 
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Kareiva 2005). Regulating services such as flood control, soil erosion prevention; 
supporting services such as nutrient cycling and soil formation; and, cultural services 
such as recreation and spiritual activities are linked to greater uncertainty in regards to 
biophysical production functions. They are therefore more difficult to value 
economically (Kumar and Kumar 2008). 
 
The ecosystem services concept, as originally described by the MA (2005), is built on 
the rationale that the true value of ecosystem services in current environmental 
management is often excluded or underestimated. The usefulness and application of 
the concept to understand human-environmental relationships has, however, generated 
widespread debate and criticism (Lele et al. 2013). The simplification of ecosystem 
services into goods and processes to be valued (economically or otherwise) has been 
criticised as potentially damaging when used for environmental policy. Some studies 
have suggested that valuation is in itself anthropogenic (Farber, Costanza, and Wilson 
2002). Others have argued that a clearer definition of ecosystem services is needed to 
prevent double counting of goods and services, in particular with respect to 
supporting services such as nutrient cycling (Fisher, Turner, and Morling 2009); that 
the concept may not address the true complexities and interactions within ecosystems 
(Mace, Norris, and Fitter 2012); and, that negative relationships within ecosystems, 
which deliver ‘bads’ and dis-services such as pests, diseases, and floods, are not 
always recognised or accounted for (Zhang et al. 2007).  
 
This thesis will investigate the governance of provisioning and regulating ecosystem 
services, and focuses on forest conservation and its implications for water resources. 
Water ecosystem services are important for rural development and provide multiple 
benefits for livelihoods, other ecosystem services, and wellbeing (MA 2005). Land-
use change to meet demands for growing agriculture, expanding settlements, biofuel, 
timber, and NTFPs are significantly affecting water resources and the quality of 
watershed systems. Competition for water supplies between agriculture, industry, 
irrigation, hydroelectricity, consumption, and the ecosystem itself may have long-term 
environmental effects (Brauman et al. 2007). This includes, for example, hydrological 
functions related to water quantity (e.g. precipitation, seasonal flows, floods, annual 
water yields) and water quality (e.g. run-off and pollutants, sedimentation, erosion), 
which can be affected when soil properties and vegetation cover are altered (Aylward, 
Hartwell, and Zapata 2010). Greater afforestation also does not equate to greater 
water provision (Calder 2005). An understanding of the function of forests relative to 
the sustainable management of, and interactions between, land and water resources is 
therefore required to manage watersheds, and the ecosystem services they provide 
(Calder 2007). 
 
 
1.3. Framing human behaviour and the environment 
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For the purpose of this study, however, it was important to understand the social 
dynamics of the use and value of ecosystem services. Human activities dominate 
ecosystem services are (Peterson 2000). Interactions between ecological and social 
systems are complex and multi-layered. Political ecology and social-ecological 
systems have been developed as approaches with which to understand social and 
environmental dynamics and relationships by conceptualising human behaviour over 
natural resources. They are trans-disciplinary in nature and are developed from 
different values, epistemological, and cultural settings, through which environments 
are perceived and used (Blaikie 2008, 1995, Walker 2006).  
 
The world is, however, chaotic, unpredictable, and not clearly understood. Individual 
and group behaviours in reality do not always match theoretical or institutional 
frameworks. Outcomes are almost impossible to forecast. Different perceptions, 
cultural backgrounds, social norms, and ecological dynamics will determine, control, 
or influence human behaviour and conflict over natural resources (Peterson 2000). 
Nonetheless, theoretical approaches such as political ecology and SES are useful to 
guide our understanding of human behaviours in relation to natural resources. They 
help to develop more applicable policy measures with which to govern the 
environment. 
 
1.3.1. Political ecology 
 
Political ecology aims to examine human-ecological systems within the context of 
local, regional, and global political economies (Blaikie 1985, 1995, 2008, Bryant 
1998). By using a more political approach, this theory provides a ‘chain of 
explanation’ (Blaikie 1985) that enables an understanding of the dynamics of natural 
resource use. Their is a focus on how decision-making is influenced by institutional 
arrangements, multiple interests, and actors (Agrawal and Gibson 1999). Central to 
political ecology is the examination of power relations surrounding the environment. 
That includes examining the role of political and economic systems on individual and 
community access to resources, material conflict, and governance institutions that 
influence behaviours.  
 
Political ecology is a powerful framework with which to analyse social-ecological 
relationships. But the focus on human systems in much of the current political 
ecology theory and frameworks, however, can be viewed as one-dimensional: It often 
overlooks the dynamics and the feedback systems between and within ecological 
systems (Peterson 2000, Rocheleau et al. 1996). It is these dynamics that alter the 
types of social conflict over natural resources. Some studies have gone so far as to 
suggest that political ecology would be more appropriately viewed as ‘environmental 
politics’ (Peterson 2000, Walker 2005). 
1.3.2. Social-ecological systems 
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The relationship between ecological and social systems is highly integrated and exists 
between multiple sub-systems, which operate across various landscapes and scales 
(Anderies, Janssen, and Ostrom 2004, Brunckhorst 2002, Holling 2001). This thesis 
advocates the use of concepts such as adaptive feedback cycles and cross-scale 
interaction to explain the connections between humans and the winder ecosystem   
within these sub-systems. This approach, in the context of this thesis, is best 
illustrated through an SES framework. An SES framework allows for the examination 
of how ecosystem processes interact and co-evolve with social systems through 
human responses, while also taking the approach beyond political power relationships 
(Ostrom 2007, Carpenter et al. 2009). An understanding of the complexities of SES – 
including, for example, interactions such as local use and cultural value of resources – 
is key to maximizing the efficacy of natural resource management and determining 
SES’ sustainability (Ostrom 2009). That includes, for example, how land management 
affects the provision of water ecosystem services. 
 
Change in a SES is inevitable. Shocks, uncertainty, and change at global and local 
scales are inherent to SESs.  Walker et al. (2006) and Folke et al. (2005) suggest that 
attributes of resilience, adaptability, and transformability are key to defining SES. The 
capacity for a SES to adapt to change (while maintaining defined functions and 
structures) is dependent on the links between natural resources in ecological systems 
and resource users within social systems (Berkes, Colding, and Folke 2000, Olsson, 
Folke, and Berkes 2004, Berkes and Folke 1998, Holling 1973, Ostrom 2009, Walker 
et al. 2006, Folke 2006). SES interactions, such as fires or increased migration to an 
area, can induce rapid change, which has both social and ecological impacts. Slower 
change, which is driven by variables such as wealth growth, soil degradation, or 
alterations in resource-use rights, can also impact a SES’ ability to adapt and 
transform. Sufficient resources and appropriate institutional structures are necessary 
to allow for adaptive capacity within societies. In contrast, an inadequate capacity to 
adapt to sudden shocks can worsen a community’s vulnerability to extreme changes 
within a SES. Those changes include uniformed institutional policies, global market 
fluctuations, or long-term climatic shocks (Walker et al. 2006, Janssen, Anderies, and 
Ostrom 2007) 
 
The relationships between the natural capital provided by ecosystem services and 
resource users link the livelihoods of those living within a SES to the resources on 
which they rely (Anderies, Janssen, and Ostrom 2004). The nature of these social and 
ecological conditions and interactions enables particular institutional arrangements for 
effective governance. The complex connections between resource users, governance 
systems, and natural resources require institutions that provide incentives for 
sustainable resource-use behaviours (Travers 2009). Drivers of environmental 
degradation and agents of poverty, such as deforestation and land conversion for 
agricultural expansion in the case of Alta Floresta, influence these institutions. They 
also feedback into the ecosystems that they aim to govern (Folke 2006). 
Improvements in the efficiency of land-use practices, particularly in agriculture, can 
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contribute to both poverty alleviation and provide incentives for the conservation of 
forest and water resources.  
 
Studies (Berkes and Folke 1998, Janssen et al. 2010) suggest a SES approach can help 
with the governance of common pool natural resources such as water and forest 
resources. Levin (2006) furthers this theory. He states that a SES approach may be 
crucial to create links between environmental protection and economic growth, and to 
account for SES interactions. Natural resource management is driven by interactions 
between ecosystems and socio-economic and political dimensions. These drive 
stakeholders’ decision-making, and the dynamics between and within these systems 
(Bunnefeld, Hoshino, and Milner-Gulland 2011). Subtleties in market forces, social or 
economic incentives, and weak institutions, for example, may determine compliant 
human behavioural responses.  
 
For both Alta Floresta and Lombok, it is apparent that compliant behavioural 
responses are influenced by internal and external subtleties.  Effective and equitable 
governance should therefore be able to address the social, economic, cultural, 
political, and ecological dynamics that affect resource-use decisions (Knight, 
Cowling, and Campbell 2006, Fulton et al. 2011). Governance of natural resources 
exists in both case studies. However, each focuses on different drivers and influences 
of landowner behaviours. In Lombok, communities are faced with internal subtleties 
such as social incentives, weak institutions, and cultural norms. Governance within 
this case study builds on these internal influences, social values, and community 
cultural norms to drive cooperative compliant behaviours. In Alta Floresta, external 
subtleties such as market forces, economic incentives, and weak institutions influence 
compliant behaviours. Reform of forest governance has aimed to address these 
factors, and therefore increase the incentive for higher compliance. However, the 
outcomes of this incentive change have been difficult to predict. 
 
A SES approach based on Ostrom (2009) was used to provide a conceptual 
framework in which to understand the multidisciplinary and multifaceted roles and 
implications of institutional governance on resource users and ecosystems in the case 
studies (Figure 1.1). Causal relationships can be difficult to determine within a SES 
due to the complexities and dynamics of SES interactions. The use of a SES 
conceptual framework is, however, useful to identify concepts, which contribute to 
institutional function, and which provide incentives for pro-environmental behaviours 
(De Caro and Stokes 2013, 2008).  
 
Key concepts identified in this approach emphasise the specific contexts in which 
resource users live, the types of resources available, and the institutions that constrain 
access to resources (Ostrom 2009). The conceptual framework used in this study 
simplified interactions between natural resources, resource system, governance 
system, and resource user subsystems that were managed in the social-ecological 
systems of the case studies Alta Floresta and Lombok. The framework conceptualised 
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the following as: Natural resource units as timber, water, NTFPs, and agricultural 
products; Resource systems as forest, agricultural, and riparian habitat; Governance 
systems as incentive-based mechanisms and public policies; and, Resource users as 
farmers and downstream users. The interactions between these subsystems lead to 
specific outcomes. All outcomes feedback into related ecosystem services and the 
core subsystems within the context of social, economic, and political settings. 
 
 
Figure 1.1.  Diagram illustrating the conceptual framework for the research based on a 
social-ecological system approach, as proposed by Ostrom (2009). 
 
1.4. Valuation of ecosystem services 
 
The benefits provided by ecosystem services hold multiple values for multiple actors. 
These include direct (e.g. timber, NTFPs) and indirect market values (water 
provision), intrinsic use and non-use values, and option and existence values (Kumar 
and Kumar 2008, Fisher and Turner 2008). They infer economic, social, or cultural 
importance, and contribution of ecosystem services to specific goals. Some scientists 
and policy makers have advocated the economic valuation of ecosystem services as a 
way to integrate natural capital into decision-making (Goulder and Kennedy 2011, 
Daily et al. 2009). The communication of biodiversity value within the political and 
economic realms of decision makers may therefore increase the implementation of 
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more pragmatic solutions (Gomez-Baggethun and Ruiz-Perez 2011). If nature’s value 
is recognized, investment in, and compliance to, conservation should, theoretically, 
increase (Daily et al. 2009).  
 
Commodification of natural capital requires an understanding of the ecological 
context and how this relates to wider SESs through economic efficiency, ecological 
sustainability, and economic systems (Wilson and Howarth 2002). Sweeney et al. 
(2004) argue that acknowledging the true value of ecosystems through the services 
they provide may alter economic behaviour. If the values of ecosystem services are 
considered within management approaches, Sweeney et al. (2004) argue that the 
conversion of forest or natural habitats for agricultural profit will be reduced, and the 
habitat’s perceived economic value by landowners can be increased. Combining 
effective and sufficient incentives for landowners is therefore important to encourage 
management, rather than exhaustion, of ecosystems (Walker et al. 2013). 
 
The economic value of ecosystem services is, however, often external to the market 
system. Because of this, failures of institutions, policy, or markets to address these 
values can lead to externalities. Externalities are negative environmental outcomes 
that impose social costs to society (Ferraro and Kiss 2002, Rudel 2005, Wunder, 
Engel, and Pagiola 2008, Landell-Mills and Porras 2002). Short-term economic 
benefits from land conversion such as timber, livestock, and crop production are often 
outweighed by these non-marketed externalities (Sweeney et al. 2004). Where 
benefits or costs of ecosystem services are undervalued, do not have a market value 
(such as clean water and wildlife populations), or are non-excludable, these 
environmental externalities may lead to inefficient resource allocation, and therefore 
market failure. Negative externalities, such as pollution, are more widely recognised 
and addressed than positive externalities, such as the provision of wildlife habitat or 
hydrological resources (Krutilla 1991).  
 
Externalities can be address through regulation, taxation, subsidies, and internalizing 
the external cost of ecosystem benefits. This can be conducted through a ‘Coasean 
approach,’ where market failures are corrected through markets that trade ecosystem 
services through transactions such as PES. ‘Pigovian solutions’ can also be used to 
correct market failures through public policy interventions such as taxes (Gomez-
Baggethun and Ruiz-Perez 2011).  
 
The case studies used in this thesis use both Coasean and Pigovian approaches to 
address externalities: In Lombok, one case study using positive financial incentives 
aimed to address deforestation through a Coaesean approach. Pigovian approaches 
were used in Alta Floresta, where public policy imposed regulations and negative 
incentives to enforce forest conservation. This Pigovian approach was also used 
indirectly in two case studies in Lombok where local socio-cultural incentives 
imposed community-wide informal policies.  
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While there is a need to understand ecosystem services in an economic context, the 
varying temporal and spatial scales, and socio-cultural perspectives that characterize 
ecosystem services, processes, and values, must also be recognised (Hein et al. 2006). 
The concept of economic valuation of the environment is fundamentally a human 
construct. Individual perception and value of ecosystems are therefore highly variable. 
They are often linked to socio-cultural backgrounds and specific natural resource use 
(Oteros-Rozas et al. 2013). In determining ecosystem services values, incorporating 
socio-cultural values, such as equity, and local perceptions of the environment, are 
important (de Groot, Wilson, and Bourmans 2002). Social values attributed to 
ecosystems are themselves also highly contextual. Methods of valuation are not 
‘ideologically neutral,’ but instead are cultural constructs (Gómez-Baggethun et al. 
2010). Culturally constructed values can act as an institution that feeds into the 
decision-making processes over how the environment and related human behaviours 
are managed (Vatn 2010a, Martin-Lopez et al. 2014, Oteros-Rozas et al. 2013). 
 
The valuation of ecosystem services, however, has been criticised. Kosoy and Corbera 
(2010) argue that the trade of single services oversimplifies complex ecological 
processes. They also suggest that the political nature of commodification may in fact 
emphasise existing power inequalities in people’s access to resources. Others 
advocate a bio-centric approach that argues a price cannot be placed on nature, and it 
therefore should be valued for intrinsic reasons (Goulder and Kennedy 1997). 
 
For the governance of ecosystem services, however, valuation can be a useful tool to 
guide decisions towards managing ecosystem services. In particular, placing values on 
environmental benefits can be used to highlight economic inefficiencies and address 
the asymmetric distribution of natural resources (Wilson and Howarth 2002). 
Valuations can estimate the opportunity cost incurred by ecosystem services 
providers, and, therefore, the amount for which these users must be compensated. 
Governance such as public policy to regulate land-use, market-based instruments such 
as PES, and institutions such as defined property rights, can be used to compensate for 
externalities that drive market failure and environment degradation. The case studies 
examined in this thesis are examples of ecosystem services management that used 
economic and culturally constructed values to influence human behaviours towards 
the environment. 
 
 
1.5. Institutions to govern ecosystem services 
 
Institutions define the ways in which humans interact with the surrounding 
environment (Corbera, Brown, and Adger 2007, Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern 2003, 
Young, King, and Schroeder 2008, Young 2003). Institutions are defined as a system 
of regulations and decision-making structures that lead to social norms connected to 
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the environment (Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994, Young 2002). They provide 
guidance to individuals and regulate interactions between groups of people (Corbera, 
Brown, and Adger 2007, Young 2003). Institutions are dynamic. They are reshaped 
through social, political and biophysical change, and human action (Corbera 2005). 
 
Institutions can be formal and are implemented through legal systems, policy regimes, 
and land tenure. They also can be informal in nature, and structured around cultural 
traditions, social norms, and customary laws. Institutions operate at different levels to 
influence who makes specific decisions, and how these choices are either enforced or 
limited (Corbera 2005). Institutions provide capacity to communities to manage SES 
interactions, address environmental externalities, and may offer solutions to 
community problems (Vatn 2010a).  
 
To control the use of natural resources, governance institutions must alter the 
incentives that drive resource users’ land-use decisions and behaviours (Milner-
Gulland 2011). These environmentally-linked human behaviours are shaped by 
multiple and complex factors.  ‘Pro-environmental behaviours’ can be considered as 
behaviours that seek reduce negative impacts on ecosystems, and promote the 
sustainable use of resources (Kollmuss and Agyeman 2002). 
Human motivation, incentives and collective action 
 
“Incentives matter” (Gneezy, Meier, and Rey-Biel 2011). They can be economic or 
social, and can act on intrinsic motivation to alter individual and collective behaviours 
(Pascual-Ezama, Prelec, and Dunfield 2013). Resource users’ perceived incentives are 
often based on the considerations of the costs and benefits of different behaviours. 
These considerations are influenced by the constraints of the institutional and 
contextual setting, and the dynamics of resources and their users.  These include 
factors and circumstances, such as: Existing institutions, i.e. that can aid or be used to 
promote pro-environmental behaviours; Economic, i.e. the financial cost and benefits 
of certain actions; Social and cultural, such as social norms and traditional customs; 
Personal capabilities, such as capital, time, social status, and power; and, Internal 
motivations, such as environmental awareness, and underlying values and attitudes 
(Stern 2000, Kollmuss and Agyeman 2002). Various incentives will have different 
effects on these factors and contexts, and, therefore, incentives must be highly context 
specific.  
 
Two over-arching views towards individuals’ desire to cooperate are described in the 
existing literature: (1) Individual rational utility maximisation – i.e. economic gain 
(e.g. Hardin 1968); and, (2) Social utility maximisation – i.e. social acceptance (Vatn 
2009). An individual rational utility maximisation viewpoint suggests human 
behaviour is motivated through extrinsic incentives, such as rewards or sanctions (e.g. 
command and control, payments). It is based on individual cost-benefit analysis for 
self-interest (REF). Conversely, social utility maximisation incorporates social 
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institutions, such as social norms, traditions, and customs, that guide pro-social 
cooperative behaviour (Ostrom 1998, Deci 1971, Gachter and Fehr 1999). 
 
Economic theory has often been solely used to design incentives. This rationale has, 
however, been criticised for excluding social interactions and the influence of social 
acceptance as an extrinsic incentive on individual behaviour (Harsanyi, 1969, 
Granovetter 1992, Kreps 1997, Falk, Gachter, and Kovacs 1999, Fehr and Falk 2002). 
Economic rationale is, in itself, dependent on already-established incentives and 
intrinsic motivation which provides a basis for societal actions and alter social norms 
(Kreps 1997, Gneezy, Meier, and Rey-Biel 2011). The assumption that economic 
incentives are complementary to existing altruistic motivation may therefore have 
significant implications and affect existing pro-social behaviours (Deci 1971, Pagiola 
and Platais 2002).  
 
Fehr and Falk (2002) argue that economic theory alone constrains our understanding 
of the influence of incentives on human behaviour. The use of social, anthropological, 
and psychological theory to understand other factors and foundations of behavioural 
motivation, such as reciprocity, social (dis-)approval, and intrinsic enjoyment, should 
also be taken into account when introducing extrinsic incentives (Gachter and Fehr 
1999). These social interactions themselves — how behaviours are formed and evolve 
— mean that the reality of introducing extrinsic incentives in practice is likely to be 
difficult to determine. 
 
Policy changes and the implementation of incentive-based institutions to govern 
ecosystem services aim to alter these motivations, and the behaviours of resource 
users. This can be either through positive means, such as social or financial rewards, 
as was observed in Lombok, or negative means, such as fines and punishments for 
non-compliance, as was observed in Alta Floresta. Should land users’ incentives for 
non-compliance, such as continued deforestation, be stronger than those for 
compliance, sustainable governance of ecosystem services is likely to be 
compromised (Rudd 2004). In Alta Floresta, non-compliant deforestation behaviours 
are the result of ineffectual incentives to alter land-use decisions. In the case study, 
non-compliant behaviours are perceived by landowners to be more cost efficient than 
pro-environmental behaviours. Consequently, ecosystem governance and function are 
severely compromised. Reformed policy approaches in Alta Floresta aim to address 
these ineffective incentives and alter landowner non-compliant behaviours. The 
implementation of incentives can, therefore, have significant effects on human 
environmental behaviours, which can either benefit or cause harm to ecosystem 
services.  
 
Ecosystem services, such as fresh water and clean air, are predominantly public 
goods. Yet, their physical provision (i.e. forest land) is often privately owned. In the 
Brazilian Amazon, land tenure is clear, and private properties constitute 53% of the 
biome (Rosa, Souza, and Ewers 2012). For Lombok, however, land tenure, as across 
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much of Indonesia, and ownership are poorly defined, and often there is confusion 
between national and traditional laws over tenure definitions (Contreras-Hermosilla 
and Fay 2005). Policies and institutions require structures that provide incentives for 
private landowners to provide or protect ecosystem services (Kemkes, Farley, and 
Koliba 2010). Traditional institutional approaches to manage ecosystem services have 
used command and control regulations, or set aside sections of the ecosystem from the 
economy by creating PAs or other conservation systems. More recent approaches, 
however, have sought to remedy market failures through public policy (taxes, user 
fees), subsidies, tradable permits, or economic incentives such as PES (Jack, Kousky, 
and Sims 2008). This change has focused on encouraging behaviours through market 
signals, rather than through explicit directives to address environmental externalities, 
such as deforestation and unsustainable land use (Corbera, Brown, and Adger 2007). 
These tools provide ecosystem services’ public goods through the collective action of 
individual resource users (Kemkes, Farley, and Koliba 2010). 
 
The use of markets as an institution often arises when resources are perceived to be 
scarce (Kinzig et al. 2011). These mechanisms are used to provide incentives for 
individuals to consider the environmental costs of their actions. These incentives are 
often economic, but may also include social rewards or can be driven by underlying 
customary norms. By influencing natural resource behaviours, incentives such as PES 
aim to integrate the short-term immediacy of conservation goals with the long-term 
slow pace of economic and social change for specific development objectives. 
Incentives used in Alta Floresta aim to address the economic externalities of 
deforestation on private properties.  They also can serve as a redistributive mechanism 
between different social groups and ecosystem users (Ferraro and Simpson 2002, 
Barrett and Arcese 1995, Adams and Hulme 2001).  
 
1.5.1. Economic incentives 
 
PES assumes compensation will provide incentives for conservation, and will not lead 
to ecosystem conversion, and therefore market failure (Kemkes, Farley, and Koliba 
2010). The creation of a market value for ecosystem services offsets lost opportunity 
costs to local providers (Engel, Pagiola, and Wunder 2008).  There are many types of 
PES that focus on specific ecosystem services. Due to their commercial scale, 
however, four main schemes have emerged: carbon sequestration, watershed 
protection, biodiversity protection, and landscape beauty (Wunder 2005b). Widely 
accepted criteria for PES schemes include: A voluntary contract for external 
beneficiaries of services, such as downstream users, to pay service providers (for 
example, local landowners), on the condition they adopt land practices and resource 
uses that restore or maintain ecosystem conservation (Wunder 2007, 2005b). The PES 
approach has been implemented in both developed and developing countries. Its 
application has been diverse, ranging from small-scale watersheds to ecosystems 
spread across entire countries (Wunder, Engel, and Pagiola 2008, Kemkes, Farley, 
and Koliba 2010).  
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It is argued by some that, despite the subjective nature of PES’s selection of 
ecosystem services, their valuation, and classification, its implementation is preferable 
to a lack of valuation and accountability, which currently drives ecosystem 
degradation and misaligned policy priorities (Spangenberg and Settele 2010). 
Economic incentives are therefore perceived by some as a cost-effective method for 
conservation (McAfee 2012). Others, however, suggest that combining conservation 
and poverty alleviation is likely to compromise institutional efficiency (Sanderson and 
Redford 2003), and Berrada (2004)1 describes PES as, “an attack on collective life” 
(as cited in McAfee and Shapiro (2010)). The introduction of incentives may, 
therefore, be unpredictable in practice, undermine existing communal relationships 
and disempower rural providers. 
 
Since the early implementation of PES under Wunder (2006)’s definition, the 
discourse about economic incentives for conservation and development has developed 
in different ways to focus on varying definitions of incentive schemes (Muradian 
2013, Muradian et al. 2010, Muradian and Rival 2012, Muradian and Vira 2013, 
Pirard 2012b). As such, PES definitions have widened to include schemes that are 
defined as ‘PES-like’ – i.e. fulfilling most, but not all criteria, or self-organised 
programmes (Wunder 2007). That includes the Sloping Land Conversion Program 
(SLCP) in China, which is aimed at protecting watersheds and reduce soil erosion, 
and is financed by central governments, not voluntary buyers (Bennet 2008). Other 
‘PES-like’ programs include Mexico’s PSA-H PES scheme that uses hybrid market-
like mechanisms and state regulations to protect national watersheds (McAfee and 
Shapiro 2010). Other approaches include collective action, where social norms 
provide incentives for positive environmental behaviours (Muradian 2013). Such 
projects expand Wunder’s (2005) original definition to include public policy-linked 
schemes and non-economic incentives. 
 
Economic efficiency considerations are important for ecosystem service valuation. 
The estimation of values can help to identify economic trade-offs between, and 
across, different users and providers of ecosystem services. The use of incentives such 
as PES to create efficient and equitable natural resource use does not represent a 
“silver bullet” for conservation or development (Ferraro and Kiss 2002, Engel, 
Pagiola, and Wunder 2008). Economic incentives may not be suitable to manage all 
environmental problems. They can be an insufficient guarantee for ecosystem service 
provision, or may ‘crowd out’ intrinsic, underlying social norms that generate positive 
environmental behaviours (Perrot-Maitre 2006, Pagiola, Arcenas, and Platais 2005) 
 
1.5.2. Non-economic incentives 
 
                                                 
1 Barreda, A. 2004. Invasiones invisibles, subsidies perversos, guerra continua [Invisible 
invasions, perverse subsidies, continuous war]. Orjarasca, La Jornada: 20-23. 
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Not all incentive-based institutions rely purely on economic compensation to motivate 
behaviours. The management of ecosystem services “typically involves social 
dilemmas” (Muradian 2013). These dilemmas occur at different scales of decision-
making, and relate to the behavioural choices of natural resource users (Muradian 
2013). A wide range of incentives motivate behavioural choices and the extent of 
compliance with environmental management institutions (Cardenas, Stranlund, and 
Willis 2000). Individual and collective behaviours are often influenced by self-interest 
and social norms such as altruism, reciprocity, wishing to avoid social disapproval, 
and fairness (Kreps 1997, Narloch, Pascual, and Drucker 2012). Social rewards, and 
punishments, therefore, can be used to promote pro-social behavior (Fehr and Falk 
2002). 
 
The use of incentives to influence behaviours are “a means of social communication 
and hold social meaning,” (Muradian 2013). Where incentives are communal, their 
use to control and solve social dilemmas can promote greater cooperation and 
collective action (Travers et al. 2011). In practice, incentive-based institutions are 
more likely to be based on hybrid governance systems such as collective action, 
compared to market-driven economic rewards or hierarchical, top-down approaches 
(Muradian 2013, Muradian and Rival 2012, Sommerville et al. 2010). Muradian et al. 
(2013) and Cardenas and Carpenter (2008) suggest that these hybrid forms of 
hierarchical control and market-based regimes can enable greater efficiency and 
equitable distribution of resources. This may foster institutions to use existing 
motivations, social norms, leadership, and penalties to enable compliant behaviours. 
 
Compliance 
 
The economic and non-economic incentives discussed so far have been directly used 
to motivate pro-environmental behaviours. The use of economic and non-economic 
motives for land-use decisions, however, may not always drive pro-environmental 
behaviours. Incentives can also be indirect, which may motivate resource user 
behaviour through negative incentives such as the threat of sanctions (Houser et al. 
2008). Sanctions, such as fines, imprisonment, or embargoes, can have ‘incentive 
effects’ that are used to prevent non-compliant behaviours such as deforestation or 
pollution. Key to determining the effectiveness of sanctions to motivate complaint 
behaviour is landowner awareness of the risk of punishment (Andrighetto and 
Villatoro 2011).  The impact of these indirect incentives on compliant behaviours is 
determined by: 1) The perceived potential economic benefits of non-compliance; 2) 
The cost of punishment; 3) The likelihood of non-compliant behaviours being 
detected; and 4) The anticipation of future offensives (Becker 1968).  
 
Compliance, therefore, is determined by the cost effectiveness of pro-environmental 
behaviours over rule breaking (Keane et al. 2008, Leader-Williams and Milner-
Gulland 1993). This may not always promote cooperation with institutions, if a 
sanction’s cost is lower than the benefit of non-compliance. Sanctions, often viewed 
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as hostile in nature, may also generate institutional distrust, and reduce the likelihood 
of compliance (Houser et al. 2008).  Regulations to alter landholder behaviours must, 
therefore, take this into account to provide sufficient ‘incentive effects’ to motivate 
compliant, pro-environmental behaviours. 
 
 
1.6. The implementation of incentive-based institutions 
 
The implementation of incentive-based institutions raises questions of how to feasibly 
apply this approach to obtain conservation and development outcomes. This section 
discusses the trade-offs incurred when using this management approach. It also 
addresses issues of efficiency and equity for resource users and ecosystem services 
protection, and the importance of context for incentive-based interventions to ‘fit’ and 
‘interplay’ within SESs. 
 
1.6.1 Trade-offs 
 
Any management approach will create trade-offs between ecosystem conservation 
and livelihoods because of the inherent interdependence between the two concepts 
(Rodriguez et al. 2006). The design of ecosystem services management illustrates 
these trade-offs. Optimizing the provision of one ecosystem service will result in 
trade-offs for the provision of other ecosystem services. By maximizing pasture 
habitat for cattle revenue in Alta Floresta, for example, that provision may not 
improve hydrological services or promote greater biodiversity and forest habitat. The 
focus on one ecosystem service, however, can minimize transaction costs between a 
broad selection of providers over a much wider region (Wunder 2005b). Larger-scale 
programs can benefit from reduced transaction costs with a greater selection of 
providers. That allows for multiple objectives to be pursued at the same time such as 
poverty reduction and conservation (Wunder, Engel, and Pagiola 2008).  
 
Trade-offs can occur between multiple ecosystem services. That includes along 
spatial scales – with local or regional effects – and along temporal scales – i.e. rapidly 
or slowly. Trade-offs also affect ecosystem services’ ‘reversibility’ – i.e. whether 
ecosystem services are likely to return to their original state if the impact of the trade-
offs stops (Rodriguez et al. 2006). Trade-offs may not always be an explicit choice. 
Interactions among ecosystem services are often not fully understood (Walker et al. 
2002), and multiple outcomes are sometimes not considered (Chhatre and Agrawal 
2009). Management approaches are typically linked to the short-term needs of 
humans, and lead to a hierarchy of ecosystem service preference. These short-term 
demands currently focus on provisioning services. This focus may have unknown 
consequences for the longer-term, larger-scale provision of regulating, cultural, and 
support services (Rodriguez et al. 2006). 
 
1:  Introduction 
 -19- 
Trade-offs between the provision of different ecosystem services also include social 
outcomes under incentive-based management structures. The key questions are: who 
is actually benefiting from the schemes, and whether the ‘real poor’ are able to access 
benefits when they lack capital or land tenure (Arnold 2002, Sommerville et al. 2010). 
The claims and distribution of payments also affect resource entitlements between, 
and within, communities (Leach, Mearns, and Scoones 1999). Changes in access to, 
and control over, resources for different actors at various times under incentive-based 
management schemes also can impact social cohesion and cultural values (Corbera, 
Brown, and Adger 2007). It is important that these values and trade-offs are 
understood when implementing incentive-based institutions as sustainable solutions to 
resource conflict. Trade-offs between efficient and equitable institutional outcomes 
are unavoidable. However, understanding the context in which institutions are 
implemented and function is likely to increase the potential for efficient and equitable 
objectives to be met. 
 
1.6.2 Issues of efficiency and equity 
 
A uniform design of incentive-based measures may not fit all situations. To alter 
patterns of behaviour in an unpredictable world will not always achieve 100% 
efficiency or equity. Incentives offer a seemingly easy solution to complex 
environment problems, but can worsen ecosystem loss if not designed appropriately 
(Kinzig et al. 2011). The design of incentive-based mechanisms must be context 
specific. To ensure environmental behaviour changes are efficient and equitable, the 
design of incentive mechanisms should take into account the existing institutions, the 
scale of ecosystem and SES function, and the prevailing socioeconomic and political 
conditions (Kinzig et al. 2011). Different forms of incentives can be used to influence 
behaviours. These can be positive, i.e. providing rewards for compliant behaviours, 
such as with the case studies in Lombok, or negative, i.e. sanctions and punishments 
for non-compliance, such as those seen in the case of Alta Floresta. 
 
Incentives may raise multiple issues related to equity and the elite capture of 
resources. Van Hecken and Bastiaensen (2010) suggest that PES can lead to a local 
bill for a ‘global free lunch.’ Concepts of social justice are central to the design and 
implementation of incentive-based mechanisms (Martin, Gross-Camp, Kebede, and 
McGuire 2014). The distribution of resources and the mechanisms that enable their 
distribution often determine human interactions. Institutions that focus on one 
equitable element do not always positively influence other parts of social justice 
(Sikor et al. In press). Conflicts over resources and institutional governance can spring 
from different beliefs of what defines ‘just’ environmental management (Martin, 
Gross-Camp, Kebede, McGuire, et al. 2014). The concept of ‘just’ environmental 
management draws on concepts that underpin incentive-based mechanisms: service 
providers need to be rewarded for benefits received by individuals outside of the 
resource base.  
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Inequality in environmental resource use is often based on people’s access to natural 
resources, and not their economic wealth status (Martin, McGuire, and Sullivan 
2013). Land tenure and property rights, especially over forests, are important in the 
creation of incentive-based policy that is designed to protect ecosystem services 
(Bremner, Farley, and Lopez-Carr 2014). Clear tenure definitions, which are 
understood at local and regional levels, are critical for the equitable distribution of 
benefits (Robinson, Holland, and Naughton-Treves 2013). Yet, the perception that 
local communities have towards land tenure often has a greater effect on land-use 
decisions, compared to whether tenure is formally recognised (Pascual et al. 2010) 
 
Governance systems whose conception of justice is similar to that of the individuals 
who provide and use resources are more likely to be received positively, compared to 
systems that are based on divergent definitions (Martin 2013). Martin, Gross-Camp, 
Kebede, McGuire, et al. (2014) argue that questions such as who participates in 
decision-making, and on whose terms, are highly influential in determining the 
equitable resource distribution. Individuals, who may focus on non-economic factors 
of justice, may not accept the economically-driven outcomes of incentive-based 
mechanisms. To address these injustices, incentive–based institutions need to 
acknowledge and align governance with the underlying institutions, power relations, 
and social norms that drive behaviours. 
 
1.6.3 The importance of context:  Institutional fit and interplay 
 
Institutions do not operate in isolation (Corbera, Brown, and Adger 2007). Existing 
institutions, which underpin society, have the potential to influence and interact with 
environmental governance institutions. These existing institutions, and the contexts in 
which they function, have the ability to enhance or undermine the productive 
management of ecosystem services (Agrawal and Ostrom 2001, Dietz, Ostrom, and 
Stern 2003).  
 
The extent to which an environmental institution is aligned to address the local SES 
context will determine institutional ‘fit’ (Young 2002, Young, King, and Schroeder 
2008). Institutions that do not match these contexts are likely to be incompatible and, 
therefore, weak in addressing the environmental issues, and be potentially damaging 
to the SES in question (De Caro and Stokes 2013). De Caro and Stokes (2013) 
provide a framework to analyse components of institutional ‘fit’ (Figure 1.2) and its 
influence to determine behaviours and compliance through institutional acceptance 
and social fit. This framework is linked to the components and actors within a SES as 
illustrated with Figure 1.1, and can help to identify factors that motivate land-use 
behaviours and determine institutional ‘fit.’ 
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Figure 1.2.  Behavioural process model linking participatory fit, social fit, and 
comprehensive fit (De Caro and Stokes 2013). 
 
Participation in decision-making can be subjective and determined by factors such as 
social norms and local perceptions of participation. Participatory ‘fit,’ i.e. aligned to 
these local contexts, is important to empower local actors and provide procedural 
justice (De Caro and Stokes 2013, 2008). The extent to which communities perceive 
that participation has been just will determine the level of acceptance of institutional 
constraints on natural resource use, i.e. social fit. This acceptance facilitates 
institutional signals, which provide incentives and motivate compliance to formal and 
informal institutional rules. 
 
A community’s ability to cooperate is dependent on existing social norms and 
motivations that guide cooperative behaviours (Ostrom 1990). Institutions that match 
these social norms, existing socio-cultural institutions, and ecological dimensions are 
more likely to ‘fit’ a SES and increase positive outcomes. Links between institutions, 
local contexts, existing institutions, cultural norms, and socio-economic conditions are 
likely to enable institutional function (Mehring et al. 2011). The impact of incentives 
on underlying motivations and social norms may either ‘crowd out’ (undermine) or 
‘crowd in’ (reinforce) intrinsic positive environmental behaviours (Clements 2010, 
Bowles 2008, Rode, Gomez-Baggethun, and Krause 2013, Vatn 2010b, Muradian et 
al. 2013). Extrinsic incentives for short-term economic gain that alter individuals’ 
moral responsibilities may result in changes to values or mind-sets, which 'crowd out’ 
social norms (Bowles 2008, Rode, Gomez-Baggethun, and Krause 2013). In contrast, 
institutions that provide incentives for intrinsic motivation that promotes cooperative 
behaviours may strengthen and complement existing social norms to conserve the 
environment. It is important to understand how extrinsic incentives interact with 
existing intrinsic motivations. They can generate incentives, which promote 
cooperative action and reinforce existing social norms (‘crowd in’) to manage 
common pool resources, rather than weaken (‘crowd out’) underlying social norms 
and behaviours (Muradian et al. 2010, Clements et al. 2010, van Noordwijk et al. 
2012). 
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There is no uniform application of incentive-based institutions to manage ecosystem 
services. Their implementation is highly context specific and outcomes are often 
unpredictable (Kemkes, Farley, and Koliba 2010). Benefits from ecosystem services, 
coupled with socioeconomic, political, and demographic factors, influence attitudes 
towards, and perceptions of, the environment. They also affect the types of resource 
use (Infield and Namara 2008). The choice of ecosystem service governance is 
dependent on a SES’s socio-economic, biophysical, and political context, and the 
context’s dynamics (Jack, Kousky, and Sims 2008). For example, environmental 
benefits from ecosystem services vary significantly across sources, locations, and 
from initial conditions. How these resources are accessed and distributed, and the 
level of heterogeneity in the opportunity costs of the land-use providing ecosystem 
services will also impact policy outcomes. The existing political processes and power 
relations will also affect whether incentive-based institutions align or compete with 
existing institutions. Over time, these contexts and their dynamics will change, and 
may affect how incentives signal behavioural adaptation towards sustainable land use. 
 
These contexts are likely to determine the equity, and environmental and cost 
efficiency outcomes of regulation (Hanna 2001). Adequate institutional arrangements, 
political support, and the specific individual characteristics of ecosystems may 
determine how effective incentives can be. To determine how incentives interact 
within a market system, policymakers must distinguish the scale at which they are 
made, and whether the ecosystems are a common pool resource, public good, or 
market commodity. Complex institutional dimension, including social norms, may 
mean that incentive-based institutions are insufficient in managing ecosystem services 
(Goulder and Kennedy 2011). Public policy, therefore, also has a critical role to 
increase the efficient use and equitable distribution of resources where market forces 
are unable to do so. This concept will be examined in Chapter 6. 
 
Incentive-based institutions encompass a diverse mix of instruments that can 
communicate the importance of conservation (Pirard 2012a). Yet, the realisation of 
benefits for both efficient ecosystem services management and greater equity for 
resource users varies significantly in its implementation (Spiteri and Nepalz 2006, 
Fauzi 2013). The institutional structure that works best to provide incentives to 
manage land-use decisions needs to create signals that direct these decisions towards 
social goals, which reduce environmental externalities. It is therefore crucial to 
understand the context in which these institutions emerge and function to align 
policies with the reality for communities on the ground that can improve the 
effectiveness of conservation initiatives and the equity of rural development. 
 
1.6.4 The “messy” middle 
  
The reality of incentive-based or other governance institutions on the ground cannot 
always be exclusively attributed to specific theories and policies behind their 
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implementation (Lichbach 2009). Lachapelle, McCool, and Michael (2003) argue that 
the original model to manage natural resources requires conditions that are rarely 
attained in the projects in which they operate. They suggest that natural resource 
problems are, instead, typified by various and often contradictory goals, minimal 
scientific agreement on cause-effect relationships, restricted time and resources, a 
scarcity of information, and institutional inequalities related to information and 
political power. The extent to which theories can explain specific problems and 
address certain particular situations can, therefore, be described as the “messy” 
middle. This view allows for a problem-centred approach that synthesises 
perspectives and theories, and moves beyond a reductionist approach. That includes 
identifying determinants of behaviourial change, which may include institutions, 
ideas, cultural meanings, and material drivers. Weber (2009) argues that social action 
(i.e. behaviours) is based on the ‘orientation to meaning and motivation by interests.’  
This thesis seeks to explore how this “messy” middle relates to the theories driving 
institutional governance of natural resource issues. This includes social elements like 
values and norms, and dimensions like individual and community interests, identities, 
and institutions (Lichbach 2009, Lachapelle, McCool, and Michael 2003). 
 
 
1.7. Research objectives and principal research questions 
 
The research explores the complex realities on the ground related to incentives-based 
institutions, and the communities and ecosystem services on which they act. It 
investigates the distance between theories behind PES and the often-unpredictable 
policy outcomes. This is done by examining the links between governance structures 
and their ability to provide incentives for landowner land-use decisions and to 
motivate cooperative behaviours. An ecosystem services approach is applied to 
explore the challenges in enabling efficient and equitable outcomes for ecosystem 
services governance in developing countries. The use of this concept, within a SES, 
enables the investigation of interactions between ecological functions, and the 
economic, social, political, and cultural drivers that provide incentives for land-use 
decisions. This study simplifies the concept of SES into social and ecological 
outcomes that interact through institutional structures and responses. Ecological 
outcomes include: Water availability, climatic variation, spring density, forest cover, 
and elevation. Social outcomes include: Water access, wealth, infrastructure access, 
and population density. Institutional responses include: Water infrastructure and 
institutional governance. 
 
A mixed methods approach was used to address multidisciplinary social and 
environmental science issues to answer the following principal research questions: 
 
1: To what degree can institutional design be used to help determine access to, and 
availability of, natural resources? 
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2: What factors have played a role in the emergence of different institutions aimed 
at managing ecosystem services? How do these factors help to influence the 
design and function of institutions? 
 
3: Within the political, biophysical, socio-economic, and cultural contexts, how 
can institutional design help to formulate policy and determine the ‘fit’ of 
ecosystem services management approaches?  
 
4: How can institutional incentives influence behaviours that lead to greater 
compliance with ecosystem services management? 
 
5:  Can institutional incentives have a material effect on the efficiency and equity 
of ecosystem services management when placed in the wider political, 
biophysical, socio-economic, and cultural contexts? 
 
 
1.8. Structure of thesis and description of papers 
 
The thesis is presented in the structure of four research papers that will address the 
five principal research questions (Chapter 3 to 6). Chapter 2 presents an overview of 
the methods used across the case studies, and introduces the study sites. It is intended 
for each paper to be read as an individual piece of research. As such, the papers 
feature a section for background information and separate methodology. Three of the 
four papers originate from the same data collected in Lombok. Consequently, some 
data overlaps are unavoidable, particularly when describing specific research 
methods. 
 
Chapters 3 to 5 focus on Lombok, Indonesia. Chapter 3 explores the impact of water 
availability and resource access for communities across the island. Lombok is under 
pressure to provide water and other natural resources for a rapidly expanding 
population, yet within the constraints of finite resources (Klock and Sjah 2011). The 
paper address question 1, and explores the concept of ‘water scarcity,’ as perceived by 
local users and for the purpose of managing ecosystem services. It identifies how 
local users experience water stress across Lombok. The study also outlines the factors 
that affect water availability and access, and how this impacts rural communities’ 
ability to cope in times of water stress. It outlines how institutional governance can 
function to address contextual water stress issues. 
 
Chapter 4 investigates the concept of equity in resource distribution through 
incentive-based institutions. It looks at whether these institutions require inequity to 
emerge, or if they enable greater equity through the management of ecosystem 
services. Local institutions are central to determine ecosystem services conditions 
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(Agrawal and Ostrom 2001). The paper focuses on institutional use and adaptation of 
incentives to manage water resources through religious, economic, and customary 
laws that motivate collective conservation activities.  
 
This paper address questions 5, 3, and 1, and explores the equitable outcomes of 
incentive-based institutions, and how underlying power relations, and political, 
economic, social, cultural, and biophysical perspectives must be taken into account. 
This approach can enable a greater understanding of the interactions between societal 
factors and institutions, and can reduce the elite capture of benefits. 
 
For the purpose of this paper four case studies were used. One of which, Gitek 
Demung, illustrated a hybrid nature of incentives, using both local customary rules, or 
adat, and monetary means to motivate environmental behaviours. It was decided to 
include this case study as an incentive-based institution for this chapter, as there were 
strong elements of the elite capture of benefits that had emerged from parts of the 
monetized institution. In Chapter 5, however, this community was also analysed as a 
control village. This approach aimed to simplify the incentives used in the incentive-
based institution case studies in Chapter 5 to enable ease of analysis.  
 
Chapter 5 explores the extent to which incentive-based institutions, which govern 
ecosystem services, are effective when placed in the context of a specific SES. 
Institutions’ ‘fit’ with other social constructs is determined by influences and 
interactions between existing and newly created institutions. Where institutions do not 
‘fit’ a SES, governance may be weak and ecosystems can become vulnerable to 
degradation (Ekstrom and Ostrom 2009). 
 
This paper addresses questions 2, 3, and 4. Institutional ‘fit’ has critical implications 
for the design, implementation, and outcomes of incentive-based interventions on the 
ground. An understanding of how institutions ‘fit’ and interact within a socio-cultural 
context is relevant when designing incentive-based institutions to manage ecosystem 
services. A one-size-fits-all approach is unlikely to work. This paper therefore focuses 
on the need to take into account the influence and interplay of other institutions to 
increase the likelihood of compliance within a local context. 
 
Chapter 6 looks at the impact of policy reform on land-use and deforestation on 
small and large property holders in Alta Floresta, within the State of Mato Grosso, 
Brazil. The research focuses on understanding the impact of Brazil’s Forest Code 
(FC) (a hybrid market-based, government-regulated policy) reform on landowner 
decisions on the local ecosystem. Incentives to comply with policies are determined 
by trade-offs of detection, the severity of punishments, and any perceived economic 
benefit of non-compliance (Andrighetto and Villatoro 2011, Keane et al. 2008, 
Travers et al. 2011).  
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This paper addresses questions 4 and 5. It enables a greater understanding of how 
policy changes may not always generate equitable outcomes. Inequality may create 
perceptions that under policy reform, compliance for some resource users can be 
optional. Where policy provides sufficient incentives – economic and enforcement – 
motivations to comply, and not to exhaust ecosystems services, may be more likely 
(Walker et al. 2013).  
 
A conclusion of the main findings of the research, and their implications for further 
ecosystem services research and policy outcomes, is discussed in Chapter 7. 
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2 Research design, methods and study 
sites 
 
 
Research that aims to inform conservation and development interventions, such as 
incentive-based institutions, requires a multi-disciplinary aims to inform conservation 
and development interventions, such as incentive-based institutions, requires a multi-
disciplinary mixed methods approach that includes social and environmental science 
methods (Newing, Eagle, and Puri 2011). Limited comprehended of the drivers of 
land-use behaviours and the incentives necessary to alter them may arise from a 
restricted focus and narrow epistemological approach of the researcher. The use of 
social science methodologies, such as Participatory Rural Appraisal, Rapid Rural 
Appraisal, can enable local perspectives to be understood. Natural resource 
availability can be determined through the use of environmental science 
methodologies, such as spatial analysis. The combination of both of these 
methodologies can build a clear understanding of resource-use behaviours. 
 
2.1. Research design 
 
2.1.1. Case study selection 
 
This thesis used case studies from Lombok, Indonesia and Alta Floresta, Mato 
Grosso, Brazil. The conversion of natural forests to agricultural land in both Indonesia 
and Brazil has had significant impacts on the functions of local forest habitats, and the 
provision of ecosystem services at local, regional, and global scales. This ecological 
change has also had significant affects on agricultural and rural development (Tomich 
et al. 1998).  
 
Land-use patterns vary significantly between Lombok and Alta Floresta. The 
differences are the result of factors such as land type, agricultural use, natural 
resource availability, landowner capital, and the implementation of institutions that 
guide land-use decisions (Lambin et al. 2001, Meyfroidt, Rudel, and Lambin 2010). 
In Lombok, small landholders, densely populated communities, expanding 
settlements, and resource use dominate land-use change. Natural resources are 
managed through regional government regulation, subsidies, and small-scale 
community institutions. In contrast, land-use change patterns in Alta Floresta are 
driven by large-scale agricultural expansion where the benefits of deforestation 
significantly outweigh that of forest conservation (Angelsen and Kaimowitz 1999, 
Ewers et al. 2009). In this Brazilian case study, ecosystems are managed through 
government policies, subsidies, and hybrid market-based approaches.  
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Several questions arise from the use of these two different study sites in this thesis. 
Specifically, whether the same ecosystem services approach can be applied to 
examine the equity and efficiency implications of institutional management that 
provides incentives for positive land-use behaviours; and, whether equity and 
efficiency implications can be examined across different governance mechanisms. 
Landowner behaviour in both locations is influenced by political, socio-economic, 
biophysical constraints. Complex interactions between socio-political actors and 
ecological processes determine land-use decisions at local, regional, national, and 
international scales (Munroe and Muller 2007). This thesis explores these interactions 
across the Lombok and Alta Floresta study sites, and how interlinked institutional 
relationships determine landowner decisions through ‘PES-like’ local-scale initiatives 
in Lombok, and regional-scale hybrid state regulations and market-like mechanisms 
in Alta Floresta.  
 
‘PES-like’ and hybrid market-based institutions 
 
The use of a strict definition of PES is difficult when using empirical data because of 
the specific contextual nature of each case study. For the purpose of this thesis, the 
research will use Muradian’s (2013) argument of ‘incentives for collective action’ – 
i.e. individual landowner actions that result in community – or regional-wide positive 
environmental behaviours. That definition allows for the comparison of the ‘PES-like’ 
and hybrid market-based and government-regulated case studies within the existing 
literature on incentive-based mechanisms.  
 
How these case studies answer the research questions? 
 
The use of these case studies illustrates how initiatives that provide incentives to 
manage ecosystem services can be developed from existing policies, social norms, 
and collective activities (Muradian et al. 2013). This approach builds on the broader 
concept of valuation of ecosystem services, and how the use of incentive-based 
institutions can motivate landowner behaviour in relation to these values. These case 
studies highlight that the realities of implementing community-led and policy-driven 
governance are not systematic. They also demonstrate how dynamics between these 
existing dimensions, and the drivers of ecosystem services use, influence land-use 
decisions. Both Lombok and Alta Floresta provide examples of why understanding 
context in governance design, as well as allowing for the non-rationale nature of 
human behaviour in the real world, is important. 
 
The Alta Floresta case study offers a broad regional view on the impact of large-scale 
governance mechanisms, which are used to motivate land-use decisions to protect 
forests and watersheds. This was achieved through regulation and, more recently, 
market-based offsets. The Lombok case study illustrates that the small-scale nature of 
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institutions can provide a detailed understanding of how incentives manage watershed 
at local levels. 
 
 
2.2. Methods 
 
2.2.1 Methodology 
 
A mixed methods approach was used in this study. This allowed biophysical 
quantitative and socio-cultural and economic qualitative data to be integrated, and 
associations between data to be analysed (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004, Sumner 
and Tribe 2008). An integrated understanding of the social, ecological, political, and 
economic processes within the SESs was required to understand how incentive-based 
institutions governed ecosystem services and the dynamic changes within them. The 
interdisciplinary nature of the research draws on the empiricist approaches of natural 
science. This thesis therefore takes a critical realist ontological perspective. The 
objective social reality of these environmental behaviours, while assumed to exist 
externally to human beings, can only be known imperfectly (Piergiorgio 2003). The 
integration of a pluralistic methodological approach enabled the acknowledgement of 
these perceptions and their influence on personal beliefs, and therefore behaviours. 
This approach provided a more holistic understanding of the issues surrounding 
incentive-based institutions in both Lombok and Alta Floresta.  
 
The use of mixed methods also enabled data to be collected concurrently.  This 
strategy allowed different question types to be employed (closed and open), data to be 
validated through triangulation, and the comparison of data through transformation 
(Driscoll et al. 2007). Spatial analysis of satellite images and environmental datasets 
also allowed patterns of land use to be mapped and quantified under different 
institutional governance structures. This approach is useful to understand the scope 
and scale of ecosystems, how their services may be valued by landowners, and how 
management approaches are implemented (Nelson et al. 2009). Spatial analysis 
highlighted synergies and trade-offs between multiple ecosystem services, 
conservation policies, and economic and socio-cultural values of the land (Berry et al. 
2005). This method was predominantly used in Chapter 6 to examine the impact of 
changes in ecosystem management requirements on land-use decisions and the 
provision of water and forest ecosystem services; and, in Chapter 1, to determine 
water access and resource availability for rural households across Lombok, and the 
implications of this availability for each household. 
 
For socio-economic data collected within Lombok (Chapters 3 to 5), a combination of 
questionnaire-based interviews, rapid rural appraisal (RRA) and participatory rural 
appraisal (PRA) techniques were employed. Consequently, data on socio-economic 
status, economic use of natural resources, and perceived values of the environment 
could be collected in both qualitative and quantitative formats. Methods based on 
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these PRA and RRA principles enabled greater participation from, and interaction 
with, communities involved in the study (Chambers 1994b). This approach also 
allowed for a deeper understanding of the complexities of a topic. In particular, the 
perspectives and motivation for certain behaviours through on-site learning, flexible 
methods, local participation, and feedback of research findings (Chambers 1994a). 
The high level of study community involvement allowed a degree of ownership, and 
also enabled less vocal groups in communities, such as women and the poor, to be 
acknowledged and to participate. 
 
Central to PRA and RRA are techniques such as semi-structured interviews, focus 
groups, and participatory mapping (Chambers 1994a, Mukherjee 1997). Homogenous 
focus groups enabled the relaxed discussion of opinions, understandings and 
perceptions of concepts, and the social-ecological system. The combination of these 
methods allowed information to be triangulated and to gain further insights into the 
topic outside potential restrictions of the questionnaires. There were, however 
limitations to this methodological approach. Semi-structured questionnaires were built 
around the interviewer’s perception of the drivers of behaviour, and socio-economic 
and environmental values within an SES. As such, the data gathered from the study 
sites should be considered objective (Mukherjee 1997). 
 
A pilot of the questionnaire was useful to reduce the potential bias from outsider 
perceptions. This was conducted for both the questionnaire and focus groups in 
Lombok. It identified local perceptions of the topic that may have differed from that 
of the researcher, and areas of the questionnaire that required clarification for 
respondents. The pilot aimed to reduce the potential bias arising from outsider 
perceptions of the drivers and roles of behaviours and values towards the 
environment. Questions were ordered in a logical manner, related topics grouped 
together, and general questions directed to precede specific questions (Saunders, 
Lewis, and Thornhill 2003). Open-ended questions obtained more qualitative data, 
and structured closed questions generated quantitative data that allowed for numerical 
analysis of responses.  
 
Triangulation was also used to cross-check answers and reduce some of the bias in 
responses. There was an assumption that individuals’ responses were truthful. 
However, outsider behaviour, and answers about controlled and compliant 
behaviours, may have had significant influence on responses. Rapid appraisal of 
communities, in particular to understand local perceptions and values, may not always 
be appropriate to understand long-term social change and underlying cultural norms 
(Mukherjee 1997). 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, however, this methodology was useful to gain insights 
of the underlying motivations behind behaviours and values, and access and 
availability to resources. This is important when dealing with the problematic nature 
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of PES definitions, the social norms that underpin cultural activities, and the 
underlying religious sentiment present in most surveyed villages. The highly 
contextual cultural constructs of values, both real and perceived, were often 
dependent on the resource and the society in question (Brondízio et al. 2009). For this 
analysis, a distinction was made between those communities that actively governed 
through incentive-based institutions, compared to those that governed merely through 
underlying social norms.  
 
2.2.2 Application of methodology 
 
This section introduces the application of the above approaches through the two case 
studies. Primary and secondary data was used and collated for the purpose of this 
thesis.  
 
Two field seasons with a total of nine months was spent in rural Lombok to collect 
primary data from household surveys, focus groups, and key informant interviews. 
Permission to conduct research in Lombok was granted by the Ministry of State for 
Research and Technology (RISTEK), Indonesia with institutional support on Lombok 
from the University of UNRAM and CSIRO, Australia. Between November and 
December 2011, preliminary focus groups and pilot household surveys were 
completed. This first field season introduced the researcher and the study to the 
communities involved, and refined the research methodology. A second season of 
research was conducted between May and November 2012 during which time in-
depth questionnaires, focus groups, and informal informant interviews were 
conducted in case study communities across Lombok. 
 
Different approaches to reasoning may evoke different interpretations to be drawn. 
Inductive reasoning was used for both of these case studies to determine causation. 
This approach enabled open-ended and exploratory observations of rural communities 
to be made and behavioural patterns to be deduced by the researcher. The data alone 
was used as the basis to derive empirical generalisations and theoretical conclusions 
(Miller and Brewer 2003). 
 
Lombok – Questionnaire-based interviews 
 
Two separate household surveys were conducted on Lombok. The first was based on 
RRA principles to collect baseline data from ten households in 30 villages across 
Lombok, totalling 300 surveys. These villages, and the household respondents, were 
randomly selected. This selection aimed to generate a representative sample of 
communities and their use of natural resources across the different land types on 
Lombok (Kothari 2004). This survey used semi-structured interviews to determine 
socio-economic status, access to and availability of water resources, and agricultural 
revenue across the island in relation to effort to obtain water as a unit per household. 
Secondary data from International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs), such 
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as Fauna Flora International (FFI), and BAPPEDA (Badan Perencana Pembangunan 
Daerah, or Regional Body for Planning and Development) were used to generate 
spatial analysis of environmental data using ArcGIS, included in Chapter 3. This data 
included information on vegetation type, average annual rainfall, elevation, and water 
availability. Analysis of both questionnaires and environmental data was conducted at 
village level. 
 
The second survey used PRA principles and methods to obtain baseline data and an 
in-depth understanding of values and social norms for both communities with and 
without incentive-based institutions. Approximately 30 households were surveyed 
across six villages, totalling 171 respondents. A comparative case study approach was 
used between communities with incentive-based institutions and appropriate control 
communities (Yin 2003). This survey used both semi-structured interviews and focus 
group discussions to determine socio-economic status, access to and availability of 
natural resources, and impacts and perceptions of institutions to manage the 
environment. Analysis was conducted using both community and household level 
responses. Triangulation through focus group discussions and informal interviews 
provided more in-depth understanding of contexts and institutional functions. 
 
One of the research assistants, Dipta Sjah, translated questions into Bahasa 
Indonesian. Prior to conducting interviews, it was ensured that all research assistants 
understood the information required from the survey. It was also often necessary to 
translate the Bahasa Indonesian questionnaire into Sasak. In translating the 
questionnaires twice, however, it was apparent that some information and colloquial 
understanding might have been lost in translation and cultural understanding. 
However, this bias could not be avoided, as it was essential to communicate in both 
languages in rural areas of Lombok. 
 
i. Socio-economic status 
 
Data on household structure was obtained regarding, age, years in education, 
occupation, religion, and time in village. Information regarding livelihoods was also 
gathered to identify the natural resources obtained from the environment. A wealth 
ranking proxy was used within both surveys. Land tenure, area of land farmed, and 
crop type grown were also an important indicator of land use across the study sites. 
 
Determining socio-economic status through wealth ranking is useful to identify 
households’ responses in relation to their wealth and perception of wealth (Chambers 
1994a). This can be deduced using indicators such as household income, assets, 
education levels, expenditure, and housing characteristics (Rutstein and Johnson 
2004). Due to time constraints and the easy access to credit across Lombok, it was not 
feasible to conduct rigorous wealth ranking, as standardisation proved difficult. 
Therefore, both surveys generated a wealth proxy of house size (number of rooms) to 
determine household socio-economic status, under the assumption that the larger the 
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house, the wealthier the household. This was developed following pilot focus group 
discussion of household wealth indicators.  
 
ii. Water and land resources 
 
This section of the questionnaire was conducted to establish a base understanding of 
availability of, and access to, water resources for household consumption. These 
questions were included in both household surveys. Information was obtained on 
water infrastructure, effort to obtain water, water quality, and extreme water events 
such as flooding and drought that had affected households. Data was also collected on 
direct use benefits from the environment, such as NTFPs, timber, and agricultural 
revenue. This data were used in the first survey to determine revenues across the 
island in relation to effort to obtain household water. 
 
iii. Values 
 
Respondents’ values of the environment and their perception of institutions (see 
paragraph below) were included in the second survey. Identification of environmental 
values was useful to establish the context in which natural resources were used, and, 
therefore, to later understand the role of institutions, their ‘fit,’ and equity outcomes. 
Questions examined respondents’ perceptions of the environment, the benefits 
obtained from its services, and where they believed institutional responsibility was 
held.  
 
iv. Incentive-based institutions 
 
It is difficult to untangle the complex and dynamic roles of multiple institutions 
within rural communities. It is likely incentive-institutions are influence by, and 
interact with, other existing institutions. To understand the impact of incentive-based 
institutions, and whether they were aligned within local contexts, respondents were 
asked questions on the existence of, and their participation in, local institutions. For 
the purpose of this study, respondents’ participation was defined as being a member 
of, or adhering to, the belief system and socio-cultural norms of an institutional group. 
Following focus group discussions, these institutions were grouped as: Village 
management, Religious, Farmer groups, Traditional/ Awiq-awiq/ Adat, and Other. 
Data was also collected on respondent perception and understanding of environmental 
management in their communities: Why it had emerged; What the rules were; Who is 
involved in decision-making; and, Whether compliance was enforced. 
 
Alta Floresta – Spatial analysis 
 
Spatial analysis was used to examine land-use decisions under changing policy 
requirements in Alta Floresta. Spatial analysis was useful to identify relationships 
between ecological, social, and economic values of natural areas (Bryan et al. 2010). 
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For Alta Floresta, this method enabled trade-offs between conservation and economic 
gain to be examined, and the implications for the efficiency and equity of ecosystem 
management to be understood. This was conducted using eight 2008 QuickBird 
images of 10m resolution to determine land cover, and two LANDSAT-5/TM images 
of 60m resolution to determine deforestation rates between 2002-2011. The images 
were classified using band 3 (0.63-0.69µm), band 4 (0.76-0.90 µm), and band 5 (1.55-
1.75 µm) in IDRISI and ArcGIS, and projected on UTM 21S (datum SAD69). The 
high-resolution images allowed distinct land cover to be categorised as: forest, 
pasture, scrubland, water, and bare-ground. Ground-truthing of property boundaries 
was conducted by the municipal administration of Alta Floresta, which determined 
geographic position and property size.  
 
Data illustrating deforestation rates between 2002 and 2011 in Alta Floresta were 
obtained from PRODES, the deforestation monitoring program at the Brazilian 
National Institute for Space Research (INPE). Two LANDSAT-5/TM images dated 
2008 and 2011 of the municipal district were used and overlaid onto the QuickBird 
images. 
 
i. Socio-economic status 
 
Within Alta Floresta, cattle ranching accounts for more than 95% of revenue from 
land use. Cattle-herd size was therefore used as a proxy to determine wealth ranking 
between properties. Based on property interview data, pasture area explained 86.7% 
of cattle-herd size and a mean density of 2.07 head per hectare of pasture was 
calculated for each property (M. Medeiros, unpublished data). 
 
2.2.3 Measures of compliance 
 
Compliance to policy requirements through forest set-asides and reforestation was 
determined using ArcGIS spatial analysis tools. Differences between compliance 
under requirements for the reformed and original legislation were calculated to 
determine local landowners’ ‘amnesty’ under the legislation. The addition of 
deforestation data, while increasing the potential of bias due to differences in 
resolution, provided a clearer indication of legislation efficiency in managing 
ecosystem services and influencing land-use decisions, as well as differences in equity 
between landowner economic statuses.  
 
 
2.2.4 Measuring equity and efficiency 
 
A lack of baseline data for the Lombok case studies meant that it was beyond the 
scope of this research to determine whether outcomes were attributed to specific 
incentive-based approaches or to other factors within the socio-ecological system 
(Ferraro 2009). However, similarities and distinguishing characteristics between 
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communities with incentive-based institutions and control villages were used to 
identify links to the equitable distribution of benefits and resources, and the efficiency 
of governance mechanisms (Pascual et al. 2010). These characteristics included: 
Effort to obtain water; Level of participation in institutions and decision-making; 
Local perceptions of environmental responsibility; and, The conservation of natural 
resources (i.e. provision of ecosystem services). 
 
In Alta Floresta, however, this study was able to determine efficiency and equity 
outcomes of natural resource governance. This analysis was conducted through the 
application of different institutional forest set-aside requirements under original and 
revised policy instruments. Efficiency was measured through the extent of forest 
ecosystem that was protected, i.e. level of compliance. Equity was measured as a 
distribution of policy reform benefits across different landowner wealth rankings, and 
landowners’ ability to meet reforestation requirements and enter the market for 
deforestation offsets.   
 
2.2.5 Measuring interplay and ‘fit’ 
 
While there is much discussion on institutional interplay and fit within the existing 
literature, clear definitions are still lacking. Key elements that are suggested to 
enhance institution fit through SES adaptive management are, however, described by 
Galaz et al. (2008) and Olsson et al. (2007). These elements were developed to 
identify indicators of fit between ecosystem dynamics and institutional governance 
systems within the case studies. They included: Bridging organisations between local 
actors and communities with other institutions; Leadership; Focus of resource 
management; Timing; and Adaptability. The presence and extent of these elements 
indicated the degree of institutional ‘fit’ or ‘mis-fit’ within the case studies. Where 
institutions ‘fit’ local community contexts, interplay was assumed to be positive. 
 
2.2.6 Analysis 
 
Qualitative and quantitative data analysis was used to identify significant variables 
within each chapter. Questionnaire data was coded and recorded in Excel. Spatial data 
was extracted from ArcGIS and also recorded in Excel, log-transforming data where 
necessary to control for non-normal distribution (Osbourne 2002). For normally 
distributed data of continuous variables, parametric tests were used (regression, t-
test). Data that was ‘distribution free’ and, therefore, did not fit the assumptions of 
parametric tests was analysed using non-parametric tests for rank and categorical 
variables (Mann-Whitney U test, Spearman rank correlation coefficient, Chi-squared) 
(Fowler, Cohen, and Jarvis 1998). Spatially-explicit General Linear Mixed Models 
(GLMM) were used to test the relationship of fixed and random effects of landowner 
compliance (Chapter 6). This model was used to analyse land-use decisions within 
hydrological basins and to control pseudo-replication (Bolker et al. 2009). All 
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analysis was conducted within Stata 12.0 and NVIVO. Statistical significance was 
measured with a probability value of 0.05. 
 
 
2.3. Study site selection 
 
Two different study sites were selected to examine the issues of equity and efficiency 
in managing ecosystem services by the provision of incentives for land-use decisions. 
It was important to select case studies that highlighted the social, cultural, economic, 
biophysical, and political dimensions that influence these decisions. It was imperative 
to understand how the dynamics of these dimensions impacted these decisions, and 
therefore equity and efficiency outcomes of ecosystem management.  
 
The Lombok case studies presented in this thesis illustrated how these contexts 
influenced access to and availability of natural resources, and, therefore, how 
institutions developed to manage resulting land-use decisions. This provided an small-
scale arena in which to examine how – with different drivers of resource use and 
management – institutions aligned with the contexts in which they functioned. This 
was demonstrated through the diversity of stakeholders, and how individuals placed 
different demands on the use of common pool resources.  
 
The study communities were specifically chosen because of the existence of 
incentive-based institutions that influenced land-use decisions and managed 
ecosystem services provision. Each mechanism was designed to provide incentives 
for environmental behaviours to benefit downstream users and protect the functional 
environment. These programs used religious motivations, traditional adat social 
norms, and economic compensation to encourage more sustainable use of water and 
forest resources. The communities and local governance institutions managed two 
separate schemes at the village level, and a third scheme was initiated and managed 
externally by an intermediary stakeholder group. To measure the impacts of incentive-
based institutions on access to and availability of resources, land-use decisions, 
environmental values, and perception of benefits, appropriate control communities 
were selected through matching (Pattanayak 2009). These were chosen due to their 
comparative experience of environmental resource issues (i.e. in close proximity to 
incentive-based institution communities, within the same watershed, at the same 
altitude etc.), and similar population sizes, water supply, and socio-cultural and 
economic statuses.  
 
The Alta Floresta case study presented in this thesis illustrated to what extent 
ecosystem services management can be used to provide incentives for compliant land-
use decisions. It was important to identify how the institution, in particular after its 
reform, affected landowner agricultural efficiency (in terms of productivity and 
revenue) and how socio-economic status impacted the ability (and desire) of 
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landowners to comply with conservation requirements or to enter a market to offset 
illegal environmental behaviours. This case study offered a broad regional view on 
the impact of large-scale government mechanisms, which were used to motivate 
landowner behaviour. The municipal district of Alta Floresta was chosen to examine 
and model the relationships between landowners and the social, biophysical, 
economic, and political contexts in which they made land-use decisions, and the 
efficiency and equity outcomes of institutional governance. The landscape was clearly 
defined as pasture or forest, which enabled a clear spatial analysis of the relationship 
between economic ability to meet the cost of compliance and the conservation of 
forest ecosystem services. 
 
In the following section, the study sites are discussed in more depth and the 
institutions are examined that manage ecosystem services. 
 
2.3.1 Study site: Lombok, Indonesia 
 
Lombok, Indonesia, the ‘Island of a Thousand Mosques,’ is an island within the Nusa 
Tenggara Barat Province, eastern Indonesia. As one of the most densely populated 
islands in Indonesia, with a population nearing 4 million people, there is intense 
pressure on limited island resources to meet growing population and agricultural 
demands. Expanding settlements, agricultural intensification, and inadequate 
infrastructure are degrading upper catchment areas. This significantly affects water 
availability (Pirard 2012, WWF-Indonesia 2001). The impact on water resources 
contributes to hydrological ecosystem services stress, and creates issues for 
sustainably managing water supplies (Klock and Sjah 2007). 
 
After the 1997 fall of President Soeharto’s centralized ‘New Order’ regime, 
significant changes in formal governance have taken place throughout Indonesia. The 
reforms of the political system were called Reformasi. These included the 
decentralisation of governance to provincial, district, and local levels. It has resulted 
in shifts in formal governance and the realignment of power relations. Some argue, 
however, that decentralization of governance has merely ‘reorganized, but not 
transformed’ power relations in local contexts (Fritzen 2007). Indonesia contains 
multiple traditional, religious, ethnic, economic, and political institutions. The 
complex mix of complementary and competing institutions has had a varied impact at 
local and regional levels (Ostrom et al. 1999). 
 
 
Ecosystem services management on Lombok 
 
Ecosystem services management on Lombok is complex. There is significant 
variability in topography, climate, land-use, and governance institutions across the 
island. Multiple institutions have emerged during the Reformasi period to govern 
ecosystem services. This institutional response presents a highly applicable 
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framework in which to research the emergence of institutions that are designed to 
manage ecosystem services for greater equity of resource distribution and sufficiency 
of use. 
 
The province is divided into four regencies (kabupaten), and one municipality 
(kotamadya): Mataram City, West Lombok, North Lombok, East Lombok and 
Central Lombok. Within each kabupaten, the land is divided into villages (desa) and 
sub-villages or hamlets (dusun). Farms on Lombok, as with much of Indonesia, are 
small-scale, and often cover less than 0.5ha. Tenure is difficult to ascertain in 
Indonesia. Different interpretations of unclear formal and customary laws undermine 
land rights and existing complex land registration systems (Resosudarmo et al. 2014). 
Land tenure is also determined by its location. Outside forested lands, the Basic 
Agrarian Law (1960) secures land tenure through titles. Within forested lands, the 
New Forestry Law (1999) provides management and lease rights. Legitimate de jure 
land rights are difficult to obtain and communities frequently act with customary de 
facto rights. This structure creates complex conflict between customary and statutory 
land tenure (Resosudarmo et al. 2014). 
 
Multiple institutions, from central and regional government to local customary laws, 
manage land and water conservation strategies on Lombok. At local desa and dusun 
levels, water is managed through two institutions: Water User Associations (WUAs) 
and Subak (a tradition-based institution). As part of decentralization of water 
management, WUAs were introduced in the early 1980s by the government 
throughout Indonesia (Klock and Sjah 2007). Subak is a traditional institution, which 
enables water distribution through payments for irrigation access (Sayuti et al. 2004). 
 
Traditional local Lombok Sasak customary laws are also influential in protecting 
forests around springs to enable water flow. This thesis focused on WUAs on 
Lombok, and how they used different approaches to provide incentives for ecosystem 
conservation for water provision. Monthly, in-kind, payments called suwinih were 
made to WUAs for infrastructure maintenance and WUA officers. The amount varied 
across Lombok between US$1-3 (Klock and Sjah 2007). This study used incentive-
based approaches by WUAs to study how the motivation of behaviours enabled more 
effective and equitable water allocation and ecosystem services management. For the 
purpose of this thesis, case studies were defined as ‘incentive-based’ when WUAs 
used incentives to motivate behaviours, and ‘control’ when WUAs did not use 
incentives. Other institutions to manage natural resources were in existence in both 
‘incentive-based’ and ‘control’ study sites. But for the purpose of this study, a focus 
was placed on the elements of natural resource institutions that provided incentives 
for pro-environmental behaviour. 
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Description of case studies: Lombok 
 
i. Religious - Asih Tigasah, Ledang Nangka Village, East Lombok 
Regency 
 
The community-based programme in Ledang Nangka was initiated in 1993 by the 
local village government to reduce conflict over water access. Situated on the plains 
below Mount Rinjani, deforestation is not a direct threat to water supply, but 
agricultural and population expansion has placed increased pressure on access to the 
resource. A local water management company, BUMDES, was created to reduce 
conflict and maintain water supply to households and the local mosque. Monthly 
payments are made to BUMDES to manage the programme, maintain and pump water 
to households and the mosque, and oversee a community embung (reservoir). Non-
compliance by community members led to fines or removal of access to the piped 
water infrastructure. 
 
The mosque played a central role in this community programme, and retained 45% of 
all payments. Religious sentiment is prevalent throughout Lombok, but is particularly 
apparent in East Lombok Regency where orthodox Islam underpins much of society 
and policy (Klock and Sjah 2011). In Ledang Nangka village, programme activities 
like budgets, and communal activities to maintain water supply and project 
developments, were communicated in the mosque during Friday prayers. Virtually all 
community members attended the mosque, and this communication was an effective 
mechanism to enable transparency. The use of the mosque to communicate 
programme details and requirements also enabled BUMDES to draw on the 
community’s religious heritage to ensure adherence to rules surrounding water 
resources. 
 
ii. Traditional - Gangga, Genggelang Village, North Lombok Regency 
 
Traditional Sasak customary laws known as adat play a key role in certain Lombok 
communities. The laws determine and control individual and collective behaviours 
(Krulfeld 1966). Adat in Gangga used awiq-awiq, the adat law of the village, to 
motivate collective activities to manage the environment. Situated at the top of the 
water catchment, close to the border with Mount Rinjani Protected Forest, the village 
had experienced significant conflict with other communities over water supply. Illegal 
logging by outside companies following the decentralization of power also degraded 
the forest around springs that supply water. 
 
Significant importance is place on adat in the more traditional communities found in 
North Lombok. Islam still plays a role in the societal beliefs and norms of adat 
communities. The religion divides Sasak culture into Waktu Lima and Wetu Telu 
communities. Waktu Lima follow a more orthodox Mecca-oriented version of Islam, 
based on the Sunni sub-sect of the religion. Wetu Telu, the religious minority, follow 
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certain orthodox Islamic principles, but also draw on local, pre-Islamic norms that 
share a common ancestry with Hinduism and Buddhism (Harnish 2005, Avonius 
2003). 
 
Islam has been “driving force of change” in Lombok (Harnish 2005). Inter-Islamic 
conflict between Wetu Telu and Waktu Lima remains with adat activities (Avonius 
2003). Under the New Order regime of former President Soeharto, Wetu Telu 
customs were punishable and individuals participating in these religious rituals could 
be arrested. Since the Reformasi era began, there has been a revival in adat, which 
has gained significant influence in the community governance structures in northern 
Lombok (Avonius 2003). Wetu Telu, or ‘three laws,’ now refers to adat, agama 
(state sanctioned world religions), and pemerintahan (government and civil law). 
 
Adat in Gangga was based on a network of mutual social obligations that enabled 
community organization. The community used adat to develop informal institutional 
rules, or awiq-awiq, to deal with conflict over water use and protect further 
degradation of forest resources. These informal rules aimed to ensure greater equity in 
resource access. They also focused on the management of infrastructure to prevent 
future extreme drought events. 
 
Awiq-awiq regulated the protection of forest around springs (33ha) by prohibiting 
logging and land degradation. It also supported pipe water infrastructure through ad 
hoc payments. Non-compliance with community obligations was met with maliq, or 
taboo in nature, and was punished through the removal of household piped access or 
fines. Awiq-awiq in Gangga relied on collective activities to protect natural resources. 
It was based on the use of accepted social norms to encourage positive environmental 
and social behaviours, which ensured water resource sustainability. 
 
iii. Economic - Lebah Suren, Sedau Village, West Lombok Regency 
 
The economic incentive-based scheme in the Dodokan watershed, West Lombok 
Regency was the closest case study to a archetypal PES scheme on Lombok, based on 
Wunder’s (2005, 2006) criteria. High levels of land degradation, illegal logging in the 
Mount Rinjani protected forest, and unsustainable harvesting practices have decreased 
the quality and quantity of local water resources. (Prasetyo et al. 2009, Fauzi and 
Anna 2013). Rising levels of tourism and urban expansion also have increased 
demand for ecosystem-related products, and have worsened habitat degradation. The 
increased pressure on springs for water reduced the overall number of springs by 40% 
since 2003, (Fauzi and Anna 2013, WWF-Indonesia 2001, Prasetyo et al. 2009). 
 
To restore the watershed, following an economic valuation by WWF Indonesia-Nusa 
Tenggara Program and a willingness-to-pay assessment by KONSEPSI (a local 
NGO), a beneficiaries-financed scheme was initiated in 2007 that was based on 
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administrative contracts (de Buren 2013, Prasetyo et al. 2009). By providing financial 
incentives to upstream communities, the project aimed to conserve and restore forest 
areas, particularly around springs. An intermediary public body – IMP (Institut Multi 
Pihak) – of multi-actor stakeholders, which consisted of local government agencies, 
NGOs, Lombok’s drinking water company (PDAM), and representatives of upstream 
communities, implemented the scheme. 
 
Lombok’s local regulation, Peraturan Daerah 4/2007, on the management of 
environmental services includes provisions for “PES.” These rules provided the basis 
on which to add a monthly tariff on water rates in West Lombok Regency and 
Mataram Municipality of Rp 1,000 (US $1) per household. The program came into 
force in 2009. Conditional agreements between providers and the IMP began in 2010. 
The IMP allocated funds for forest restoration through tree nurseries and the planting 
of trees in community forest (HKm) areas in upstream regions to compensate for 
unsustainable harvest practices and land use. To date, more than Rp 445 million 
(US $45,500) has been distributed to four farmer groups in various villages that cover 
approximately 300ha of upstream forest land (Fauzi and Anna 2013). The selection 
process for community proposals to receive payments was unclear. There also was 
little, if any, control or mapping of conditional activities, and it was difficult to 
ascertain the program’s level of success (de Buren 2013). The control of fund 
transfers from users to providers through legislated tax undermined the voluntary 
nature of PES. Legal loopholes also allowed the Mataram Municipality to avoid the 
tax contributions within the West Lombok Regency. 
 
Lebah Suren is a community that receives funding from IMP under the PES-like 
scheme. A single farmer group, who owns land within the HKm community forest, 
received finance towards the restoration of deforested land through the plantation of 
fruit and timber trees. The group also received money for “economic development.” 
This development funding was a flexible payment to provide micro-finance within the 
community. To date, only one year of payment has been received in 2011 and the 
community “will not be applying again as [they] do not have the need,” village head, 
Lebah Suren. Much of the community was focused on sustaining two communally 
owned hydroelectric power generators that provide electricity for the sub-village. This 
focus drove forest protection, as the community must maintain water flow and foster 
collective activities such as pipe maintenance to prevent “people downstream taking 
too much water”. 
 
While this case study exhibited user-pays principles and directness, it did not fulfil all 
of the criteria for a typical PES scheme as documented in the existing literature. It did 
not meet the criteria of conditionality, voluntary contracts, and additionality (Engel, 
Pagiola, and Wunder 2008, Ferraro and Simpson 2002, Kemkes, Farley, and Koliba 
2010, Muradian et al. 2010, Sommerville et al. 2010, Tacconi, Mahanty, and Suich 
2011, Wunder 2005, 2006, Wunder, Engel, and Pagiola 2008). Conditionality within 
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the program was weak due to a lack of continued payments to community groups and 
low levels of monitoring and enforcement. It also was difficult to determine the extent 
of additionality in Lebah Suren, as there were multiple institutions at play within the 
community. 
 
2.3.2 Alta Floresta, Mato Grosso, Brazil 
 
The highly biodiverse Brazilian Amazon ecosystem provides multiple ecosystem 
services which benefit local, regional, and global environments and communities (de 
Souza, Miziara, and Junior 2013). The protection and maintenance of these ecosystem 
services, however, compete with the growing demand to convert forest habitats for 
agricultural land. The complex social, economic, ecological, and political processes 
and interactions drive deforestation of native vegetation in rural land-use systems. 
This is having an impact on the function of forest habitats and hydrological systems, 
through the loss and degradation of riparian forest areas. 
 
Since 2005, overall deforestation has decelerated, with a reduction of 70 % between 
2005 to 2013 (Nepstad et al. 2014). This has been based on a combination of 
increased political focus to address the drivers of deforestation through regional 
policies; punishment for illegal forest clearance such as the introduction of restrictions 
on access to markets and rural credit, fines and embargoes; and a period of low 
commodity prices (Della-Nora et al. 2014). Further legislation expanded protected 
areas and indigenous territories by 68 %, which now cover 47 % of the Brazilian 
Amazon (Nepstad et al. 2014).  
 
For the agro-industrial Amazon frontier, however, deforestation remains relatively 
high, particularly within private properties (Rosa, Souza, and Ewers 2012, Bowman et 
al. 2012). The drivers of deforestation and their impact on land-use decisions remain. 
These include: Landowner response to commodity markets, and an increased global 
demand for soy and beef products; Economic subsidies to expand pasture; Weak 
enforcement and monitoring; and, Corruption (Brando et al. 2013). This results in 
inefficient management of ecosystem services and inequitable outcomes in addressing 
deforestation. The outcome of the recent implementation of institutional reform to 
motivate landowners to protect forest within private properties is, as yet, unknown. 
This may have implications for both private landowners and the provision of 
ecosystem services. 
 
Ecosystem services management in Brazil 
 
Forest ecosystems and the services they provide are managed and protected through 
multiple policies and regulations in Brazil. These include national policies such as the 
National Plan for Deforestation Reduction in 2004 and the National Policy on Climate 
Change in 2010. In total, protected areas, indigenous reserves, and legislation requires 
the protection of forest on private properties. With approximately 53 % of native 
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vegetation based within private properties, the conservation of forestry resources in 
these landholdings is important to maintain ecosystem function. The policy and 
regulatory approach has attempted to manage land conversion for agricultural 
expansion on private properties through the Brazilian Forest Code (FC) (Soares-Filho 
et al. 2014, Stickler et al. 2013). 
 
iv. Case study description: Alta Floresta, Mato Grosso 
 
The municipality of Alta Floresta within the State of Mato Grosso, Brazil is situated 
along the ‘Arc of deforestation’ in the Amazon. Land conversion to meet growing 
agricultural demands for cattle ranching and monoculture cropland expansion has 
driven deforestation (Rosa, Souza, and Ewers 2012, Rudel 2005, Lapola et al. 2014) 
(Aguiar, Camara, and Escada 2007, Fearnside 2005, Laurance et al. 2002, Michalski, 
Metzger, and Peres 2010). Rates of deforestation are sensitive to socio-ecological 
system dimensions and interactions. In particular, political change, economic markets, 
and demographic fluctuations impact deforestation behaviours (Rosa, Souza, and 
Ewers 2012, Rudel 2005). Land conversion as a result of deforestation has a 
significant impact on ecosystem services across multiple scales (Hayhoe et al. 2011, 
Fearnside 2005). In large-scale basins such as the Amazon, the governance of 
ecosystem services requires an effective and high-impact response. 
 
The FC was implemented in 1965 and required private landowners to maintain 80 % 
of their land as legal reserves of forest, and to protect riparian forests along rivers and 
streams. For private landowners, there was considerable opportunity cost in setting 
aside land that could potentially be used for agricultural revenue. For ecosystem 
services, further deforestation risked habitat fragmentation, changes to hydrological 
services through loss of riparian forests, and loss of biodiversity, carbon storage, and 
soil nutrition. The FC implementation has generated controversy from both 
landowners and those looking to conserve forest and slow deforestation (Stickler et al. 
2013). Attempts to reconcile landowners’ desires to maximize utility with forest 
conservation have been complex. A lack of legislative clarity, weak enforcement, the 
perceived cost of compliance, and high agricultural revenues were influential in the 
outcomes of the FC in changing landowner behaviour. 
 
Changes in 2012 to the Brazilian FC governance of forest ecosystem services on 
private properties significantly reduced conservation requirements. These policy 
changes created divergent benefits for small and large properties. That includes 
different implications related to the amnesty of environmental debt and the 
opportunity to purchase or sell surplus forest areas to offset forest areas on non-
compliance. The impacts of these differences on providing incentives for compliance 
presented a highly applicable case study, in which to research the equity of large-scale 
ecosystem services management institutions and their influence on land-use 
behaviours. 
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2.4. A critical reflection on the different methods used in Lombok 
and Alta Floresta 
 
As with all methodologies and their application, there are limitations and constraints 
to the case studies used in this thesis. The use of the two case studies is unusual due to 
differences in geography, institutions, and scale between Lombok and Alta Floresta. 
They were chosen, however, to identify the complex reality of incentive-based 
mechanisms in their local understanding, implementation, and outcomes.  
 
Spatial analysis is a useful tool to determine governance responses by landowners to 
incentives, in particular over long timeframes. The lack of available macro-scale data 
for Indonesia, the micro-scale nature typical of Indonesian farmers, and the 
complexity of tenure across Indonesian provinces meant that such a study was not 
feasible for this thesis. The high-resolution images of a municipality in Alta Floresta 
enabled the use of this methodology to enable understanding through aerial 
observations of actor-specific responses to policy incentives. A broader spatial 
analysis across Lombok was used to identify baseline environmental parameters. The 
use of multiple images with different resolutions and various sources presents 
limitations and greater margins of error. In addition, the generalisation that spatial 
analysis can generate may omit some of the complexities of heterogenetic landscapes 
and the multiple variables that influence landowner behaviour and environmental 
variation (Godar et al. 2014). 
 
In the Lombok case studies, there are number of assumptions in the application of 
matching. To select relevant comparative variables, the complexity of underlying 
processes and dynamics within, and between, villages must be understood (Ravallion 
2005). The comparative variables used in this study were based on observations over 
a short period of time. This may, therefore, give rise to bias related to unobserved 
variables, variables that were influenced by incentive-based mechanisms, or variables 
that were not controlled for (Clements 2012). These limitations are important to 
consider, especially in the context of monitoring and evaluation of PES programmes 
where baseline information is often absent and the construction of PES itself may be 
built on assumed observations. 
 
The use of both the Alta Floresta and Lombok case studies was important to illustrate 
the complex reality of implementing incentives at local and national levels, when the 
projects are community- and policy-driven. It is important for practitioners of PES 
and incentive-based conservation to understand the realities of such natural resource 
governance. Due to time constraints in data collection and data availability, the use of 
these two case study countries was required. While this does give rise to issues of 
comparability through geographical, institutional, and land-use model differences, the 
two case studies provided insight into different methodologies when investigating 
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incentives-based institutions and the broader theoretical issues that arise from their 
implementation.  
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3 Surrounded by water, but not a drop 
to drink? Implications of island water 
stress on Lombok, Indonesia 
 
 
 
3.1 Abstract 
 
Water resources are increasingly perceived as ‘critically stressed’, particularly in 
island ecosystems where resources are finite. On Lombok, Indonesia, a rapidly 
growing population is placing pressure on catchments. These areas must provide 
adequate water supply and access for multiple urban and agricultural sectors. 
Household surveys conducted in communities across the island’s catchment identified 
use, access, and availability of water resources in relation to wealth and 
environmental variables. While there are multiple definitions of ‘water scarcity,’ it 
provides a clear example of the unpredictable nature of applying theoretical 
definitions and resource governance to the complex realities on the ground. The 
perceived nature of localized scarcity is stark for Lombok’s rural populations in the 
upper catchments in isolated regions. Inadequate access to water and relevant 
infrastructure can have significant implications for agricultural productivity and crop 
revenue. These limitations can exacerbate a cycle of poverty, a lack of access to 
resources, and potential inequality. Management of water may allow a more 
sustainable use of the resource. This management must come from a demand-driven 
perspective to improve efficiency of resource use and enable improved access to 
water infrastructure for rural communities. 
 
 
3.2 Introduction 
 
Water is a complex resource fundamental for survival. Hydrological ecosystem 
services provide benefits for human-wellbeing, biodiversity, and the economy 
(Kemkes, Farley, and Koliba 2010, Nelson et al. 2009a, Carpenter, Mooney, Agard, 
Capistrano, DeFries, et al. 2009). Water availability, and allocation and access to the 
resource, is a major constraint for agriculture, livelihoods, poverty, and wellbeing 
(Rijsberman 2006, Rockstrom et al. 2004). When scarce, water has biophysical, 
social, economic, and political effects. These effects can lead to ecological and 
societal instability that may threaten the sustainability of natural resource use.  
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Water resources are inextricably linked with, and affected by, the social-ecological 
system (SES) in which they are found (Anderies, Janssen, and Ostrom 2004). 
Ecosystem services, including water, interact with, and are interdependent on, the 
social system(s) within the wider SES. The resilience of water resources in a SES can 
be both enhanced and lost. It can be driven by interactions between social and 
ecological systems. Yet what factors impact the availability and access of water 
resources?  
 
The governance of local water resources faces multiple challenges because of the 
extent, nature, and complexity of water-related conflict, security, and institutional 
cooperation. A multidisciplinary SES management approach is required to understand 
the contextual dimensions of the biophysical, social, economic, and political factors 
that determine availability, access, and demands for consumption (Calder 2005). 
Conflict over water resources can arise from these interconnections. Where multiple 
stakeholders hold diverse values and place many demands on water for land-use, 
tensions over rights can be created. Access rights are often highly complex. There are 
political considerations related to land-use, power relations between stakeholders, and 
historical management issues related to the resource (Calder 2005). Consequently, the 
dynamic interrelations between hydrology, ecosystems, land use, and population 
requirements must be understood. These interconnections can help determine drivers 
of water stress, and create sustainable and multi-use management systems. 
 
This paper investigates what factors determine the availability of household water 
resources for communities on Lombok. Determinants of water availability can be 
physical or social, and are closely linked to SES dynamics (Anderies, Janssen, and 
Ostrom 2004). Water related conflict is a key issue for communities on Lombok. It is 
necessary to understand factors influencing household access to and availability of 
water resources to implement efficient and equitable governance. This paper aims to 
identify areas of water stress and vulnerability for Lombok communities. It also seeks 
to determine whether current infrastructure availability and management approaches 
are sufficient in the face of increasing pressure on natural resources and whether 
‘water scarcity’ definitions are reflective of the realities present on the ground on 
Lombok. 
 
3.2.1 The concept of water scarcity 
 
The concept of water scarcity is complex and is connected to multiple definitions. 
Both a biophysical phenomenon and a social construct, water scarcity depends on the 
scale in question (global or local), and whether it is a supply or demand issue (Cook 
and Bakker 2012, Falkenmark 2003, Falkenmark and Lundqvist 1998, Falkenmark, 
Lundqvist, and Widstrand 1989, Rijsberman 2006, Mehta 2001, Lankford et al. 2013, 
FAO 2007). True physical water scarcity may impact supply, but available water that 
is unable to be used efficiently can affect demand. Symptoms of water scarcity 
include severe environmental degradation (including river desiccation and pollution), 
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declining river basin water availability, and increasing problems of water allocation 
where some groups win at the expense of others (FAO 2007). 
 
It is important to understand how the concept of water scarcity is constructed. 
Depending on which definition is used for governance, the “real causes of scarcity 
may be obscured, leading to inappropriate” solutions (Mehta 2001). Water scarcity, in 
itself, may be a perceived concept. Dwindling rainfall and increasing droughts can 
mask wider climate uncertainty or regional variations. Scarcity also can be felt more 
intensely now than in the past, despite total volume and temporal variation remaining 
unchanged (Mehta 2001). While definitions can often be limiting, it is important to 
assess relative scales of resource scarcity. These relative scales determine their value 
to resource users: “As scarcity of water goes up, so does the competition for water 
among users”, (Rijsberman 2006). Defining water as scarce is dependent on: (1) How 
‘needs’ are defined – i.e. whether environmental needs are also accounted for; (2) The 
proportion of resource that can be made available to satisfy these needs; and, (3) What 
temporal and spatial scale is used in defining water scarcity. 
 
Definitions also determine the indicators that are used to assess water scarcity. The 
indicators include: the Falkenmark Water Stress Indicator where areas with less than 
1,000 m3 of water available per capita per year are experiencing water stress 
(Falkenmark, Lundqvist, and Widstrand 1989); Water Resources Vulnerability Index; 
Water Poverty Index (Sullivan et al. 2003); and physical and economic scarcity 
indicators (Rijsberman 2006).  
 
For the purpose of this paper, I will define water scarcity as when individuals have 
reduced access to safe and affordable water for household consumption and their 
livelihood needs (Rijsberman 2006). The scope of this paper will focus on local 
assessments of water scarcity and stress using proxy indicators. Proxy indicators will 
include acquisition effort to obtain household water supply, infrastructure availability 
(household water source), and river basin water balance. This definition and research 
method were chosen because of data limitations and because problems relating to 
water availability are often local (Rijsberman 2006, Sullivan et al. 2003). The study 
examined issues impacting access and availability of both domestic and agricultural 
water resources. When investigating acquisition effort, however, this paper focused 
only on domestic water supply. Water management of domestic water supply on 
Lombok is examined in later chapters (Chapter 4 and 5), and therefore investigating 
the context of scarcity is useful to inform further discussion regarding benefits from 
and alignment of management institutions.  
 
3.2.2 Island water systems and water scarcity 
 
Water resources are highly dynamic. They can have significant temporal and spatial 
variation in quality and quantity. This is highly apparent on island ecosystems 
because island SESs are heavily constrained by their size, isolation, geology, 
3:  Implications of island water stress on Lombok, Indonesia 
-67- 
typography, climate, and hydrology. Social capital and economic development issues 
also affect island SES. On islands, the finite availability of a narrow natural resource 
base is a limiting factor: “Water scarcity is common on islands,” (Hophmayer-Tokich 
and Kadiman 2006). A highly sustainable management approach is therefore crucial. 
While water scarcity is common, its causes can arise from varying physical and 
climatic conditions, depending on the island in question. Even islands with high 
rainfall may have limited groundwater storage capacity (through limited surface area, 
steep topography, easily eroded soils and short river channels). That can create 
freshwater scarcity during dry seasons (Khaka 1998, Hophmayer-Tokich and 
Kadiman 2006).  
 
Land use types are also highly significant in the scarcity of resources. They determine 
water availability, allocation, and access.  Many deforestation and land clearance 
processes and outcomes can increase pressure on, and problems with, water resources. 
That can lead to excessive run-off (Hophmayer-Tokich and Kadiman 2006). The rural 
poor are particularly vulnerable to changes in water availability, and extreme events 
such as floods and droughts. These events can cause shifts in market prices related to 
natural resource management that affect livelihoods. This vulnerability to market 
fluctuations has the potential to create both a cycle of poverty and a high level of 
water scarcity (FAO 2007).  
 
The way in which institutions function is key to the cycle of land use, water 
availability, and poverty. Effective governance of water resources, including managed 
allocation, is vital to reduce water stress. Where governance systems are weak or 
fragmented with multiple agencies, unequal water resource distribution may add to 
local water scarcity. Water scarcity for the poor is therefore significantly linked to 
institutional function. The level of transparency of decision-making and the degree of 
equitable outcomes guaranteed by those in power also play a role (FAO 2007). 
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3.3 Lombok 
 
 
The island of Lombok is part of Nusa 
Tenggara Barat (NTB) province in 
eastern Indonesia (Figure 3.1.). It is 
facing increasing pressure on limited 
water and forest resources to 
support its rapidly growing 
population, demands from 
agriculture, and changes in climate. 
Situated between 8o12’ and 8o55 
South and 115o46’ and 116o28‘ East, 
Lombok has an area of 4,619 km2, 
and spans just 60 km by 80km at its 
widest point. The island is 
dominated by Mount Rinjani 
(3,726 m), which plays a significant 
role in the island’s hydrological 
cycle. The mountain functions as one 
of Lombok’s main water catchments 
(FFI-Indonesia and BATBP 2012b). 
Three of the four main Watershed 
Figure 3.1 Location of Lombok within 
Indonesia, illustrating altitude variation.  
Source: Creative Commons 
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/
83/Lombok_Locator_Topography.png 
Management Areas (SWP DAS) are connected to Rinjani. The fourth is fed by 
Mount Sabiris (716 m) in the south west of the island (Asatawa 2004a, Rosalita 
2012).  
 
3.3.1 Water use and drivers of watershed degradation on Lombok 
 
Lombok’s highly variable and seasonal climate makes the island inherently vulnerable 
to changes in environmental variability (Butler et al. 2010, Asatawa 2004a, Butler, 
Habibi, et al. 2014). Rainfall is one of the most important climatic factors, and it 
averages 1,593.36 mm per year (Butler et al. 2011, Rosalita 2012). Variation in 
precipitation distribution is greatly affected by steep topography. That specifically 
includes Mount Rinjani in the central north, its surrounding hills, and the low-lying 
plains to the south of the mountain. The northwest of the island receives the greatest 
amount of rainfall. Precipitation patterns create a defined wet (November to February, 
200-500 mm per month) and dry (June to September, 25-100 mm per month) season 
(Rosalita 2012). As rainfall is one of the most important water resources, it has led to 
the dominance of rain-fed agriculture and embungs (water reservoirs).  
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Surface water from rivers, streams, and springs, is used for domestic use and 
irrigation channels in rural areas. Surface water availability is determined by 
topography, climate and land cover. Current surface water potential has been 
calculated as 3,904.54 Mm3 (Rosalita 2012). Urban areas connected to domestic and 
industrial use rely on ground water sources when surface water is unavailable. Current 
ground water area has been mapped at 3,761 km2 (Rosalita 2012).  
 
Topography in Lombok can be split into three categories: Upper slopes, lower slopes, 
and alluvial plains. The categories determine water availability through patterns of 
spring and river distribution. Surface water is used for all types of water needs, except 
in main towns such as Mataram, the capital city on Lombok, where ground water is 
used for domestic industrial use (BAPPEDA, 2012). Agriculture across the alluvial 
plains dominates the use surface water. In these regions, dams, irrigation channels, 
and embungs have been created to divert water resources for irrigated fields, land 
fisheries, livestock, and plantations. Potential water availability is divided between 
four main basins, with 197 sub-watersheds. One is located north of Mount Rinjani 
with area of 1,124 km2; and three are situated south of the mountain with an area of 
2,366 km2 (BAPPEDA, 2012). 
 
3.3.2 Land cover and land use 
 
Lombok is a complex agro-ecosystem. Its ecosystem services are “dependent on and 
impacted on by people” (FFI-Indonesia and BATBP 2012a). Forest cover on Lombok 
(1,465.74 km2, 31.73 % of the island) is limited to the upper catchments on Mount 
Rinjani and isolated patches in the southeast. The island’s forests range from upland 
dry-land forests to mangroves along the coast. There is significant variation in the 
management of forests according to stakeholder type, their use, and government 
involvement (Asatawa 2004a). Forests are classified and protected as: National Park, 
Protected Forest, Community-Production Forest (Hutan Kommutasi - HKm), or 
Limited Production Forest (Figure 3.4) (Asatawa 2004a). Community-Production and 
Limited-Production forests allow for restricted extraction and use of forest resources. 
Limited local opportunities for alternative livelihoods and low levels of enforcement 
create a dependency by some communities on these resources for subsistence and 
income generation. 
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Figure 3.2 Aerial view of land use and forest on the slopes of Mount Rinjani, 
Bayan, North Lombok (Photo: P. Habibi, 2012). 
 
Since the reform era (1998-1999), significant deforestation has converted large forest 
areas to plantation agriculture (Figure 3.2). Between 1999-2006, 57.15 km2 of forest  
(3.49 %) were cleared and a further 197.92 km2 (13.50 %) was converted from 
primary to secondary forest (FFI-Indonesia and BATBP 2012b). Deforestation and 
forest encroachment have also been exacerbated by policy changes. Removal of 
government kerosene subsidies in 2008 led to an increased use of fuel wood for both 
households and industry, particularly for tobacco curing. Distrust of the local 
government, and a lack of tenure within Community-Production forest (including 
customary adat forest rights) have discouraged long-term conservation.  
 
Further conversion of forested lands to agriculture has affected total water yield by 
altering the balance of infiltration, evaporation, and runoff in the hydrological 
resource (Costa, Botta, and Cardille 2003a, Calder 2005). While the effect of forest 
ecosystems on water is complex and site specific, the loss of forest riparian habitats 
compromises the functional quality of ecosystem services and the watershed 
(Sweeney et al. 2004, Calder 2005, Wunscher, Engel, and Wunder 2008). 
 
3.3.3 Water use and drivers of watershed degradation on Lombok 
 
What does the notion of ‘water scarcity’ mean on Lombok? There are multiple factors 
driving the degradation of watersheds on the island at geographical and temporal 
scales.  
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i. Demographics 
 
Lombok’s rapidly growing population, high poverty rates, and lack of alternative 
livelihoods have placed pressure on the island’s limited resources. Lombok had a 
population of 3.17 million in 2010, with an annual growth rate of 1.17 %, (FFI-
Indonesia and BATBP 2012b, Fachry, Hanartani, and Supartaningsih 2011, Klock and 
Sjah 2007, BPS 2010, Fachry et al. 2011). The island’s population is expected to grow 
to 4.46 million by 2050 (Fachry et al. 2011). The local populace has exposed 
Lombok’s ecosystems to deforestation and degradation of watersheds within the 
expanding settlements (Suhartanto et al 2012). While Lombok’s overall population 
growth rate has steadily declined between 1971-2010, urban populations have 
increased by 41.7% over the same period (Fachry, Hanartani, and Supartaningsih 
2011). Poverty levels have also declined from 30.4% in 2001 to 21.6 % in 2010. 
Lombok’s Human Development Index currently stands at 64.66, and reflects a low 
life expectancy (67.5 years, compared to 71.0 years in all of Indonesia), low levels of 
literacy, education and income of the population. 
 
ii. Land use 
 
The average farm size on Lombok is 0.47 ha per household. Approximately 80% of 
water resources are used in crop agriculture, although farmers’ productivity on 
agricultural land is limited (Sayuti et al. 2004, Rosegrant and Ringler 2000). Paddy-
field distribution is centred around the lower catchment of Mount Rinjani where 
irrigation is possible, and rainfall is greater. Tobacco plantations and vegetable 
smallholdings are located throughout the southern plains, which rely more on rain-fed 
water supplies. The majority of Lombok’s agricultural production is rain fed, and 
there are few irrigated fields (ratio of 2.5:1.0 respectively) (Klock and Sjah 2011). 
Multiple cropping occurs relative to climatic seasonal changes. Approximately two 
rice-intercropping harvests and one fallow period take place at the end of the dry 
season. 
 
Upland catchment communities predominately rely on agroforestry, including 
plantations of cacao, coffee, and coconut. Lowland communities focus on intensified 
crop production, primarily driven by industrial tobacco plantations that supply 70 % 
of all Indonesian tobacco (Choy 2012). This industrial and intensified agricultural 
production in lowland communities places significant pressure on local water 
resources, soil fertility, forests, and the long-term sustainability of the ecosystem.  
 
iii. Water use 
 
There are multiple uses of water from within Lombok’s catchments. These includes 
domestic and industrial use in the urban centres, and agricultural and ecosystem 
maintenance in the rural catchments (Table 3.1) (Franks, Lankford, and Mdemu 
2004). Water allocation systems present a significant challenge. They must supply 
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both urban and rural domestic and agricultural demands (Klock and Sjah 2007, 2011). 
Indonesian water utilities (PDAM) are responsible for distribution and conservation of 
water. This includes managing pipelines and protecting water resources at their 
source. PDAM services do not always reach rural communities. The coverage drops 
to 14 % of communities in the rural West Lombok Regency (Klock and Sjah 2007). 
Rural populations therefore rely on wells or, in higher elevations, springs, which, if 
communities can afford the infrastructure, are piped to households. For these marginal 
communities, access to clean water comes at a higher price, both financially and in 
effort needed to obtain water for their household needs (Asatawa 2004a). For upland 
communities, the reduction in spring numbers has increased the distance and time 
spent to collect household water (Klock and Sjah 2007, Asatawa 2004a). 
 
Table 3.1. Water consumption in Lombok by use (million m3 or mcm) (Klock and 
Sjah 2007). 
 
 Domestic Agriculture Industry Other 
Consumption  294 5,762 35.62 663 
Percentage 85.0 0.5 4.3 10.2 
 
 
Growth in population, agriculture, and economic activities increases the demand of 
freshwater supply (Suroso, Abdurahman, and Setiawan 2010). Expanding human 
settlements continue to extract a greater proportion of water that had previously been 
allocated for agricultural production. Limited infrastructure also can not meet urban 
water demands, which creates a deficit water balance and reduced water flow 
(Asatawa 2004a). In the West Lombok Regency, for example, the Sesoat River flow 
rate dropped from 16.03 m3/sec in 1996 to 9.09 m3/sec in 2002 (Klock and Sjah 
2007). Urbanisation also affects water quality because of a growth in water pollution 
and inadequate waste management systems. Currently, 6.0 % of Lombok’s inhabitants 
rely on unprotected water supplies and 43.8 % of households lack proper sanitation 
facilities (Fachry et al. 2011).   
 
The water balance on Lombok is becoming critical. Surface and groundwater struggle 
to supply irrigation needs, and the domestic and industrial demands of a growing 
population (Suroso, Abdurahman, and Setiawan 2010). In Lombok, the existing 
surface water supply (2,024.98 Mm3/yr) is unable to meet current demands 
(3,606.32 Mm3/yr) (Rosalita 2012). While there is an estimated potential surface 
water availability of 3,904.54 Mm3 per year, infrastructure and water resource 
limitations are creating water balance deficits in some watersheds. Decreased and 
unreliable surface water availability is increasing demand for, and reliance upon, 
groundwater wells. Rapid development in the upper catchments is reducing 
reabsorption, and in municipal areas, water consumption is exceeding the ability of 
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groundwater aquifers to recover supply (FFI-Indonesia and BATBP 2012a, Rosalita 
2012). 
 
These issues related to expanding populations and settlements are linked with a 
degradation of upper rural watersheds, which has led to increases in floods and 
landslides. The growing pressure on Lombok’s limited water resources has exposed 
the vulnerability of the poor to changes in resource availability. It also may lead to the 
potential for increased elite capture of resource benefits. These issues present serious 
challenges, in both urban and rural areas, to the equitable and sustainable supply of 
water across Lombok (Klock and Sjah 2007). 
 
iv. Climate change 
 
Vulnerability to climate change on Lombok is particularly apparent in the water sector 
because of the sizeable changes in precipitation and temperature, extreme climatic 
events, and sea level rises (Suroso et al. 2009). The island is affected by the El Nino 
Southern Oscillation. This can generate periods of drought or years with high rainfall 
(Klock and Sjah 2007, Butler et al. In Press, Corrected Proof). Increased climatic 
variation, including a rising fluctuation and uncertainty in seasons and a significant 
decrease in rainfall, is predicted by 2030 (Figure 3.3). These predictions suggest that 
the greatest reduction in monthly rainfall will be experienced along the slopes of 
Mount Rinjani. For northern Lombok in particular, total monthly rainfall is likely to 
decrease by 20 %. Together with climatic events such as floods and extended 
droughts, these ecological changes have a significant impact on both food and water 
security on Lombok (Sayuti et al. 2004).  
 
 
Figure 3.3. Best estimates of projected changes in total monthly rainfall by 2030, 
as a percentage of 1970s climatology for January, April, July and October 2030 in 
NTB downscaled to 1km. Climate simulations are based on the SRES A2 
emissions scenario (Source: CSIRO) (Butler, Habibi, et al. 2014). 
 
v. Socioeconomic and governance 
 
Water scarcity is also human-induced on Lombok. Social, economic, cultural, 
political, and biophysical factors affect the access, availability, and allocation of the 
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island’s water resources (Asatawa 2004a). These include illegal logging, weak 
governance, pressure from population expansion, lack of education, and natural 
resource management conflicts (Asatawa 2004a, FFI-Indonesia and BATBP 2012b).  
 
Recent modernization, increased tourism, and urban expansion have led to a move 
away from traditional and cultural conservation methods. Those include awiq-awiq 
(traditional Sasak cultural morals), bada musyawarah (community decision-making), 
and goyong rotong (‘community spirit’) (Klock and Sjah 2007). High demands for 
water from urban areas’ and the tourism sector that was traditionally allocated to 
agriculture, are depleting surface water and groundwater (Haryani et al. 2007). Rural 
water resources are under increasing pressure to provide for urban systems. This has 
resulted in reduced food security, and reliance on rice imports for example (Sjah and 
Baldwin In press). These demands – coupled with deforestation – have led to a 40% 
reduction in the number of springs around Mount Rinjani (WWF-Indonesia 2001). 
Traditional approaches to manage access to and availability of water at local levels, in 
the face of wider competition for resources from tourism and urban centres, may now 
be insufficient to enable water security for rural communities (Sjah and Baldwin In 
press). 
 
Top-down government approaches, sectoral fragmentation, and elite capture have 
created resource-controlled approaches and widespread mistrust. That facilitates 
stakeholder competition, a lack of coordination, and poor-information disclosure. The 
Indonesian government has historically governed water management on Lombok. 
This governance structure arose since 1990, when the country’s government 
introduced an increase in paddy-intensification and economic development within 
eastern Indonesia (Sato 2006). Water User Associations (WUA) were initiated in the 
1980s to give local communities the responsibility to manage the distribution of water 
(Klock and Sjah 2007). However, the effectiveness of WUAs is significantly reduced 
by fundamental weaknesses in their institutional scope, and local perceptions of their 
strong links to central government.  
 
Fragmented sectoral approaches to managing water also have fed stakeholder 
confusion. Different agencies manage water according to land use. For example, 
building pipeline infrastructure for surface water is the responsibility of the 
Department of Public Works (Perkerjaan Umum); groundwater is managed by the 
Department of Mines and Energy; and, the Forest Department  (BPDAS - Balai 
Pengelolaan Daerah Aliran Sungai) is accountable for watershed conservation 
(Asatawa 2004a).  
 
Conflicts over water resources often emerge because of misunderstandings between 
upstream providers and downstream users. Inconsistent policies also affect access to 
clean water. Upstream users typically make claims to property rights related to water 
resources. That includes how water resources are used, stored, diverted, and, 
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ultimately, disposed of. Equally valid are downstream users’ demand for clean 
drinking water, despite their distance from the water source (Asatawa 2004a). For 
example, the rural communities in the upper catchments of the Dodokan watershed, 
which feeds Mataram, have an unequal ecological responsibility to protect water 
sources to meet the municipality’s demands. During the dry season, some downstream 
villages without access to piped water have little water flow. And in Muncan, a 
village in southern Lombok, households may only get water once every two nights 
(Klock and Sjah 2007).  
 
Different stakeholders require water resources for different land uses. This tension 
creates different values on how resources are viewed, accessed, and used.  Conflict 
can vary from minor disputes between communities, to large scale district level 
conflicts (Asatawa 2004a). Where there is a lack of inequitable access to resources, 
insufficient resolution of conflict, or continued poverty, tensions between 
stakeholders can escalate, and may drive unsustainable resource use (Asatawa 2004a). 
 
3.2.4 Implications of water stress on Lombok  
 
How communities cope with water stress and the resulting impacts have implications 
for the long-term sustainability of the resource. To implement any institutional 
governance that reduces water stress for communities and the environment, it is 
important to understand the drivers of water scarcity and the factors that limit or 
enable coping mechanisms. This paper seeks to understand factors that affect the 
availability of water resources for communities across Lombok.  
 
 
3.4 Research questions 
 
This paper therefore addresses the following research questions:  
 
1: How extensive is the variation of water availability – and access to the 
resource for communities – across Lombok?  
 
2:  What factors can affect the availability of and access to domestic water 
resources?  
 
3:  What are some of the implications of domestic water availability and access 
for agricultural revenue? 
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3.5 Methods 
 
3.5.1 Study site selection  
 
A comparative case study method was used to survey a set of households within 30 
villages (desas) across all of Lombok (Figure 3.4) (Yin 2003). These were randomly 
selected to generate a representative sample of communities. This method enabled the 
extrapolation of data on their socioeconomic, natural resource use, and, specifically, 
access to and availability of water across different land types. Villages and 
households were used as embedded units of analysis to allow for analytical 
generalization of both the environmental and socioeconomic variables that influence 
water availability and access to the resource. Ten households in each of the 30 
villages across Lombok were randomly selected and sampled for socioeconomic and 
demographic characteristics. They were additionally sampled for their access, use, 
and infrastructure related to domestic water use, and agricultural revenues. While the 
research also examined access and availability of agricultural water supplies, 
examination of the impact of water acquisition effort was calculated for domestic 
water resources only. This constraint does limit understanding of the impacts of water 
scarcity on agricultural revenue. For the purpose of this study, however, it provides an 
insight into the wider impacts of water stress on households on Lombok. 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Land cover in relation to survey villages (Source: Own elaboration, 
Data: BAPPEDA 2012, FFI-Lombok 2011). 
 
3:  Implications of island water stress on Lombok, Indonesia 
-77- 
Environmental and demographic spatial data was gathered from secondary sources 
such as BAPPEDA  (Badan Perencana Pembangunan Daerah - Regional Body for 
Planning and Development) and Flora Fauna International, Indonesia. These 
secondary sources included data on river basin water balance, distance to Mataram, 
sub-district area, forest area, paddy area, population size, and average rainfall per 
year. Data determining the water balance of river basins was calculated by 
BAPPEDA. This used catchment area, annual rainfall, and surface water availability 
(Mm3/sec) to determine surface water availability within sub-watersheds. Surface 
water potential was categorized as ‘sufficient’, ‘deficit’, or ‘extreme deficit’, 
according to 2020 projected demands (with projected population size) and water 
availability (Rosalita 2012). Due to lack of data on groundwater area these categories 
were used in this study as a proxy for water availability. The multiple case study 
design allowed for the comparison of these variables across a water stress gradient.  
 
The use of secondary data from government and NGO resources may increase the 
margin of error in analysis. The village scale of environmental data, particularly in 
relation to household scale socio-economic data, may reduce applicability of 
environmental variables. For example, the location of a household within a catchment 
may generate variation in environmental variables at village level. However, due to 
time constraints in data collection and limited data availability, this study used village 
scale data in relation to household responses.  
 
3.5.2 Survey Methods  
 
Household surveys focused on poverty status, natural resource use (with a focus on 
water access and availability), and livelihood strategies. In total, 300 households were 
sampled. Prior to data collection, a pilot survey and initial focus group discussions 
were undertaken for training purposes. The trial also helped to inform and evaluate 
the questionnaire. Quantitative responses were sought through the questionnaire, 
while qualitative discussions were held around natural resource availability, and 
changes in access and availability to the resource. This approach enabled a greater 
depth to the responses beyond the researcher’s own a priori epistemological 
approach.  
 
Trained researchers from the University of Mataram conducted the surveys. Data 
collection took place between June-August 2012.  The collection of a wealth variable 
from indicators such as household asset value, income, and expenditure (Filmer and 
Pritchard 2001, Rutstein and Johnson 2004) was beyond the scope of this rapid and 
wide-scale survey.  
 
During the pilot, early focus group discussions surrounding the concept of wealth 
were used to develop a wealth ranking using house size (room number) as a proxy for 
socioeconomic status between households. While this wealth proxy may lead to some 
ambiguity, principal component analysis was also conducted on the percentage of 
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respondent income spent on food, school fees, medicine, transport, electricity, and 
other expenditures. Expenditure on food was the key principal financial component. 
When this data was correlated with a separate wealth proxy (years in education and 
occupation), it was apparent that respondents’ expenditure on food also related to their 
occupation. For example, traders and businessmen would buy nearly 100% of their 
food. Farmers and labourers, in contrast, bought a lower percentage of their food.  
 
Agricultural revenue per year also positively correlated to the number of rooms in a 
household using regression (r2=0.2271, d.f.1, p***). Consequently, a wealth proxy of 
room number to denote house capital will be used in the analysis. Questions and 
responses were translated into Bahasa Indonesia with the help of the multilingual 
research assistants. During training, it was ensured that the assistants understood the 
information required from the survey. Nonetheless, following the pilot survey, 
cultural and language differences were apparent, and some of the meaning of the 
survey may have been lost in translation. To increase comprehension, the finalized 
questionnaire was simplified and included local names and colloquialisms. Interviews 
lasted approximately 40 minutes and were conducted in Bahasa Indonesia. 
 
3.5.3 Analysis 
 
Spatial analysis using ArcGIS 10 extracted environmental and demographic data at 
village level. This analysis may have lost some of the scale of the data because 
questionnaires were conducted at household level. Some households within villages, 
for example, were spread along a gradient (e.g.: from sea level to Mount Rinjani 
slopes). Yet the village level analysis allowed for an approximation using the 
environmental data available.  
 
Questionnaire data was coded, and Stata 12.0 and Excel were used for all statistical 
analysis, suitably transforming data where necessary (Osbourne 2002). To analyse 
normally distributed data of continuous variables, parametric tests were used where 
possible. The stringent assumptions made by parametric tests, particularly with 
environmental data analysis, may not always be suitable (Fowler, Cohen, and Jarvis 
1998). Therefore, non-parametric tests for rank and categorical variables were also 
used to analyse ‘distribution free’ data (Fowler, Cohen, and Jarvis 1998). Statistical 
tests were two-tailed with a probability value of 0.05. Where Indonesian Rupiah (IDR 
– Rp) values are used, rates were taken from 2 September 2012: 1USD: 9530Rp using 
http://www.xe.com/currencycharts/?from=USD&to=IDR&view=2Y.  
 
Where multiple factors were involved as explanatory variables, General Linear Mixed 
Models (GLMM) were used for multivariate analysis of both fixed and random effects 
on responses from different distributions (Bolker et al. 2009). GLMMs were 
developed to test the relationship of variables impacting water acquisition effort per 
capita and sources of water for household consumption across the island. These 
models were built using explanatory variables such as distance to Mataram, 
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population density, and a proxy of wealth (house size). Environmental variables 
considered included altitude, forest area, spring density, and river basin water 
availability. To avoid pseudo-replication, forest area, spring density, river basin water 
availability, and altitude were modelled as random effects, and distance to Mataram, 
population density, and a proxy of wealth were modelled as fixed effects (Bolker et al. 
2009). The significance and direction of each independent variable on access to and 
availability of water was indicated by the GLMM coefficients. 
 
There are limitations to the data set because of the use of multiple survey locations 
with many differing levels of water availability, land use, and land types. Ecological 
impacts also often have random effects that imply the presence of non-normal 
distributed data. The effects of these ecological factors on household water source and 
acquisition effort characteristics cannot be clearly separated. Where interdisciplinary 
approaches are required between ecological and economic studies, it is important to 
distinguish between where importance is attributed in design criteria. As such, and for 
the purpose of this paper, a priori assumptions are made regarding cause and effect 
relationships (Armsworth et al. 2009). 
 
 
3.6 Results  
 
The survey villages illustrated significant environmental and socioeconomic variation 
across Lombok. Village area ranged from 5.04 km2 to 184.45 km2, with an average of 
35.98 km2. The villages’ altitude varied from 7 m to 1,170 m above sea level. 
Population density was high throughout the test sites on the island, with an average of 
396 people per km2. The highest density was found in central Lombok, where the 
village of Medas had 1,292 people per km2. While this is likely to be linked to the 
village’s high urbanization and proximity to Mataram, it should be noted that villages 
within the central part of Lombok have been divided into smaller villages (and thus 
areas). This initiative aims to improve the governance of the growing populations. As 
a result, the division of villages into smaller villages may limit the applicability of 
population density data as village areas in other areas of Lombok are much larger. 
Low population density villages were found in remote areas in northern Lombok, 
close to the summit of Mount Rinjani.  
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Figure 3.5. Legal felling of timber within community production forest, Lebah Suren 
(Photo: L. Garrett 2012). 
 
Forest cover per village ranged from 0 km2 to 77.88 km2 and paddy field cover ranged 
from 0 km2 to 14.80 km2. Paddy fields were located in the plains below the slopes of 
Mount Rinjani. Land cover is likely to be significantly related to island topography 
and proximity to Mount Rinjani where most of the protected and production forests 
are managed (Figure 3.5). Land cover was not related to illegal deforestation, 
although informants spoke of illegal deforestation occurring throughout the protected 
forest on a small scale. 
 
3.6.1 Water distribution and availability across Lombok 
 
There was significant variation in water distribution and availability across the survey 
communities (Figure 3.6). The four main watersheds, although unequal in size and 
population density, were distributed between Lombok’s districts: North (Putih), West 
(Dodokan – the main watershed), East, (Menanga), and Central (Jelatang).  
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Figure 3.6. Annual rainfall distribution across the main watersheds on Lombok 
(Source: Own elaboration. Data: BAPPEDA, 2012). 
 
Elevation and rainfall 
 
As within many island ecosystems, topography played a key role in distribution 
of rainfall across Lombok. It influenced land use types and domestic water 
sources. The majority of the population was located within the plains of the 
island in central, west, and east Lombok. The topography in these regions 
allowed for intensive agriculture – dominated by rice, tobacco, maize and chili – 
throughout the dry and wet seasons. Rainfall patterns were also reflective of the 
island’s topography and the impact of both Mount Rinjani and Mount Sabiris on 
the hydrological cycle of the island’s ecosystem (Figure 3.6). It should be noted 
that rainfall pattern data across Lombok was limited, and only noted minimum 
and maximum rainfall levels. Significant climatic and seasonal changes in rainfall 
were observed in Lombok, based around distinct wet and dry seasons.  
 
Across the island, the wet season lasted approximately 6 to 7 months, between 
September and February. The dry season, however, showed greater variation in 
parts of Lombok. Most areas experienced a minimum of 3 to 4 months with little 
or no rainfall. But for some survey villages, the dry season could last up to 9 to 10 
months. The highest average rainfall was observed within Jelatang and Dodokan 
watersheds, and the lowest in north Lombok within Putih watershed (Table 3.2).  
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Table 3.2. Average annual rainfall (mm) within each watershed (BAPPEDA, 
2012). 
 
Watershed Min Max Mean 
Dodokan 513.57 2,805.00 1,659.29 
Jelatang 400.00 3,000.00 1,700.00 
Menanga 516.67 2,583.33 1,550.00 
Putih 733.33 1,800.00 1,266.67 
 
 
River basin water availability  
 
‘Sufficient’ river basin water availability was found in villages within all watersheds. 
Jelatang watershed river basins, for example, had 75% sufficient water availability. 
The greatest ‘extreme deficit’ river basin water availability was found in Dodokan and 
Menanga, where the largest population densities were also found (Table 3.3). ‘Deficit’ 
and ‘extreme deficit’ river basin water availability was positively significantly higher 
in villages with higher population densities, lower average annual rainfall, and higher 
spring density. 
 
Table 3.3. General liner mixed model analysis of environmental and 
socioeconomic factors relating to river basin water availability (n=296). Pearson 
values (z).  
 
Variable Pearson z 
value 
Significance level 
 Elevation -0.75 >0.05 
Forest area 0.12 >0.05 
Spring density 2.02 * 
Distance to Mataram -1.34 >0.05 
Population density 3.20 *** 
Wealth 1.17 >0.05 
Average rainfall -7.09 *** 
 
Critical probability values quoted are represented as follows: ‘***’=p<0.001, ‘**’=p=<0.01, 
‘*’p=<0.05, and ‘>0.05’= Non-significant (p=≥0.05) (Fowler, Cohen, and Jarvis 1998) 
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Villages with larger areas of forest were more likely to be situated in a ‘sufficient’ 
river basin, although this was not significant. Paddy field area was often larger in 
village areas with higher annual rainfall, and located within ‘deficit’ and ‘extreme 
deficit’ river basins. This relates to the tendency on Lombok for rain-fed paddy (and 
other crops) agriculture, compared to irrigated fields observed in other islands of 
Indonesia.  
 
High population densities observed in urban areas located far from forest areas were 
additional socioeconomic factors in driving water stress for communities. This high 
demand was reflected in the large population size, agricultural expansion, and high 
demand by urban areas, which placed significant pressure on rural water resources. 
The highest population density (522 people per km2, and an average of 447 people per 
km2) was found in survey villages in East Lombok within the Menanga watershed. 
This watershed had 66.66 % of villages within an ‘extreme deficit’ river basin. That 
placed considerable pressure upon water resources. Wealthier communities were 
found in East Lombok, reflective of the high agricultural (tobacco) productivity in this 
area. In contrast, the poorest communities were found in southwest Lombok, within 
the Jelatang watershed, where occupations were mainly farm-based or based around 
trading. Education levels were also higher in East Lombok, with an average of 
8.53 years, compared to 2.25 years in southwest Lombok.  
 
3.6.2 Domestic water availability and sources 
 
Water was sourced from multiple sources across the survey villages. In total, 54.39 % 
of households sourced water from wells, 33.78 % from piped water to households, 
6.08 % from rivers and springs, 1.69 % from reservoirs, and 4.05% from other 
sources. Domestic water sources for households were predominantly determined by 
environmental rather than socioeconomic variables (Table 3.4).  
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Table 3.4. General linear mixed model analysis of environmental and 
socioeconomic factors relating to household domestic water source (n=300). 
Pearson values (z).  
Variable Pearson z 
value 
Significance level 
 Elevation 2.99 *** 
Forest area 1.10 >0.05 
Spring density 0.09 >0.05 
Distance to Mataram 5.45 *** 
Population density 2.22 * 
Wealth 1.18 >0.05 
River basin water availability -2.45 * 
 
Critical probability values quoted are represented as follows: ‘***’=p<0.001, ‘**’=p=<0.01, 
‘*’p=<0.05, and ‘>0.05’= Non-significant (p=≥0.05) (Fowler, Cohen, and Jarvis 1998) 
 
The type of water source of surveyed households was not significantly correlated to 
wealth, spring density, or forest area (Table 3.4). Distance to Mataram and elevation 
was highly, positively significantly correlated with household water source (Figure 
3.7). Households furthest from Mataram were observed to use springs and rivers for 
domestic water sources. Households in villages closer to Mataram were more likely to 
access water via wells or piped water systems. Wells were more likely to be used at 
lower elevations. However, respondents in two villages in East Lombok who used 
wells noted that the “water [was] not clean”, and they were “often sick,” or had to 
boil or buy water to drink. 
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Figure 3.7. Domestic water source of survey households and distance to 
Mataram (km). n=300. 
 
The source of household water was significantly different between watersheds 
(χ²=48.805, d.f.3, p=***). Households within the Dodokan watershed had 
significantly more varied water sources. This diversity was likely due to the 
watershed’s large area and the many different land types, topography, and land uses 
within it. Jelatang watershed respondents relied significantly on wells, with little 
piped water to households. Nearly three-quarters of respondents within the Putih 
watershed had access to water via pipes, either their own or shared with other 
households. Sourcing water from springs was limited to households in Dodokan and 
Putih watershed. This is expected because of the topographic dominance of Mount 
Rinjani and associated springs within the watershed. Respondents in Menanga had a 
strong reliance on wells and piped water to households. 
 
3.6.3 Agricultural water availability and sources 
 
There were three main sources of water for agricultural productivity: Rain, shallow 
wells, and irrigation channels. Crop type was associated with agricultural water 
source (ρ=0.2804, n=125, p***). Poorer households had less access to irrigation and 
wells (ρ=0.2832, n=125, p***), and relied on rain-fed rice. Wealthier households 
were more likely to collect non-timber forest products (NTFPs), tobacco and timber, 
and use shallow wells and irrigation channels. Irrigation and rain-fed agricultural 
sources were also more likely to be used in river basins with ‘sufficient’ water 
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availability, while more respondents used shallow wells in ‘extreme deficit’ and 
‘deficit’ river basins (ρ=0.1812, n=125, p***).  
 
3.6.4 Infrastructure and effort to acquire household water 
 
Access to water infrastructure varied across the island, although the majority of 
communities surveyed had piped water into their households. Some households relied 
on freshwater collection for domestic consumption. To determine the cost per unit 
effort of water acquisition per household, the distance to collect water was multiplied 
by the number of times per day collected, then divided by the number of adults per 
household (Table 3.5). 
 
Table 3.5. General liner mixed model analysis of environmental and 
socioeconomic factors relating to household water acquisition effort (n=300). 
Pearson values (z). 
 
Variable Pearson z 
value 
Significance level 
Altitude 4.99 *** 
River basin water availability -5.12 *** 
Forest cover -0.93 >0.05 
Spring density 0.24 >0.05 
Distance to Mataram 4.99 *** 
Population density 0.99 >0.05 
Wealth -0.39 >0.05 
Domestic water source 3.91 *** 
 
Critical probability values quoted are represented as follows: ‘***’=p<0.001, ‘**’=p=<0.01, 
‘*’p=<0.05, and ‘>0.05’= Non-significant (p=≥0.05) (Fowler, Cohen, and Jarvis 1998) 
 
Water acquisition effort was highly positively, significantly correlated to domestic 
water source (Table 3.5 and Figure 3.8). Households using springs and wells had the 
highest water acquisition effort. Distance to Mataram and river basin water 
availability were also significant strong determinants of water acquisition effort. As 
discussed earlier, distance to urban areas affected the source of water for domestic 
use. Daily water acquisition effort per capita was greatest in villages furthest from 
Mataram. The rural nature of communities was a key determinant of infrastructure in 
place to supply households with water. During the dry season, respondents in a village 
in North Lombok noted that: “we don’t get a lot of water and have to [obtain] it from 
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a different place.”  A respondent in Central Lombok reported that it was “difficult to 
get water and we have to go very far”, while others said they “[bought] water from 
outside the village to drink”. 
 
 
Figure 3.8. Household effort per capita to acquire water per water source 
(n=300). 
 
Water availability within the river basin was more likely to be ‘sufficient’ when water 
acquisition was higher. Area of forest, spring density, population density, and wealth 
were not significant influences on water acquisition effort. Altitude played a greater 
role determining water source, compared to acquisition effort (r2=0.6265, d.f.1, 
p>0.05). But for the sake of the model, the resulting impact on water acquisition effort 
was significant. For example, wells were used more frequently at lower altitudes than 
piping (which often used gravitational pull to pressurize pipes and was used more 
frequently at higher altitudes). 
  
3.6.5 The implications of domestic water access and availability on farmer 
livelihoods 
 
The impact of domestic water access and availability varied across household, village, 
and watershed scales. Environmental factors such as altitude, river basin water 
availability, mean annual rainfall, and seasonal variation played key roles in 
determining water access, availability to the resource, and water stress due to 
seasonality. This is reflective of the distinct vegetation types and land use observed 
across the island (Figure 3.4). This environmental variation influenced the demand for 
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and availability of water for household consumption. To focus on the implications of 
this variation in access and availability across agricultural livelihoods, the dataset was 
reduced to include only farmers and agroforestry workers. The labour time allocated 
for their household water acquisition was then calculated to examine its relationship 
with agricultural income.  
 
 
Figure 3.9. Impact of household water acquisition cost per capita per day on 
annual agricultural revenues (n=92). 
 
Household revenue from farm and agroforestry livelihoods varied from US $35.77 to 
US $8,394.54 per year, with a mean of US$ 870.97. Income was determined by crop 
type (z=2.79, n=92, p**), and was greatest from tobacco harvests, lowest from non-
timber forest products (NTFPs), and showed greatest variance from irrigated rice. 
Annual income was not influenced by productive water source (z=0.87, n=92, 
p>0.05). While annual agricultural income is likely to be influenced by crop type and 
market prices, effort to acquire domestic water was found to impact agricultural 
revenue, both directly and indirectly (z=-2.34, n=92, p**) (Figure 3.9). Respondents 
with a higher effort to obtain household water were observed to have a decreased 
agricultural income for intercropping and tobacco, but not for rice or NTFPs. This 
divergence may be linked to the time costs involved to collect domestic water, which 
takes time out of agricultural activities and productive output, or to the fact that, 
according to respondents, rice and NTFPs require less agricultural labour.  
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3.7 Discussion 
 
3.7.1 Variation in water availability and access on Lombok 
 
Lombok illustrates many of the characteristics of island natural resource dynamics. 
The island’s geographic features play a dominant role in the distribution of resources, 
particularly fresh water. Water availability, allocation of resources, and water stress in 
Lombok shows significant variation, depending on biophysical variables. These water 
issues are influenced by the elevation of Mount Rinjani. The mountain topography 
determines land cover – forest or open plains, etc. – and, consequently, productive use 
across the island. Livelihoods are limited to certain geographic ranges: with rain-fed 
and irrigated rice on the base of the slopes of Mount Rinjani; tobacco plantations 
across the plains; and NTFPs on the upper slopes. These forms of agriculture create 
high dependence on the island’s hydrological and climatic cycles. 
 
There is intense pressure on Lombok to maintain sufficient water supply for urban, 
rural, and agricultural systems. Population density is particularly high in the central 
and eastern regions where agricultural production is also very intensive. In these 
areas, rapid cycles of rice, tobacco, and intercropping are prevalent throughout the 
year. Much of these crops are reliant on rainfall, compared to river basin water 
supplies, for production. However, demand from communities in these regions is 
increasing the vulnerability of river basin water availability, which is categorized as 
‘extreme deficit’ in areas of high population density. Lombok’s growing population is 
currently accentuating the limiting factors of island’s finite water and land resource 
base. 
 
How ‘scarce’ is water on Lombok?   
 
This study used proxy indicators of acquisition effort to obtain household water 
supply, the availability of infrastructure, and river water balance to assess water 
scarcity. The data did not clarify the presence of true physical water scarcity, but 
highlighted societal scarcity of water resources. A more accurate assessment of 
physical water scarcity would be beneficial to ascertain the physical capacity of water 
availability. This could include measurements such as amount of water withdrawn per 
individual sharing each unit of water. Societal scarcity of water resources was, 
however, observed, for example, through the impacts of limited access to 
infrastructure to safe and affordable domestic water. SES interactions, in particular 
between this infrastructure, access to resources, and the institutional management of 
water use, are influencing the vulnerability of water resource systems to 
environmental factors such as climate change. While this does not necessarily lead to 
physical water scarcity as such, demand for water is high in agricultural areas, areas 
with high population density, and close to Mataram’s urban area. These demands 
create stress and ‘extreme deficit’ river basin areas.  
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Future increases in population size, rapid agricultural intensification, and climatic 
changes which influence rainfall are likely to put the island at risk of further 
population-driven water scarcity and potential physical water shortages (Kummu et al. 
2010, Falkenmark et al. 2007, Ohlsson and Turton 1999, Butler, Habibi, et al. 2014). 
Any water shortage, both present and future, faces further pressures from significant 
seasonal variation, which may be worsened by regional differences. These impacts 
influence both water availability and demand at varying scales across Lombok. 
Distinct wet and dry seasons are limiting factors to agricultural productivity and 
access to water for domestic household use, which is reliant on rain-fed agricultural 
systems. Due to time constraints, it was beyond the scope of this research, however, to 
examine the seasonality of water acquisition effort. Nonetheless, the identification of 
societal water stress and the potential for ‘scarcity’ as defined by Falkenmark (2003), 
Falkenmark and Lundqvist (1998), Rijsberman (2006) and Lankford et al. (2013) is 
still a useful tool to understand the management of water resources on Lombok.  
 
Any water scarcity or stress is a limiting factor on economic development and 
agricultural productivity (Falkenmark et al. 2007). On Lombok, scarcity of water is 
currently not limited by physical water availability, but by its allocation, i.e. societal 
scarcity. Societal scarcity does often accompany physical scarcity (Kummu et al. 
2010, Ohlsson and Turton 1999). Using infrastructure availability, effort to obtain 
household water supply, and river basin water balance as indicators of water scarcity, 
Lombok does indicate a resource under pressure. Greater infrastructure is available in 
‘sufficient’ river basins, but these regions often have higher demands for obtaining 
household water supply from larger population densities. Households experiencing 
water stress were often far from Mataram, and therefore general public infrastructure 
and development. This impacted the household water source, with those further from 
Mataram more likely to rely on springs and wells, and also increased the acquisition 
effort to obtain domestic water. Lack of infrastructure to manage the pressure on 
ecological resources for communities further from Mataram is therefore impacting 
access to and availability of water resources for households. 
 
What does ‘water scarcity’ mean for water availability and access on 
Lombok? 
 
The data emphasized the significance of Mount Rinjani in determining not only water 
availability, but also domestic water resources across Lombok. Households at higher 
elevations had greater access to household pipes and community water reservoirs. 
Spatial scales vary significantly for water resources, which are impacted by local 
social and economic characteristics, and physical water availability (Sullivan et al. 
2003).  
 
On Lombok, the availability of water and its distribution is a localized issue. It is 
shaped by the topographical nature of the island. Use of wells for domestic water was 
found in survey villages of lower altitudes. That is expected, as communities access 
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the ground water resource within Mount Rinjani’s alluvial plain. Piped water to 
households, together with reservoirs, was observed in greater frequency in the upper 
catchments. This is likely to be reflective of a higher reliability of water supply from 
springs and rivers descending Mount Rinjani. 
 
Socioeconomic characteristics and wealth status were weak determinants of 
household water sources. It was difficult to ascertain whether wealth did not improve 
access to water infrastructure, or if access to water infrastructure increased wealth.  
More rural communities, i.e. those furthest away from Mataram, did show a greater 
reliance on reservoirs, springs, and rivers. This suggests that infrastructure is driven 
by urbanization. Communities far from central urban systems lack access to domestic 
water sources through piped water systems. This is reflective of PDAM’s 
infrastructure and service scope, which do not always reach more rural populations. 
The impact of governance and WUAs was not apparent in this chapter of the thesis. 
Further research to understand their influence in managing water infrastructure and 
the implications for household consumption was conducted and will be presented in 
proceeding chapters.  
 
3.7.2 Impacts of domestic water availability on livelihoods 
 
How does water distribution and access influence the cost of acquiring 
domestic water for households? 
 
Water allocation systems between urban, rural, and agricultural systems are complex 
and challenging (Klock and Sjah 2007). Domestic water sources are an integral part of 
household coping strategies, and affect economic productivity and individuals’ health. 
As such, domestic water sources, although they only account for a small proportion of 
water withdrawals, can play an important role in poverty alleviation (Howard and 
Bartram 2003, Gleick 1998). Studies have shown that domestic water sources can 
influence levels of poverty through time spent (cost per unit of effort) obtaining 
household water resources (Sullivan et al. 2003). Links between wealth and domestic 
water sources, and water acquisition effort, were not made in this study. On Lombok, 
wealth influenced productive water sources, both directly and indirectly, as a result of 
crop type and water requirements.  
 
A significant proportion of time spent collecting domestic water can perpetuate the 
cycle of poverty, lower agricultural productivity, and reduce livelihood revenue. 
Water sources influence any acquisition effort. Households surveyed on Lombok 
reflected this principle. Significantly higher effort was required to access wells, 
springs, and rivers than what was needed for piped or reservoir water sources.  
Reliance on water sources, which require a high effort to obtain access, increases the 
vulnerability of households to changes in water availability and access to these water 
sources (Klock and Sjah 2011). For example, a high dependence on springs on Mount 
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Rinjani, which are already vulnerable to degradation, may increase a household’s 
vulnerability to reduced water availability. 
 
Effort to acquire water was highest away from urban centres. That emphasised the 
lack of PDAM infrastructure in Lombok’s rural communities, and the impact of this 
limitation on individuals’ lives. Rural regions in Lombok, which are far from the 
political centre in Mataram, often have scarce economic and social capital, little of 
which is allocated to develop water supply infrastructure (Gleick 1998). High rates of 
urbanization and migration towards urban centres for employment have rapidly 
increased the demand for water from urban centres. Improving access to water by 
reducing effort requires a consideration of multiple users and across multiple scales 
(Lankford 2013). It is therefore challenging to implement water management policies 
to increase infrastructure far from this high demand, particularly because of the 
limited socio-political influences held by rural communities. 
 
What are the implications for farmer revenue on Lombok?  
 
Water acquisition effort may not be the single determinant of agricultural revenue. 
Yet it is clear that time spent away from productive activities to acquire basic 
household resources like water reduces the manpower and potential output of limited 
agricultural resources.  Water acquisition effort may not be the single determinant of 
agricultural revenue. It may perpetuate a cycle of poverty. Income from farms and 
agroforestry plantations in surveyed households varied significantly according to crop 
type and household location. This is reflective of the influence of Mount Rinjani on 
the island’s hydrological cycle and distribution of water resources.  
 
Trade-offs between increasing agricultural productivity through extra manpower and 
obtaining water varied according to water source type. While time taken to obtain 
water is a significant factor that affects agricultural revenue, further variables such as 
crop type, pesticide use, number of harvests per year, the type of labourers employed 
on the land, and tenure may also influence annual revenues and should be included in 
further research.  
 
Additionally, “No economic sector consumes as much freshwater as agriculture”, with 
rain-fed crops accounting for the majority of water consumption (Rockstrom et al. 
2010). Different crops have different water requirements throughout their growth 
cycle. Some of these crops are time dependent, which increases the significance of 
seasonal rainfall on agricultural output (Sayuti et al. 2004). 
 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
 
It is apparent that water resources on Lombok are stressed, and this research indicated 
societal scarcity for some areas of the island. This may lead to future physical water 
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scarcity, in particular when considering the impacts of climatic change. Rainfall 
projections indicate significant changes in seasonal rains in both timing and amount 
(Butler, Skewes, et al. 2014). The whole island is unlikely to experience a ‘drying’ as 
such; in fact some areas may remain unchanged in terms of rainfall. However, the 
northern part of the island is likely to experience significant rainfall decreases (Butler, 
Skewes, et al. 2014). These decreases may increase seasonal drying and alter 
monsoon timings, which are often key to agricultural cycles. River basin water 
balance indicates the impact of growing demand on surface water availability, with 
densely populated areas often situated in ‘extreme deficit’ river basins. Further 
research to model predicted temperature raises, and therefore evaporation, and 
extreme events (floods, droughts) should be conducted to present a clear indication of 
water resource vulnerabilities on the island, and how these issues may affect 
household water acquisition. 
 
Trade-offs between upstream and downstream users, ecosystems, and livelihoods are 
likely to occur when balancing access, availability, and allocation of water resources 
(Rockstrom et al. 2010, Calder 2005). Within island ecosystems, the finite nature of 
resources is both a key determinant and driver in implementing effective resource 
management, particularly linked to water resources.  
 
‘Secure’ water for the needs of any SES is complex and dynamic because of the many 
interdependent environmental and human variables. This supports the need to 
understand a more ‘complex’ reality of water scarcity due to the unpredictable nature 
of applying theoretical governance to communities on Lombok (Lichbach 2009). The 
mechanisms with which households, communities, and watersheds cope with water 
stress are predominantly determined by biophysical elements and interactions that 
control hydrological systems and cycles. Social, political, and economic capital also 
enables the maintenance of water supply systems through: infrastructure availability 
and distribution; management for increased supply; or more efficient use to meet 
demand. “Lack of social resources can also act as a bottleneck”, (Falkenmark et al. 
2007, Ohlsson and Turton 1999). When linked to time needed to obtain sufficient 
domestic water, which is taken away from other productive and revenue-generating 
activities, these bottlenecks may create a cycle of poverty. 
 
Consequently, how can water be managed on island socio-ecological systems such as 
Lombok, which has an intensive agricultural land use, high poverty levels, and a high 
population density? Climatic changes are also increasing both community and 
ecosystem vulnerability to water availability (Falkenmark et al. 2007). Where 
alternative livelihoods are limited, it is difficult to intensify land productivity, protect 
ecosystem services, and alleviate poverty.  
 
Lombok illustrates how expanding urban settlements have increased the demand for 
water away from rural areas, and how infrastructure has consequently been focused 
on urban systems. Large population sizes dictate demand for water resources, and 
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which societal sectors compete for them (Falkenmark et al. 2007). Rural communities 
themselves are often located in the upper catchments of watersheds (Rockstrom et al. 
2010). It is these rural communities on Lombok that often lack domestic water 
infrastructure. 
 
The agricultural sector on Lombok is also a high consumer of water. Export of 
‘virtual water’ - i.e.: the export of water-intensive agricultural commodities such as 
tobacco – may also be transferring water resources out of Lombok (Dalin et al. 2012, 
Allan 2003). Diverting limited water resources to increase agricultural productivity 
will result in trade-offs for other water users and sectors, both upstream and 
downstream (Rockstrom et al. 2004). Finding a balance to satisfy urban population 
demands, agricultural intensification, and the development of rural water 
infrastructure is complex.  
 
Already faced with a high effort to acquire domestic water, rural farming 
communities depend on unreliable crop water supply on Lombok. These communities 
are particularly vulnerable, both now and under future climatic changes, to changes in 
water availability. Changes in hydro-environments may also be increasing urban 
water scarcity and exacerbating the vulnerability of rural communities’ water access 
(Variravamoorthy, Gorantiwar, and Pathirana 2008, Rosegrant and Ringler 2000). 
Increasing demand-led management to focus on developing infrastructure and 
increasing efficient water use may enable a more sustainable use and equitable 
allocation of water resources. 
 
This paper has outlined some of the challenges facing communities on Lombok at 
household and village level in water stressed agro-ecosystems. It argues that 
smallholder farmers annual revenues are significantly affected by the access and 
availability of domestic water infrastructure, in particular proximity to urban 
infrastructure. Further study is necessary to determine if distance to infrastructure or 
rural wealth (for example, from crop type) affects smallholder annual revenues, or 
whether the wealth proxy used was inaccurate.  
 
“The story of meeting the challenges of water scarcity is a social story”, (Ohlsson and 
Turton 1999). For Lombok, this social component requires the need for increased 
efficiency in measures of water allocation and higher equity in resource access. 
Greater equity in resource access is related to limited nature of PDAM and a lack of 
water infrastructure in more rural areas.  Stronger governance, including greater 
coordination between government departments managing land and water, may help 
increase the efficiency of water allocation within catchments.  
 
Current water resource management and coping mechanisms to deal with water stress 
on Lombok are limited, but are focused on a ‘supply-based’ paradigm. This focuses 
on increasing access to water through improved infrastructure rather than 
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management of demand through end use efficiency. However, for marginal 
communities connecting to infrastructure or effort to obtain water within a supply-
based approach is often costly. Marginal communities are often in rural upstream 
areas. Their role in maintaining upper water catchment quality is also higher. A shift 
towards a ‘demand-based’ approach is therefore vital to overcome both current and 
potential future water shortages (Variravamoorthy, Gorantiwar, and Pathirana 2008). 
A ‘demand-based’ focus on end use efficiency may improve limited water resource 
allocation. Increased efficiency of water use, and resource storage, particularly during 
the rainy season, may reduce the vulnerability of communities on Lombok to 
seasonal, and climatic, water stress. 
 
An integrated approach that encompasses the multiple and competing goals is needed 
that would link better distribution and allocation of water resources. This could be 
achieved through improved governance and socio-economic measures, such as 
market-based incentives, with increased agricultural efficiency. Given predictions of 
climatic change and population growth, stronger, less fragmented institutional 
function, including improved infrastructure, is vital to manage limited water 
resources. To balance water demands from agriculture and expanding populations, 
improved and extended water-related infrastructure would foster improved access to 
water and could allow for a more sustainable use of Lombok’s water resources.  
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4 Exploring the relationships between 
incentive-based management, 
collective action and social equity: 
Protecting hydrological services on 
Lombok, Indonesia 
 
 
 
4.1 Abstract 
 
The use of incentive-based mechanisms to resolve conflict over natural resources has 
been promoted to protect ecosystem services and enable greater equity in resource 
distribution. This paper investigates incentive-based institutions to manage water 
resources on Lombok, Indonesia and how they affect issues of equality. Different 
forms of incentives were used, and each was highly context specific. The importance 
of institutional structure to individual and collective behaviours linked to the 
extraction and use of natural resources is well documented. This paper argues that the 
long-term legitimacy of such schemes requires careful design and projects’ 
implementation may not always be reflective of theoretical models. There should be a 
specific focus on understanding ‘real world’ dimensions such as the existing 
communal governing institutions, power relations, and social perceptions. This 
approach includes clear definitions of property rights, a high degree of transparency, 
and an appreciation of underlying cultural norms to ensure greater equity in 
participation and benefit distribution. Different institutional factors determine the 
extent of equity over efficiency. True markets for incentive-based systems may 
require inequality to balance the need to access natural resources to compensate for 
the opportunity costs associated with their use. Yet by solely focusing on efficient 
environmental outcomes – and not equity – the objectives of the incentives’ may be 
undermined. That may therefore increase pressure on ecosystem services through the 
unequal distribution of resources. 
 
 
4.2 Introduction 
 
This section provides an overview of issues regarding the provision of hydrological 
services on Lombok, Indonesia, as highlighted in Chapter 3, and discuss Indonesia’s 
political background, which is important to understand power relations and 
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governance, and their influence on natural resource equity. I then provide an 
introduction to the current literature surrounding the relationships between incentive-
based management, collective action, and social equity. I discuss three case studies 
from Lombok that illustrate these interactions within the context of Indonesian power 
relations, and the implications of implementing incentive-based management of 
ecosystem services in the real world in which they function. 
 
4.2.1 Hydrological services on Lombok 
 
As one of the most densely populated islands in Indonesia, an increased pressure on 
resources for growing agricultural and local consumption contributes to hydrological 
stress and creates a major concern for water management (Klock and Sjah 2007). 
Central to the supply of water services is Mount Rinjani. Forests surrounding its 
slopes are considered highly significant in the hydrological cycle. They regulate water 
flow and control land erosion (Asatawa 2004b, Pirard 2012b, Aukland, Moura Costa, 
and Brown 2003). Degradation of these catchments, predominantly through 
deforestation, affects water availability (Pirard 2012b, WWF-Indonesia 2001).  
 
As highlighted in Chapter 3, access to and availability of hydrological services for 
household consumption on Lombok is highly variable. Variation in surface water 
availability of basins is linked to the physical dimensions of the island itself, such as 
proximity to water sources, land cover and land use type, and altitude; and, social 
dimensions, such as population density, and infrastructure. Conflict over access to and 
availability of household water resources on Lombok has arisen following 
competition between sectors, such as agriculture, forests, opposing institutional 
management types, and large populations, demanding water. Governance of water 
supplies on Lombok therefore faces multiple challenges to meet these demands and 
sustainably manage limited water resources. The implementation of incentive-based 
management approaches at the community-scale raises questions as to how these 
demands for water can be aligned to avoid the elite capture of benefits, and to enable 
greater social equity and efficient conservation outcomes.   
 
4.2.2 Governance on Lombok 
 
Natural resource management issues are complex on Lombok. This complexity has 
led to a number of coping strategies – both social and technical. They have evolved to 
allow for the continuation of agricultural practices during dry season water shortages 
and the attempt to address conflict over environmental resources. The coping 
strategies include flexible cropping systems, water allocation mechanisms, traditional 
management practices, and alternative payment schemes implemented at island, 
regional and local scales (Klock and Sjah 2007). 
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Known as the “Island of a Thousand Mosques,” Lombok’s belief systems are central 
to the dominant indigenous people, Sasak, who represent 90% of the population. 
Belief systems, both traditional adat and Islam, are highly significant in governing 
both society and natural resources. The majority of the Sasak population follows a 
more orthodox Waktu Lima religion based on the five pillars of Islam. A minority of 
traditional communities follow Watku Telu, which also is based on the Islamic faith, 
The communities, however, also place significant importance on adat, which 
customary cultural laws that control individual and group behaviours (Krulfeld 1966). 
Waktu Telu communities are based upon a network of mutual obligations (gotong 
royong) for economic, social, and religious organization (Bowen 1986). Individuals 
are socially obligated to participate in communal aid and must follow the concept of 
maliq, meaning, “don’t” for activities that are taboo in nature. Disobedience of maliq 
is typically met with strong social criticism, which is based on a predetermined belief 
system that uses supernatural ancestral sanctions to deter individuals’ behaviour 
outside prescribed social norms. 
 
Governance in the wider political context of Indonesian Reformasi 
 
“Interpretations of changes in Indonesia’s macro-political context go to the heart of 
the potential nature of “elite capture” at the community.” (Fritzen 2007).  
 
Since the fall of President Soeharto’s centralized ‘New Order’ regime in 1997, a 
political system of Reformasi has driven significant changes in formal centralized 
authoritarian governance at central, provisional, district, and local levels. This change, 
with shifts in formal governance and the resulting realignment of power relations, 
presents a highly applicable framework in which to research the emergence of 
different institutional designs for managing natural resources and whether these 
institutions require or reduce inequality. 
 
The decentralization of power in Indonesia is viewed as “political normalization,” i.e. 
the process of decentralized power becoming the norm across Indonesia  (UNDP 
2004, Fritzen 2007, Bank 2004). Hadiz (2003, 2004) argues that while “democratic 
transition” is occurring in Indonesia with dramatic changes in institutional structure, 
the power relations themselves remain the same. Fritzen (2007) supports this view. 
He highlights the significant difference between Reformasi political and social 
institutions and the actual implementation at the local context. 
 
The World Bank (2004) identifies community-level development, with donors as 
catalysts, to be vital to change local power relations. It empowers local communities 
through providing incentives for local governmental accountability (Fritzen 2007). 
Yet the rapid use of new governance forms, or those that poorly align with the local 
context, can allow elite manipulation and promote inequity (Fritzen 2007). Inequity 
and elite capture of benefits may not always malicious. For example, elites whose 
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actions, while disparate in power, control rather than capture benefits through altruism 
and sharing of some benefits with the poor (Dasgupta and Beard 2007, Mansuri and 
Rao 2004). It may be impossible, however, to avoid control of hierarchical powers in 
community development initiatives. It would be useful to investigate if, and thus how, 
and under what institutional framework, the role of such inequalities can be 
constructive (Fritzen 2007, Chowdhury and Yamauchi 2010). 
 
The creation of local government infrastructure opens up vulnerabilities to inequity. 
Social heterogeneity (elite capture and poverty), political awareness levels, and social 
cohesion between local areas influence the power relationships that underpin local 
authority infrastructure (Chowdhury and Yamauchi 2010, Fritzen 2007, Platteau 
2004). The complexity of multiple traditional, religious, and ethnic institutions in 
Indonesia results in a mix of complementary and competing institutions. These 
institution have a varied impact at local levels (Ostrom et al. 1999). Fritzen (2007) 
and Haidz (2003) suggest that while Indonesia is “democratized,” decentralization of 
governmental structures has merely “reorganized but not transformed” power 
relations in local contexts. While Indonesia may be decentralized on paper, in 
practice, local systems of governance remain centralized. 
 
4.2.3 How does incentive-based management of ecosystem services 
address inequity? 
 
To protect ecosystems’ long-term integrity, efficient and equitable institutions are 
required to manage the interconnections between societies, ecosystems, and 
environmental service delivery (Vatn 2010b, Vira 1997, Vatn 2010a). Given the 
complexity and dynamics of social and ecological systems, finding appropriate 
institutions to manage the environment is “one of the greatest challenges in the realm 
of environmental protection” (Ostrom 1990, Clements 2012, Ostrom 2007b). 
Institutions -- defined as, “the rules of the game” (North 1990) – are social practices, 
which determine participation in decision-making. They also define which activities 
are allowed and constrained, and what structures are used for social interaction 
(Mehring et al. 2011, Ostrom 1990). Groups of individuals within an institution’s 
framework operate in material organisations. These are based on rules that can be 
formal, such as policy, property rights, and legal systems, or informal, such as social 
norms, local customs, or traditions which shape interactions (Corbera 2005b, North 
1990). The local social, economic, political, and external environmental context will 
significantly influence these social practices, either formal or informal. 
 
Vatn (2010a) describes three types of institutional structures that enable governance: 
Hierarchical (‘systems of command’), Markets (‘voluntary exchange’), and 
Community structures (‘based on cooperation’). These types of structures influence a 
society’s economic growth and human welfare (North 1990, Clements 2012). Human 
action and social change also can affect and reshape institutions. They influence 
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which individuals can make decisions, how these decisions are controlled (Corbera 
2005b). 
 
Regimes that manage environmental resources are types of institutions (Erkstom and 
Young 2009, Young, King, and Schroeder 2008). At various scales, institutions 
enable practices that address and govern ecosystem-based management. Institutions 
can have a strong influence over environmental resources. Institutions’ function and 
structure also can affect societal behaviours towards the environment, which can 
consequently impact demand for ecosystem services (Swallow and Meinzen-Dick 
2009, Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern 2003). Importantly, the most significant institutions 
that address environmental governance may not be specifically designed for that 
purpose (Erkstom and Young 2009, Young, King, and Schroeder 2008). 
 
Institutions do not function alone. They interact with and within other institutions, and 
social, political, economic, and biophysical dimensions. This creates significant 
uncertainty in determining institutional outcomes. Governance often affects the 
outcome of other institutional arrangements, and can have both positive and negative 
results (Young, King, and Schroeder 2008). The dynamics, functionality, and multi-
level nature of social-ecological systems make the ‘fit’ of institutions to the temporal 
and spatial scales difficult to achieve (Young, King, and Schroeder 2008, Erkstom 
and Young 2009). Effective institutional governance must take into account the local 
context that both influences, and is influenced by, societies in which they are placed. 
 
Incentive-based institutions for ecosystem services seek to enable change in 
institutional structures to modify environmental behaviours. They also serve as a 
mechanism to redistribute benefits from ecosystems (Corbera 2005a). Incentive-based 
institutions try to integrate both biodiversity protection and sustainable development. 
The aim is to link the institutions with wider political goals such as environmental 
neoliberalism, conservation, poverty reduction, and ecosystem services frameworks 
(Clements 2012, Naidoo et al. 2008). In many locations, such command and control 
environmental institutions are limited in their scope, efficiency and overall 
effectiveness in protecting ecosystem services (Swallow and Meinzen-Dick 2009).  
Traditional market processes rarely capture public goods and the value of ecosystem 
services (i.e.: water provision, carbon storage, and nutrient cycling) (Costanza et al. 
1997, Travers 2009). Uncompensated benefits become positive ‘externalities.’ 
Processes such as deforestation drive natural ecosystem service degradation and loss 
(Landell-Mills and Porras 2002). The inclusion of environmental costs for lost 
services would, more often than not, reduce the economic efficiency of ecosystem 
degradation (Balmford et al. 2002). The use of compensatory incentives to offset lost 
opportunity cost can help resolve conflicts between natural resources and resource-
users, and therefore make them more efficient in managing ecosystem services 
(Wunder, Engel, and Pagiola 2008). 
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Based on an ecosystem services approach, the use of such incentives (often economic, 
including Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES)) has generated strong interest. The 
criteria for incentive schemes are based upon Wunder (2005b) early studies. Funded 
either by direct or indirect services users, incentive-based institutions have the 
potential to mobilise financial resources to integrate the short-term immediacy of 
conservation goals with the long-term economic and social change of development 
objectives (McShane et al. 2010, Tacconi 2007, Ferraro 2001). Influencing 
individuals’ natural resource-use decisions via incentives also can serve as a 
redistributive mechanism between different social groups and ecosystem users 
(Adams and Hulme 2001, Barrett and Arcese 1995, Kumar and Muradian 2008).  
 
Where incentives are involved, the type of ecosystem service is important in an 
institutional design and governance context (Swallow and Meinzen-Dick 2009). The 
case studies in this research focused on watershed service provision through 
incentive-based institutions. These aimed to protect watershed integrity to enable 
adequate flow, withstand flash floods (a frequent event in Lombok upper catchments), 
while also increasing social equity of access to the resource. These mechanisms were 
often managed through the installation of water infrastructure and forest replantation. 
Institutions to manage watersheds are complex. Multiple actors, various organisation 
levels, and a high degree of interaction with other institutions were evident. As a 
common pool resource, ground water is seen as a public good, with a high cost of 
excluding free riders. The benefits of water resources are subtractive in nature and 
have a communal use, this denotes that, “when water is scarce, conflict is likely” 
(Wade 1987). 
 
When dealing with natural resource management, the influence of incentive-based 
institutions on individuals’ and organisations’ behaviour and decision-making is 
convoluted, particularly when institutional ‘interplay’ is high. It is therefore difficult 
to align theoretical assumptions with the ‘messy’ reality of outcomes from incentive-
based institution implementation For example, the culture and social norms that 
structure the society is highly significant (Rojas 2006). The impact of existing power 
relations and well-defined and enforced property rights also are essential to 
understand for the creation of functioning markets for incentives. 
 
Local governance institutions play a key role in determining variation in forest 
conditions (Agrawal and Ostrom 2001). The role of local institutions in natural 
resource governance is highly dynamic. They have a multi-directional influence on 
socioeconomic, political, and environmental outcomes.  Anderson and Agrawal 
(2011) argue that the structure and strength of these local institutions can affect 
socioeconomic contexts. They contend that governance institutions can mediate the 
positive or negative effects of these contexts, which arise from market forces, 
demographic pressures, and political regimes.  
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4.2.4 Collective action and maximising social utility 
 
Incentive-based institutions draw from theories of economic rationality aimed at 
maximising individual benefit. Yet human motivation is complex (Vatn 2010b, Vatn 
2010a). Rational choice alone cannot explain individual behaviour. And it is this very 
behaviour that incentive-based institutions aim to influence through rational utility 
maximisation (e.g. Hardin 1968). The use of economic theory to predict natural 
resource behaviours overlooks social utility maximisation, such as existing social and 
cultural activities such as collective property rights and customary laws (e.g. Vatn 
1009). These communal local institutions, however, may represent significantly 
strong incentives and should be considered in incentive-based institution design to 
understand the foundations of behavioural motivation (McAfee 2012b, Kreps 1997, 
Gachter and Fehr 1999, Fehr and Falk 2002).  
 
The type of resources and associated property rights also should not be overlooked. 
Exploitation for some resource types may occur under multiple property rights (Wade 
1987). Water is a common pool resource with a joint subtractive use. Social 
organisation is required to distribute and ration water resources, and regulate 
individuals’ access and use rights (Mosse 2003). Where resource appropriators help 
create and adapt rules, self-organised systems of resource governance can emerge. 
Where common goals, which cannot be achieved by individual actions, are obtained 
through actions of more than one person (Wade 1987), cooperative solutions can 
result. These cooperative behaviours to manage common resources, argue Mosse 
(1997, 2003), also can arise from moral conscience or social norms. This research will 
contribute to the debate surrounding the emergence of collective action and its role in 
managing common pool resources. It focuses on the implementation of incentive-
based management to motivate collective action and how benefits are distributed. 
 
4.2.5 What conditions enable collective action to emerge?  
 
Wade (1987, 1988) suggests that motivation to prevent the depletion of common pool 
resources – a development on the Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin 1968) – drives 
collective action for environmental behaviours. Hardin argues that without regulation 
and property rights, common pool resources will be depleted. Wade proposes that it is 
the risk of resource depletion and scarcity, linked to ecological variation across water 
catchments, which has significant effect on the strength of any collective cooperation. 
Mosse (2003) furthers this viewpoint. He suggests that the very nature of physical 
control of water resources creates a social role for water, and, as such, influences 
social organisation. He argues that institutional responses are the result of ecological 
conditions, which influence water availability. These responses ultimately shape 
village-level strategies and power alliances, the historical variation of which is highly 
significant in local water management regimes (Mosse 2003). 
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“Cooperation is not, as Wade suggests, an all or nothing option (1987:187).” (Mosse 
2003).  
 
Water management systems are often embedded in social customs. Their evolution 
towards more formal regulation and visible organisational structures is not smooth 
(Mosse 2003). The likelihood for collective action is difficult to predetermine in the 
real world. While ecological determinants are significant, they are not independent 
from historical and political complexities, nor from the social dimensions of common 
pool resources that have also shaped institutions (Mosse 2003). This may suggest that 
collective action may be higher in smaller, homogeneic groups that try to reduce their 
vulnerability and communal dependence on natural resources. These relationships 
often exist through religion, folklore, social norms and traditional customs (Mosse 
2003). In contrast, large groups, whose common interest has a wider scope, may 
require greater incentives, such as selective punishment, to achieve group objectives 
(Olson 1971, Varughese and Ostrom 2001). 
 
By working towards a common objective, collective action has the potential to 
provide a catalyst to reduce the impacts of socioeconomic inequality on the 
environment (Anderson and Agrawal 2011). As such, drivers of this action, other than 
economic efficiency, such as religious or social norms, cultural obligations or 
education programmes, may have a greater influence on community cooperation. 
They can enable more positive environmental behaviours, which overcome 
transaction costs and barriers to participation by smallholders (Swallow and Meinzen-
Dick 2009). Conversely, existing inequalities can undermine the likelihood of 
collective action. Differences in resource availability may affect the need for, and 
ability to undertake, such action. 
 
4.2.6 Efficiency vs. equity in benefit capture arising from collective action 
 
Socioeconomic inequalities negatively affect common pool resources (Anderson and 
Agrawal 2011). This heterogeneity may reduce the sustainability of collective action 
for natural resource management. That can include the exhibition of high levels of 
distrust, the unequal distribution of powers to make decisions, and the 
disproportionate allocation of benefits from the common resource managed by an 
institution (Neupane 2003, Seabright 1993, Moore 1993). These inequalities can 
create a potential vicious circle of free-riding, over-harvesting, and unsustainable 
environmental outcomes. 
 
Conversely, others argue that these socioeconomic inequalities are essential to, and 
reinforce, ecosystem services incentive-based institutions (McAfee 2012b, Engel, 
Lopez, and Palmer 2006). Engel, Lopez, and Palmer (2006) suggest that to maintain 
cooperation and collective action for natural resource management, it is crucial to 
have inequality in both material goods and socioeconomic interests. This creates a 
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‘market’ in which to bargain for and provide incentives to obtain material or social 
benefits. McAfee (2012b) debates that the very logic of PES (i.e.: to provide 
incentives based on opportunity costs) in itself is “anything but neutral.” She 
highlights that those better off are more likely to profit from deforestation and land 
degradation because they often have greater capital to do so, land tenure, and access 
to labour etc. To compensate for these high opportunity costs, significant incentives 
are required. As such, wealthier individuals may benefit more than the poor from 
incentive-based institutions. This valuation of opportunity costs, however, does not 
take into account the historical context of current power relations, which determine 
the current state of hierarchical opportunity costs. That includes the strength of 
purchasing and bargaining power, and the level of need for those buying and selling. 
This suggests that it is an inherent outcome of incentive-based institutions that costs 
and benefits are distributed unequally, thus maintaining, if not increasing, inequity. 
 
Inequity of resource appropriation may lead to the elite capture of benefits. This 
phenomenon arises when those with greater political and/or economic power, and 
influence, appropriate public resources meant for communal benefit at the expense of 
the less influential or minority groups (NCAER 2009). Weak institutions, changes in 
resource ownership, and fluctuating values make rent seeking more attractive. Those 
who would have been entitled to receive benefits may be taken over by new actors 
(Kronenberg and Hubacek 2013). That includes less economically or politically 
strong areas of the community experiencing reduced access to public good than 
others. This inequality causes serious concern during the provision of public goods in 
areas where the poor are disempowered and are unable to counteract the power of the 
local elite (Platteau 2004, Chowdhury and Yamauchi 2010). The inequality can 
reduce cooperation and diminish ecological resources. To improve the equity of 
resource distribution, decentralisation of power is required (Bank 2003, 
Chowdhury and Yamauchi 2010). The benefits of decentralisation for greater 
equity in the distribution of public goods is, however, likely to be obsolete and 
ineffective if there is elite capture, especially at the local level (Chowdhury and 
Yamauchi 2010, Travers 2009, Vatn 2010b, Vatn 2010a). 
 
Many assumptions must be made in analysing the extent and influence of elite 
capture on institutions. These assumptions are in addition to the multiple factors 
that also influence institutions and the phenomenon of elite capture on the 
ground (Platteau 2004). Many factors determine ‘elites.’ They range from class, 
ethnic group, traditional hierarchies, political affiliation and power, to groups 
historically discriminated against, religious affiliation and socioeconomic status 
(NCAER 2009). Galasso and Ravallion (2000) note that in communities that were 
unequal to begin with, elites captured larger benefit shares, and with a higher 
bargaining power, they also had a stronger influence on decisions over public 
goods. 
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Not all individuals in power, however, divert resources from their intended 
beneficiaries. In studies by Platteau (2004), where elites enable an improved 
situation for the poor, the outcome proved to be of greater importance to the 
poor than the elites who may have benefited from the potential appropriation of 
resources. Other studies found that elites operating in more informal institutions 
were less likely to capture benefits than those influencing more formal 
governance systems (Alatas et al. 2013). Understanding local power relations is 
essential to enable institutional effectiveness. Many projects change institutional 
structures, but power relations and hierarchies remain (Fritzen 2007). 
 
Rights over access to, and use of, natural resources also influence power relations and 
hierarchies. They affect the equitable nature of their governance structures. Property 
rights are essential for market institutions to exist. Institutions such as PES are, in 
themselves, the creation of new forms of property. They may alter power relations 
and institutional trade-offs involved in those relationships.  
 
Without a sense of resource ownership, individuals tend to seek short-term gains 
(Hardin 1968). Where there are large boundaries, it also is difficult to define the 
relationship between resources and user groups – such as understanding user 
demands, resource knowledge, and proximity. These blurred definitions can affect 
negotiations between participants of incentive-based institutions. They can lead to the 
commodification of resources, which generate new socio-economic hierarchies and 
changes in access to wealth and resources. A lack of defined relationships can 
potentially result in unequal bargaining power (Kronenberg and Hubacek 2013).  
 
To understand incentive-based institutions, it is essential to examine the biophysical, 
social, economic, and political contexts in which they are based (McAfee 2012b). By 
their very nature, such institutions are significant in determining access to, and rights 
over, natural resources. They also define environmental values for specific societal 
groups. The processes, which drive institutional change and adaptation, create 
synergies and trade-offs for both natural resources and the wider society. That 
includes levels of inequality (Vira and Adams 2009, Redford and Adams 2009). The 
efficiency and equity of incentive-based institutions, including the ‘interplay’ between 
incentive-based institutions and other rural institutions, remains unclear. Incentive-
based institutions that focus specifically on water resources may have a greater 
‘interplay’ than others because of their multiple temporal and spatial scales and 
actors. 
 
 
4.3 Research questions 
 
This paper therefore addresses the following research questions: 
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1: Can incentive-based institutions function be determined by greater equality? 
 
2: To what degree can incentive-based institutions influence equality within 
communities? 
 
Understanding these questions may provide insights into the theoretical application of 
providing incentives to alter behaviours. This may determine whether an incentive-
based institution contributes or prevents further deterioration of ecosystem services, 
and the institutions’ impact on cultural and societal norms (Daily et al. 2009, Galaz et 
al 2008, Young et al 2008).  
 
 
4.4 Methodology 
 
Analysing the efficiency and equity of institutions is challenging and multifaceted 
(McShane et al. 2010, Clements 2012). Collective action is dynamic in nature, with 
multiple variables in play at any one time. These not only influence the social and 
ecological conditions of a system, but also the processes that underpin systemic 
changes. Multiple variables lead to high levels of uncertainty in measuring and 
determining cause and effect (Meinzen-Dick et al 2004). The uncertain long-term 
nature of these impacts and outcomes – whether positive or negative – make the 
identification and attribution of specific variables difficult in any short-term study. 
Yet by exploring these relationships, trade-offs and synergies can be shown that may 
influence the institutional design of incentive-based institutions related to ecosystem-
based management. 
 
4.4.1 Case study selection 
 
Four comparative case studies were purposely selected to illustrate the role of 
incentive-based institutions. These were Lebah Suren, Ledang Nangka, Gangga, and 
Gitek Demung. Each study represented diverse institutional structures and contextual 
variables to the management of water provision in Lombok. The four case studies 
presented in this paper illustrate the complex relationships between stakeholders in 
the capture of common pool resources. All case studies were situated in the upper 
catchments on the slopes of Mount Rinjani and the incentive-based management 
observed in these case studies emerged as a result of conflict over, and access to, 
water.  
 
The communities themselves largely initiated this management. In two locations, 
however, government or non-government organisations (NGOs) played a role. In 
Lebah Suren, government and NGOs were major instigators of the incentive-based 
institutions. In Gitek Demung, government PNPM (Practical Projects to Empower 
Society) projects also provided funding and institutional design. In all case studies 
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except Ledang Nangka, communities were isolated and dependent on the adjacent 
forest for the majority of their cash and subsistence livelihoods. These livelihoods 
were dominated by rice-based agriculture with irrigation and rain-fed systems. They 
also included agroforestry, and tobacco and maize agriculture. Incentive-based 
institutions had been initiated in the communities after conflict arise over water 
availability and access to resources.  
 
4.4.2 Methods 
 
Household questionnaires, key informant interviews, and focus groups were 
conducted using Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) principles (Chambers 1994a, 
Mukherjee 1997). Approximately 30 household questionnaires, two focus groups, and 
two to three key informant interviews were conducted per village. Households and 
focus groups were randomly selected, while key informants were chosen for their 
involvement in incentive-based management (e.g. WWF), or their role in village 
governance (i.e. Village Heads). While user groups in the case studies did not own 
property, and often shared natural resources with other user groups, they had similar 
de factor managerial rights. Some access rights had emerged after the decentralisation 
program in 1998. That included Gangga and Gitek Demung, where forest resources 
were opened to both outsiders and community members.  
 
The questionnaires focused on understanding respondent perceptions and values of 
resources, their comprehension of incentives and their role in motivating 
environmental behaviours, and access to and availability of natural resources, in 
particular hydrological resources. Key informant interviews and focus group 
discussions focused on understanding why incentive-based management had emerged, 
how they functioned, and the extent to which community members were involved in 
decision-making, collective activities and receipt of benefits. 
 
Where possible, male and female focus groups were conducted separately. These 
groups enabled more qualitative discussions beyond the semi-structured 
questionnaire. Focus groups and key informant interviews enabled triangulation of 
contexts and institutional function as perceived by the local community. All 
questionnaires, key informant interviews, and focus groups were conducted with the 
assistance of a trained researcher in Bahasa Indonesian, translating from Sasak where 
necessary.  
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4.5 Results 
 
4.5.1 Case Study 1: Ledang Nangka village, East Lombok – Incentive: 
Religion 
 
A local company, BUMDES (Badan Usaha Milik Desa - Village Owned Enterprises), 
was established in 1993 to manage water supply to reduce conflict over water access 
and maintain water supply to households. The company has used the influence of the 
local mosque to create informal rules, which determine environmental behaviours and 
ensure compliance across seven sub-villages.  
 
Situated on the lower slopes of Mount Rinjani, the village is not directly affected by 
forest clearing. Agricultural and population expansion has, however, increased 
pressure on water supply, creating intra-community conflict over access. Payments 
are made by the community to BUMDES to pump water to households, manage a 
small reservoir, and maintain vegetation around the spring. The mosque retains 
approximately 45 % of all payments. Religious beliefs are predominant throughout 
Lombok, and the Waktu Lima belief is particularly evident in Ledang Nangka. The 
mosque had a separate water source, “So that the community water does not disturb 
it. Therefore if there is community conflict, there is always water for religious 
activities,” Head of BUMDES.  
 
Friday prayers are used to communicate monthly budgets, communal activities 
required to reduce water contamination, and the project’s overall progress. This 
feedback mechanism results in high transparency of, and high participation in, the 
institution. It draws on the community’s religious belief to ensure that rules are 
adhered to as, “we do not want to be bad Muslims,” respondent, men’s focus group. 
All households were able to benefit from the infrastructure (cleaner water, greater 
access and availability), as long as payments were made. Greater equity in water 
resource provision had reduced inter-community conflict. This was exemplified by 
the transparency of the management, and the use of religious fervour to motivate 
collective activities. This built upon underlying social norms and was, therefore, 
likely to induce stronger compliance and participation in communal action for the 
common goal of water provision. 
 
4.5.2 Case Study 2: Lebah Suren, Sub-village, West Lombok – Incentive: 
Money 
 
Situated within the Dodokan watershed, the main catchment providing water to 
Mataram and west Lombok, this case study is the closest to a typical ‘PES’ system. 
With state-induced formal rules, Lebah Suren showed the greatest impact of external 
institutional control over resources and the incentive-based institution. A multiple 
stakeholder intermediary, IMP (Institut Multi Pihak), manages the scheme, which 
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aims to increase efficiency of water provision for downstream users and protect forest 
habitats. The project was established after societal concern over the impacts of forest 
degradation on water flow to Mataram Municipality and an economic valuation of 
Mount Rinjani (WWF-Indonesia 2001). Stakeholders include, an international non-
governmental organisation (WWF), a local NGO (Konsepsi), community 
representatives, and the Department of Forestry. 
 
Service beneficiaries from West Lombok regency pay a consumer tax on their water 
use. The payment is used to cover the Dodokan project’s costs, including payments to 
communities on the upper slopes. These communities compete for payments annually 
through proposals from local farmer groups. Three groups (approximately 75 
individuals) per year receive funding for reforestation of 300 ha of community 
production forest (HKm) land that produces mahogany and agroforestry species. 
These species were chosen to enable the community to obtain benefit from the trees 
once they reach maturity. The money also is used for ‘economic development,’ which 
is decided by the community. Farmer groups received funds for the year period. Each 
year, a new proposal must be submitted. ‘Economic development’ funding is 
predominantly used towards small-scale microfinance. In 2011, legislation was passed 
to ensure consumer tax payments to fund the project. The regional legislation 
currently only applies to West Lombok. Service beneficiaries in Mataram 
Municipality, one of the highest consumers of the Dodokan watershed, are not 
required to pay for water services, although they draw water from the same source as 
West Lombok.  
 
The IMP, the stakeholder intermediary, decides which community groups will be 
allocated funds. The criteria for selection are often unclear, which generates mistrust 
from unsuccessful community groups. The IMP monitors monthly implementation, 
including fines for non-compliance. Lebah Suren was one of three community groups 
currently receiving money from the scheme in 2011. Payments are only made for one 
year, after which communities must submit a new funding proposal. A single group 
within a sub-village receives payments and seedlings to plant within their HKm 
community production forest plots.  
 
The community of Lebah Suren is focused on the provision of sustainable water 
resources. It prioritises water supply for two collectively owned hydroelectric power 
generators that supply the village. This focus appeared to drive much of the 
community’s cohesion around communal activities, including water pipe maintenance 
and work by farmer groups. Many respondents were concerned that, “Villages 
downstream are taking too much water. We need to protect it to get electricity,” 
respondent, men’s focus group; and, that “Our electricity [availability] is disturbed 
often,” respondent, women’s focus group. Many respondents spoke of the need for 
constant pipe maintenance to prevent blocked water supply, and that it was the 
community’s role to work together to fix this. Pride over the community hydroelectric 
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power generators was high (not all households had access to piped water, but all parts 
of the village had access to electricity), and many felt a desire to protect it from other 
villages. “Other villages want access to it [the hydroelectric power generator], but 
we have to protect our water.”  
 
Very few individuals of this community received economic benefit from this scheme. 
As a result, few were motivated specifically by these financial incentives to act 
collectively. Many respondents did not consider the scheme to be of significance for 
their households, or their community. “I don’t trust them [IMP]. I don’t pay 
attention to them. I have no interest and I am too busy with my own work,” 
questionnaire respondent. Collective action did, nonetheless, exist in Lebah Suren. 
While Islam is strong within the community, a more transitional culture of Waktu 
Lima appears to drive social norms and gotong royong. Communal activities to 
protect households from outsiders were developed from Awiq-awiq rules. “We are 
able to protect our community better than others [other villages] as our community 
is so strong,” respondent, men’s focus group. 
 
4.5.3 Case Study 3: Gangga, Sub-village, North Lombok – Incentive: 
Collective action/ Adat 
 
Situated in the upper catchment, Gangga is a more traditional community based on 
the Waktu Telu religious belief. It uses collective action and adat, known locally as 
awiq-awiq, to reduce conflict over water availability and to protect the forest from 
illegal logging. Awiq-awiq are community-specific customary laws. These informal 
rules inform social norms and motivate cooperative behaviours. The sub-village is 
part of Genggelang village, and together with Gitek Demung, represents the fourth 
case study.  
 
The sub-village borders the Mount Rinjani protected forest, and experienced severe 
logging from external companies following the decentralisation of the late 1990’s. To 
remove these companies, local groups were organised to patrol and protect the 
community forest. UNICEF developed piped water infrastructure in Gangga in the 
1980s. Conflict over the availability of water resources and the ownership of water 
pipe infrastructure along the water catchment arose in both Gangga and between other 
sub-villages. These conflicts were accentuated by drought events – the last of which 
occurred in 2010 – that damaged irrigation pipes.  
 
To counteract the conflict over resources, the community developed new informal 
institutional rules to ensure equitable access and manage future extreme events. 
Building on existing social customary laws, the community has developed collective 
activities to protect the forest area around the spring, community agroforestry plots, 
and the pipe infrastructure. These existing social customary laws included: A ban on 
deforestation, slash and burn, and building activities within the forest; Forest patrols 
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to prevent non-compliance; and, communal pipe maintenance when infrastructure was 
damaged. These activities are led by the head of the sub-village, who oversees forest 
patrols to prevent illegal logging, and initiates communal activities when needed (i.e. 
after a flood has damaged pipes). “If we take care of the forest, we have no water 
problems,” Gangga village head. 
 
All households have access to piped water with payments only required on an ad hoc 
basis for maintenance. Local customary laws require all community members to 
protect the forest, with punishment, such as social exclusion, fines or reduced water 
access, for non-compliance. Collective activities developed from these cultural norms 
have led to community members working to maintain the infrastructure for water 
access and protect the surrounding forest to ensure water resource availability. 
 
4.5.4 Case Study 4: Gitek Demung, Sub-village, North Lombok – Incentive: 
Adat/ Money 
 
As a sub-village of Genggelang village (see case study 3), Gitek Demung is situated 
in the upper catchment of a small watershed, which stretches the length of 
Genggelang village. Following a drought event and increasing intra- and inter-village 
conflict over water availability, a local institution, PAMDES, was established. 
PAMDES was built on customary laws, awiq-awiq, and earlier water infrastructure 
developments in Gangga, monthly payments of US $1 are now made to the institution 
to ensure piped access. Awiq-awiq is used to protect the forest area (33 ha) around the 
spring to maintain water flow and enable greater equality in access for all sub-villages 
along the Genggelang’s catchment. Payments are used for the salaries of PAMDES 
(70 %), contributions towards the village government (30 %), and forest maintenance 
(10 %).  
 
Awiq-awiq customs ensure that financial punishments for non-compliance occur. “It 
[awiq-awiq] is more effective than jail,” head of village. Consumers accept payments 
as an assurance of access to water. Transparency is extremely low, which creates high 
levels of mistrust towards PAMDES by some community members. While the origins 
of awiq-awiq ensure that community members worked together and maintained 
acceptable social norms, there does not appear to be much participation of the broader 
community in the implementation and decision-making of the institution that manages 
water. Conflict remains both within Gitek Demung and between other sub-villages in 
Genggelang, including Gangga. During the study period, the head of PAMDES was 
driven out of the village following a severe water scarcity within downstream sub-
villages at the height of the dry season. While community members want greater 
access to sustainable water resources (although not all had access to piped water via 
PAMDES, but continued to rely upon the spring), there appeared to be low levels of 
community cohesion 
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In Gitek Demung, inconsistent application of both awiq-awiq and PAMDES to 
manage household water resources appeared to generate both inefficient management 
and low equity in benefit allocation. Incentives for collective action, such as did not 
appear to be explicitly linked to either these traditional laws or financial motivations, 
i.e. underlying social norms, nor working towards common goals for improved access 
to and availability of water resources. Mistrust of PAMDES was evident: “Water is 
not distributed evenly, as who [ever] pays more gets more water,” questionnaire 
respondent; and, “If you have more money then you can afford to pay for better 
[water] flow,” respondent, mixed focus group. Many respondents felt that their 
community was not benefiting from this management, and, therefore, “The 
community has to sort its own problems,” female respondent, mixed focus group. 
The use of awiq-awiq did, however, provide indirect incentives to manage the 
environment (i.e. but not specifically household water provision), such as communal 
maintenance of HKm Community Forest. Yet, unlike Gangga, further upstream, who 
had more control over pipe, when water availability was low, they “Had no other 
options,” respondent, mixed focus group. 
 
 
4.6 Discussion 
 
These case studies provide an insight into the ways that incentive-based management 
motivated collective action, and how resulting benefits were allocated.  They draw on 
the debates surrounding collective action driven by Mosse (1997, 2003) -- that 
collective action arises from moral conscience or social norms -- and Wade (1988) – 
that collective action develops in order to obtain common goals with greater 
efficiency.  
 
In Lombok, public policies and incentive-based mechanisms appear to be strongly 
aligned (Pirard 2012c). Many of the incentive-based initiatives are linked to local, 
regional, and national policies such as reforestation through seedling plantation, 
which occurred in all four case studies.  There were strong institutional differences 
among the case studies that range from how they were started to how they were 
governed. The very nature of market-based incentives denotes certain elements such 
as conditionality, additionality, and positive rewards. The incentive-based 
management observed in these case studies included positive incentives in the form of 
social rewards, and financial gain. Additionality was not clear in any of the case 
studies, but conditionality, such as fines or social exclusion for non-compliance 
existed and was enforced to varying degrees in Ledang Nangka, Lebah Suren, and 
Gitek Demung.  
 
Analyses of the four institutional case studies on Lombok highlight how multiple 
factors impact the distribution of benefits under natural resource incentive-based 
mechanisms. All case studies illustrated a variety of institutional design, and that, 
4:  Incentive-based management, collective action and social equity 
 -118- 
while theoretical assumptions can be drawn, the ‘messy’ reality of their 
implementation makes it difficult for correlation to be clearly determined. Both 
formal and informal rules were in place, and there was varying extent of respondent 
understanding of mechanisms’ objectives and how they were enforced. Formal rules 
existed in Ledang Nangka, Lebah Suren, and Gitek Demung, which regulated 
payments and conditionality.  
 
Can incentive-based institutional function be determined by greater equity? 
 
The case studies show that the implementation of formal rules within an institutional 
framework is often accompanied by existing traditional informal rules, which shape 
underlying social norms and power relations. These underlying factors have 
significant implications for the design and implementation of incentive-based 
institutions. The combination of formal and informal rules can be complementary, 
which allows for the use of religious incentives alongside more formal rules in the 
case of Ledang Nangka. It can also competing, which involves new legislation to 
manage resources in parallel to traditional community rules in the case of Lebah 
Suren. Individuals’ understanding and awareness of traditional, or more informal, 
rules appeared to be greater than more formal rules from either from IMP (Lebah 
Suren), or PAMDES and BUMDES companies (Gitek Demung and Ledang Nangka, 
respectively).  
 
All case studies exhibited levels of heterogeneity and hierarchy. There was evidence 
of social hierarchies and significant power relations, which appeared to be involved in 
community and incentive-based institutional function. Traditional Indonesian 
hierarchies were evident, as local government administrators and religious groups had 
significant power and influence over communities, and the incentive-based 
institutions. The ability to determine clear relationships between hierarchies and 
behaviour was difficult due to the complex, intertwined nature of social relationships, 
intrinsic, and extrinsic motivation in practice. 
 
As with much of Indonesia, Islam was a strong, underlying force within each 
community. Mosques played an important central role. They provided a strong focal 
point. This included communicating incentive-based institution information during 
Friday prayers as well as “motivating the young” (key informant, Ledang Nangka) to 
participate in community activities. It was only in Ledang Nangka where the mosque 
was used as a communication tool to influence compliance to the market via the 
community’s religious devotion.  
 
Where incentive-based institutions were built on clear hierarchies power relations 
appeared to be reinforced. It also indicated a stronger likelihood of compliance to 
institutional rules, which suggests that socio-economic equity is not required for this 
management to function. In cases where hierarchies were limited, or existed via social 
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obligations under adat, the existence of an incentivised market was unclear, though 
collective action remained high. 
 
4.6.1 Conditions that enable collective action – Wade vs Mosse 
 
Community discussions implied that collective action in Gangga and Gitek Demung 
evolved from existing informal rules that emerged from awiq-awiq and cultural 
community ties. These cultural practices are reflective of the Waktu Telu culture, 
where social obligations to the wider community control or influence social 
behaviours. Since 2008 in Gitek Demung, these norms had developed into a more 
hierarchical scheme when stronger management was required across a larger spatial 
scale to resolve conflict over water access. Both of these case studies support 
arguments by Mosse (1997, 2003) that collective action is driven by underlying social 
and cultural norms that motivate community cooperation. The use of economic 
efficiency arguments (Wade 1988) to design incentive-based initiatives would not be 
appropriate in these Lombok case studies. Incentives to alter environmental 
behaviours would, therefore, need to build on local intrinsic motivations, which drive 
social utility maximisation (Vatn 2009).  
 
Informal rules also existed in parallel with more formal institutional rules in both 
Lebah Suren and Ledang Nangka. Lebah Suren’s local collective action was 
significant in enabling use of water resources and hydroelectric provision. This builds 
on Wade (1988)’s debate that greater efficiency to reach common goals enables 
collective behaviours. Ledang Nangka’s collective action relied significantly on 
direction from the central village mosque for both social and environmental 
management and guidance. This case study appeared to have developed collective 
management and use of water resources to enable greater equity and efficiency in 
water supply, yet used social norms (in this case, Islam) to maintain collective 
activities once efficient water supply had been achieved.  
 
A community’s capacity for collective action over resource management and social 
cohesion was stronger in communities with more informal rules, as evident in 
Gangga. It was unclear whether strong customary laws and communal involvement in 
activities in Gangga supported Andersson and Agrawal’s (2011) view that informal 
rules mediated the impact of socio-economic inequalities on the environment. Socio-
economic and political inequities were observed in Gangga. But further research is 
needed to determine the influence of collective action on these inequalities in relation 
to natural resource use.  
 
Where collective action was strongest, inequity was lower and the impact of the 
incentive-based institution appeared to be weaker. Lebah Suren showed significant 
evidence of community cohesion through local groups such as farmer associations, 
and collective action activities. Despite residents spread over a large geographical 
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area, the focus of much of the Lebah Suren’s community appeared to be maintaining 
electricity supply. The community’s ownership of the two hydroelectric generators 
drove much of their collective activities. It ensured equal electricity supply, the 
maintenance of water pipes, and the protection of the water source. The collective 
ownership of the generators had greater importance to the community than the 
incentive-based institution, which, for many members, was a detached institution. 
This resulted in low levels of understanding of rules. It also led to a lack of awareness 
of the existence of the incentive-based institution scheme. There were low levels of 
involvement and benefit sharing because payments were only issued to a small group 
of individuals. 
 
The customary laws of awiq-awiq in Gangga enabled significant levels of cohesion 
and collective activities among community members. Focus groups noted that issues 
were trusted to be resolved within the community. The belief in awiq-awiq was 
sufficient to ensure compliance with rules and equitable resource distribution. 
Strength of communal activities appeared to be connected to the small-scale area to be 
managed. It also included other social rules under awiq-awiq, a charismatic leader, 
and low heterogeneity in livelihoods, and individuals’ socio-economic status within 
the community. This community bond created a strong representative body to protect 
environmental resources, and reduced the exclusion of certain social groups (Mehring 
et al. 2011).  
 
This cohesion was less apparent in Gitek Demung and Ledang Nangka. In Gitek 
Demung, the incentive-based institution had been built on existing norms from awiq-
awiq. But strong collective action did not emerge from this cultural heritage. A 
significant level of distrust between community members and village administration 
was evident. Residents of Ledang Nangka also were involved in less community-
focused livelihoods, which often took place away from the village. The community’s 
strong focus on religious activity, Waktu Lima, gave a greater emphasis on external 
concepts than localised communal social norms. 
 
It is unclear whether these incentive-based institutions required a base of collective 
action to function. Most case studies did have underlying collective activities. The 
exception was Ledang Nangka, where the mosque influenced the incentive-based 
institution. Both Gangga and Gitek Demung drew on existing collective action 
traditions, and appeared to have a greater capacity for further communal goals. The 
institutions in place at Lebah Suren worked in isolation from any existing cultural 
activities. This is the result of the outside driven nature of the incentive-based 
institution spurred on by INGOs, NGOs, and local government agencies. Existing 
communal activities indicated the high potential for working for the collective rather 
than just individual benefit. 
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4.6.2 Efficiency vs. equity in benefit capture through collective action  
To what degree can incentive-based institutions influence equity within 
communities? 
 
The implications of the case studies’ structures on benefit distribution was mixed. 
Improved access to water resources occurred across all case studies. There were 
considerable differences between the redistribution of benefits and empowering of 
local people between the communities. This disparity raises questions as to the ability 
of incentive-based institutions to enable greater equity in reality.  Three out of the 
four case studies’ (Ledang Nangka, Gangga, and Gitek Demung) institutions focused 
on distributing capital benefits on a community-wide scale. In contrast, Lebah Suren’s 
downstream neighbours benefited along with a small group within the sub-village.  
 
Downstream benefits were distributed indirectly from water and forest management 
in any upper catchment. This scheme was the only case study with a specific external 
focus as part of the design.  Financial benefits for socio-economic development were 
limited to a small farmers group in Lebah Suren. This reaffirmed existing unequal 
resource distribution. It also led to the capture of benefits in this sub-village under 
formal rules (Alatas et al., 2003), while also emphasising the distance between the 
power of those implementing and those making decisions. 
 
Conflict remained between, and within, the sub-villages of Gangga and Gitek 
Demung. The stress of the dry season reduced access and availability to sub-villages 
downstream from Gitek Demung, which also caused increased conflict. Political 
conflict and mistrust were evident over how benefits were generated and used from 
Gangga and Gitek Demung. A lack of transparency from PAMDES regarding its 
funding potentially worsened this conflict. It created mistrust among residents and 
fostered feelings of disempowerment. In Ledang Nangka, while the mosque received 
a significant financial benefit from the incentive scheme, residents believe this to be 
deserved and water resources were distributed fairly and transparently. This 
institutional structure supports Platteau’s (2004) view that elite capture of benefits can 
be of lesser importance if it enabled improvements for the poor. 
 
Significant variation in stakeholder involvement was also observed across the case 
studies. Whether the schemes were initiated from within the community or by 
external bodies, such as the government or NGOs, had an impact on how well 
institutions ‘fit’ the communities and on the levels of community participation. This 
division highlights the conflict of interest between policy and local context. It also 
shows the distance between those in power, often based outside the communities, who 
make decisions and those, often from inside the communities, who implement the 
activities.  
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The majority of the Gangga community was aware of the role of awiq-awiq in the 
activities used to manage access to resources. This awareness was fuelled by a strong 
community head who made decisions via community meetings. In contrast, only those 
individuals in the Lebah Suren community who were paid as part of the incentive-
based mechanism were aware of the scheme operating in the sub-village. Others were 
unaware of changes to resource access. This lack of broad understanding illustrates 
the importance of participation at all levels – decision-making, design, 
implementation and monitoring – to maximise local understanding, empowerment, 
and opportunity to obtain benefits.  
 
Empowerment was obvious in Ledang Nangka where the scheme was initiated and 
then run by the local community. Transparency was high through open and regular 
budget updates and project communication via the mosque. Trust in the local religious 
organisation linked to the incentive-based institution drove compliance by reducing 
the opportunity for free riders.  
 
In comparison, a collective of NGOs, the local forestry department and community 
representatives facilitated the government-introduced scheme in Lebah Suren. This 
incentive-based institution exhibited the lowest involvement by the local community 
and less ‘interplay’ with local institutions. It also showed a least amount of equal 
distribution of benefits of payment schemes. While a single group within the sub-
village were receiving payments and seedlings to plant within their HKm Community 
Forest plots, they had no involvement in the overall management or decision-making 
process. Community members who were not receiving payments did not directly 
benefit from the incentive-based institution through either capital or empowerment 
over resources. This lack of broad community involvement was contrasted by the 
widespread collective action regarding an existing hydroelectric scheme. This was 
created by the local community, and distributed both water and electricity equally to 
most sections of the community. 
 
These disparate case studies reflect the current changes in power relations and 
political structures under decentralisation in Indonesia. In all four case studies, it was 
implied that elite control of institutional structures, management and, likely, benefits 
was widespread. This is supportive of the argument (Hadiz 2003) that power relations 
in local contexts have merely been reorganised, rather than transformed, under 
Reformasi. Inequitable influence on institutions between actors, either as a result of 
material capital or existing power relations, appeared to impact levels of participation 
and transparency of information. That led to control of information by those in power, 
such as low transparency in Gitek Demung, or the reinforcement of hierarchical 
prestige and power with the use of the highly influential mosque in Ledang Nangka. 
The four case studies show the need to understand the historical and political 
conditions of governance in a local context when assessing the impact of introducing 
newer institutional structures.  
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4.7 Conclusion 
 
These findings have clear relevance for PES and incentive-based program design and 
implementation. They highlight the complexity of attributing the practicalities of 
natural resource management to the theories that underpin them. Human behaviour is 
determined by multiple factors, which are difficult to correlate with specific drivers or 
variables. Lombok illustrates a number of examples of incentive-based institutions, 
each influenced by their own political, socio-economic, cultural, and biophysical 
contexts. Using market-based approaches to conservation raises both ideological and 
practical concerns (Milne and Niesten 2009). There are many challenges for the 
implementation of incentive-based institutions on the ground. That includes poorly 
defined property rights, different institutional arrangements, and conflicts between 
customary and external driven objectives. These four case studies highlight the 
variation of equity and efficiency facing incentive-based institution interventions.   
 
The case studies suggest that incentive-based institutions work best when built on 
existing collective action institutions that draw on intrinsic motivation and social 
norms. When they are developed in conjunction with local communities, incentive-
based institutions have a great potential to show greater alignment with the cultural 
context and existing institutions. These institutions may not be specifically focused on 
natural resource management, but there is strength connected to building on existing 
social norms and customs (Mosse 1997, 2003). Where incentive-based institutions 
were instigated in isolation from existing institutions, such as in Lebah Suren, there 
was little evidence of ‘interplay’ with existing institutions. As a result, the incentive-
based institution in Lebah Suren illustrated lower levels of local empowerment, equity 
in resource, and benefit distribution.  
 
In particular, these case studies build on debates by Mosse (1997, 2003), and support 
the argument that incentives that draw upon social norms to generate collective action 
may be more successful for more efficient and equitable environmental management. 
Ultimately, these appear to drive greater efficiency in the context of Lombok than 
collective action built on increasing efficiency to obtain common goals as argued by 
Wade (1988) and Hardin (1968). Where efficiency is maximised, greater equity in 
distribution of resources are not always achieved. Incentive-based institutions in these 
case studies that were externally instigated focus on efficiency, whereas local-led 
institutions were driven by greater equity in resource distribution. A lack of equity 
was not required to enable these local initiatives to function, however, it is likely to be 
required to enable a market to allow for opportunity costs.  
 
All programmes appeared to be at risk of elite capture of benefits because of the 
potential for rent seeking. Cultural hierarchies, a lack of clear enforcement, and 
existing Indonesian power relations also played a role. The presence of the elite 
capture of resources and benefits from incentive-based institutions remains 
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widespread because such benefits are highly context specific. Assessing social 
impacts is complex. The short time-scale of this study presents significant limitations 
to understand these long-established cultural norms. Further in depth research to 
understand the cultural drivers and perceptions of natural resource use within Lombok 
is therefore required. 
 
The context-specific nature of each incentive scheme highlights the need to directly 
target mechanisms at local providers. Key to these case studies is the necessity to 
align incentive-based institutions with existing institutions and intrinsic motivations. 
This not only allows ‘interplay’ with underlying social norms, but also strengthens 
each incentive-based institution. Incentive-based mechanisms have been implemented 
as solutions to dynamic situations (Kronenberg and Hubacek 2013). Over time, 
changes will occur in the provision of ecosystem services, the demand placed on 
them, and societal preferences for how resources are used. The increased value of 
ecosystems through incentive-based institutions can also alter local perceptions and 
uses associated with ecosystem services.  
 
There are many challenges for the successful implementation of these mechanisms 
within local contexts. The case studies in Lombok highlight the need to recognise that 
every scheme is influenced by its unique political, economic, biophysical, social, and 
cultural contexts, and that outcomes are very difficult to predict. It is paramount to 
understand how these existing institutions and their dynamics may interact with 
incentive-based institution design prior to implementation. This may determine 
whether incentives enable collective action that contributes to, or prevents further 
deterioration of ecosystems. The appreciation of variable local contexts before 
mechanisms are created may prevent the elite capture of benefits through rent seeking 
and inequitable resource distribution. Yet while it may increase equity among users, 
this approach may also lead to negative affects on the programs’ environment 
efficiency outcomes, and eventually on the resource users themselves.  
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5 How well do incentive-based 
institutions ‘fit’ the societal values of 
ecosystems on Lombok, Indonesia? 
 
 
 
5.1 Abstract 
 
Incentive-based institutions to manage ecosystem services have been widely 
implemented to influence land-use behaviours for sustainable natural resource use and 
environmental conservation. Incentive-based institutions, such as Payments for 
Ecosystem Services (PES), are based on Coasean principles that focus on 
compensatory measures, which can generate markets to solve environmental 
economic externalities. Environmental values are not, however, just driven by 
economic rationale. Human behaviours are driven by multiple, and often 
unpredictable, factors. Socio-cultural values and social norms also play a significant 
role in determining land-use behaviours. The sole use of economic values and 
financial incentives through incentive-based institutions may not always align with 
the local context in which they function. This has implications for the generalisation 
of policy and its practical implementation. Six villages in Lombok, Indonesia were 
examined to identify societal values and perceptions of the environment, and the 
relation of these social norms with incentive-based institutions. Villages that managed 
resources through incentive-based institutions illustrated higher institutional ‘fit’ and 
interplay when incentives were based on existing social norms. These institutions 
generated greater trust, community participation, and compliance. An understanding 
and inclusion of local perceptions and socio-cultural values of ecosystem services are 
crucial. The contextual nature of these perceptions and social norms, however, means 
that the criteria for PES application are unlikely to be met universally. The use of 
Coasean approaches to provide economic incentives may, therefore, not be sufficient. 
Policies, such as PES, that are based purely on theoretical principles may require a 
design to include the real world in which they function. As such, greater institutional 
‘fit’ can be fostered when societal values are incorporated to promote collective 
behaviours for sustainable natural resource use. 
  
5:  Incentive-based institutional ‘fit’ 
-131- 
5.2 Introduction 
 
5.2.1 Institutions in ecosystem services management 
 
Ecosystem management “typically involves social dilemmas” (Muradian 2013). These 
‘dilemmas’ relate to the choices of decision-makers about natural resource use. The 
loss of wellbeing, for example, can arise from an individual who pursues short-term 
gains from natural resources over the long-term sustainability of the resource 
(Muradian 2013). The management of ecological systems reflects similar conflicts 
that underpin “issues of the commons” (Muradian 2013). Solving these issues requires 
institutional structures to constrain, and provide incentives for, human interaction 
(Folke et al. 2007, North 1990, Corbera, Soberanis, and Brown 2009). Limits consist 
of formal elements, such as rules, laws, and constitutions. They also include informal 
elements, such as culturally imposed codes of conduct, behavioural norms, and social 
characteristics of enforcement. Fundamentally, institutions create links between 
society and ecological systems to enable long-term environmental and development 
objectives.  
 
Effective governance of ecological and social conditions requires specific institutional 
arrangements. Social systems are themselves dependent on the dynamic function of 
ecosystem services, which hold values for use and non-use (Muradian 2013, 
Muradian et al. 2013). These complex interactions between resource users, 
governance systems, and natural resources (social ecological systems, or SES) require 
institutions that provide incentives for sustainable resource use behaviours (Travers et 
al. 2011). Innovative socio-ecological theories also are required to handle the 
complexity and dynamism of SES interactions to protect the long-term use of natural 
resources (Armitage et al. 2012). The use of incentive-based management, such as 
Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) is based on the Coasean principles. It centres 
on creating measures that compensate for opportunity costs by generating markets 
that solve environmental economic externalities, such as deforestation and 
degradation. Key criteria of PES schemes have been developed by Wunder (2005, 
2008a), and include: Directness, Additionality, Existence of voluntary contracts, 
Conditionality, and a User-pays principle. 
 
Studies have shown, however, that the contextual nature of SESs is highly significant 
in affecting behavioural outcomes from institutional arrangements (Travers et al. 
2011, Ostrom 1990). Different institutional structures that govern SESs generate 
varying transaction costs for communities involved (Muradian 2013). Modes of SES 
governance can be categorised as hierarchical- (systems of command), markets- 
(systems of voluntary exchange), and community- (systems based on cooperation) 
management (Vatn 2010b). Many forms of governance, however, have characteristics 
of all three categories. As such, they are often represented through hybrid structures, 
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and may even be interdependent on each other for functionality (Muradian 2013, Vatn 
2010b).  
 
This paper seeks to examine the ‘fit’ of incentive-based management in the context of 
communities in Lombok, Indonesia. It studies elements of ‘fit’ in relation to the use 
economic and non-economic incentives to motivate sustainable land-use behaviours 
for water ecosystem services provision. It builds on current debates emerging in PES, 
specifically whether the use of Coasean arguments to design incentive-based 
initiatives are appropriate in all cases; and, whether fulfilling the PES ideal proposed 
by Wunder (2005, 2008a) is appropriate, or may be unlikely to ‘fit’ with the local 
social, economic, biophysical, or political contexts in which initiatives must operate. 
 
5.2.2 Incentive-based approaches 
 
Incentive-based approaches to manage ecosystems, such as Payments for Ecosystem 
Services (PES), are one such hybrid structure that has been widely implemented. The 
aim is to encourage behaviours that enable greater sustainability in resource use and 
to promote more equitable distribution of resources for resource users. Wunder (2005) 
initially defined the concept as the use of direct payments as incentives for land users 
to manage their land more sustainably to provide ecosystem services. This, he argued, 
could provide opportunity costs for conservation, rather than degradation of 
ecosystems, while also increasing benefits for resource users. Criteria for PES include 
voluntary contracts (Engel, Pagiola, and Wunder 2008b, Wunder 2006a, 2007, 2008b, 
2005), the user-pays principle (Engel, Pagiola, and Wunder 2008b), conditionality 
(Kemkes, Farley, and Koliba 2010, Sommerville et al. 2010), directness (Ferraro and 
Simpson 2002, Muradian et al. 2010), and additionality (Ferraro and Simpson 2002, 
Sommerville et al. 2010). Not all incentive-based institutions necessarily adhere to 
strict criteria, or involve economic transfers (Hutton and Leader-Williams 2003). 
 
Non-economic incentive-based approaches 
 
Incentives do not just have economic meaning, but also hold social significance 
(Muradian 2013, Kreps 1997). Central to this is the opportunity for communities to 
control for social dilemmas of ecosystem management (i.e. the imposition of penalties 
for non-cooperative individuals or social rewards for compliance). Where incentives 
are communal or promote group decision-making, they often result in greater 
cooperation and self-organisation within communities (Travers et al. 2011). In 
particular, Ostrom (1990) placed great importance on the ability for communities to 
organize independently of governance structures and cooperate between themselves. 
Community cooperation enables a greater ability to self-organise the governance of 
natural resources, compared to government-imposed solutions. Higher cooperation 
between community members is likely to increase participation in decision-making 
that can create “collective choice arrangements” (Ostrom 2011). The ability of 
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communities to cooperate is partly conditional on existing social norms that guide 
cooperative behaviours (Fehr and Falk 2002, Ostrom 1990). This is a highly 
contextual component depending on each SES in question. 
 
Coasen approaches to incentives 
 
Early advocates of incentives, like Wunder, Ferarro and Kiss (Wunder 2001, Ferraro 
and Simpson 2002, Kiss 2002, Wunder 2006b), used Coasean approaches to solve 
economic environmental externalities. The Coase Theorem argues that, under certain 
conditions, a pure market approach can be used to internalise the cost of non-market 
environmental values (Muradian et al. 2010, Gómez-Baggethun et al. 2010, Pascual et 
al. 2010, Schomers and Matzdorf 2013, Engel, Pagiola, and Wunder 2008a). This 
market-based system enables an approach where beneficiaries directly pay service 
providers. For example, in the Vittel Vosges Mountain scheme, where 27 upstream 
dairy farmers in France are paid by the water company Vittel, which is based 
downstream, to farm using sustainable practices to maintain high water quality 
(Wunder, Engel, and Pagiola 2008, Schomers and Matzdorf 2013, Perrot-Maitre 
2006). Coasean approaches are more likely to be found in initiatives where benefits 
are obtained at local levels. Large-scale initiatives often involve other institutions 
acting as intermediaries to establish and maintain the incentive mechanisms. This 
approach reduces the reliance of the initiative purely on independent markets to 
govern the distribution of costs and benefits (Schomers and Matzdorf 2013). 
 
Not all incentive-based schemes fit the Coasean approach. For example, in 
government payment schemes, the state acts on behalf of service providers. Payments 
can be linked to environmental externalities or to the ecosystem service itself, which 
often is a tradable commodity (Schomers and Matzdorf 2013). Buyers are not always 
direct users, but pay for the provision of public goods. For example, Mexico’s Pagos 
por Servicios Ambientales Hydrologicos (PSA-H) PES program was implemented at 
a national scale in 2003 to protect water services, i.e. public goods (Schomers and 
Matzdorf 2013, Southgate and Wunder 2009). Uniform mandatory water fees 
payments were made to contribute to the protection of existing forests to reduce 
aquifer exploitation. Payments were then distributed to private and communal 
farmers. 
 
Beyond the Coasean approach, economic rationale cannot explain all land-use 
decisions (Vatn 2010b, Vatn 2010a). Social and cultural values, and the roles of 
environmental resources, are also influential in determining land-use behaviours for 
both communities and individuals (Gachter and Fehr 1999, Vatn 2009). Some 
incentive-based schemes may build on these values to create social or cultural 
incentives to motivate environmental and cooperative behaviours. These deeply-
rooted social customs, it is argued, can provide incentives for collective action and 
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cooperative solutions that can used to govern natural resources (Mosse 1997, Wade 
1987). 
 
5.2.3 Institutional ‘Fit’ 
 
Incentive-based governance systems do not operate in a vacuum (Vatn 2010b). They 
are likely to be influenced by, and interact with, existing institutions. Given this 
complexity, the context in which institutions function must be understood to 
sustainably manage the ecological system on which resource users depend (Muradian 
et al. 2013). Effective management of natural resources may be enabled, or 
undermined by, the interplay within, between, or across institutions and values 
(Agrawal 2002, Corbera, Brown, and Adger 2007, Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern 2003, 
Young 2002, Gehring and Oberthur 2008). These interdependencies may have 
significant implications for the ability of both ecosystems and governance to function. 
The value of ecosystem services develops from social perceptions that are, in 
themselves, not “ideologically neutral” (Gómez-Baggethun et al. 2010, Adams et al. 
2003). Effective institutions require an understanding of the cultural, social, 
economic, and political context of the sites in question. They also need an awareness 
of existing institutional roles, and knowledge about whether these roles are strongly or 
weakly defined, especially when related to local property rights (Clements 2010).  
 
Institutions to manage ecosystems services must match these socio-cultural, 
economic, political, and biophysical dimensions in which they aim to function 
(Ekstrom and Ostrom 2009b, Galaz et al. 2008). ‘Fit’ is the extent to which these 
governance institutions align to the dynamics of the SES. Institutional fit 
consequently provides the foundation for how the ecosystem processes operate (Galaz 
et al. 2008, Erkstom and Young 2009, Folke et al. 2007). The interdependent nature 
of these highly-dynamic processes within SESs occur at both temporal and spatial 
scales (Galaz et al. 2008). ‘Fit,’ therefore, becomes a function of the robustness and 
effectiveness of a SES’s social institutions and the ecosystems in which they operate 
(Folke et al. 2007, Robbards et al. 2011, De Caro and Stokes 2008, 2013). Institutions 
that ‘fit’ the SES in which they aim to govern require adaptive co-management. That 
not only accounts for changes within biophysical systems, but also the interactions 
within socioeconomic systems (Young 2007, Olsson et al. 2007). The multi-level 
nature of actors’ interaction patterns – often with contradictory objectives – is key to 
determining the ability for these actors to adapt and self-organise in the face of 
environmental and societal dynamics. Adaptive co-management combines both 
collaborative management and the dynamic capacity of governance structures to 
continually evolve SES, which would imply a better ‘fit’ (Olsson et al. 2007, Folke et 
al. 2005).  
 
5:  Incentive-based institutional ‘fit’ 
-135- 
 
Elements of institutional ‘fit’ 
 
The challenge policy makers is to establish institutions that govern resources, which 
not only ‘fit’ the ecosystems, but also are founded in the societies in which the 
institutions exist and where resources are used and valued. “Optimal fit between 
institutions and the resources they govern may not be the tightest fit” (Folke et al. 
2007). Consequently, while the literature lacks clear definitions of institutional ‘fit,’ 
Olsson et al. (2007) and Galaz et al. (2008) describe key elements that enhance fit 
through SES adaptive co-management  (Table 5.1). 
 
Table 5.1. Elements of institutional ‘fit’ between ecosystem dynamics and 
governance systems. Adapted from Galaz et al (2008), Folke et al (2007) and 
Folke et al (2005). 
 
Fit element  Definition and mechanism Indicators 
Bridging 
organisations 
between local 
actors and 
communities with 
other institutions 
• Provides an arena in which to 
builds trust, resolve conflict, 
etc. 
• Provide strategies to manage 
social networks 
• Facilitate adaptive co-
management  
• Participation decision-
making and outcomes 
• Incorporation of 
cultural norms  
Leadership  • Key individuals that link within 
and between organisation 
levels 
• Facilitate communication of 
information within a local 
context 
• Strong individuals 
guiding institution 
• Trust of institution 
• Public awareness of 
institution 
Focus of resource 
management 
• The scale of an institution is 
fundamental to the issue of ‘fit’. 
The ability of an institution to 
cover the jurisdiction of an 
ecosystem or whether the 
control of specific resources is 
too narrow has impacts for 
efficiency and adaptability 
• Scale of institution 
• Understanding of social 
and ecological 
mechanisms driving 
resource use 
• Directed institutional 
response to address 
drivers of change 
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Timing • Whether an institution is 
implemented too early or too 
late to govern the ecosystem. 
• Institutional decisions and / or 
social responses time span may 
be too long or too short to 
affect the ecosystem 
• Long-term solutions 
2 Ability to respond to 
social and ecological 
drivers within time 
frame 
Adaptability • Institution has the capacity to 
adapt to environmental and 
social changes, both slow and 
abrupt 
• Capacity for conflict 
resolution 
• Capacity to respond and 
adapt to feedbacks 
2. Institutional 
learning 
 
 
5.2.4 Implications of Institutional ‘Mis-Fit’ 
 
Institutions that do not ‘fit’ the resources, resource use, or social system, which they 
are intended to manage, create ‘gaps’ in governance (Ekstrom and Ostrom 2009b). 
Failure to take into account the interdependency between social and ecological 
systems can lead to functional ‘mis-fit.’ That can substantially contribute to the 
deterioration of ecosystem services (Ekstrom and Ostrom 2009a). Functional ‘mis-fit’ 
is “the failure of an institution or set of institutions to take adequately into account the 
nature, functionality, and dynamics of the specific ecosystem it influences,” (Ekstrom 
and Ostrom 2009b).  
 
The potential for institutional ‘mis-fit’ arises from the dynamic, and often 
unpredictable, nature of SES interactions and the values placed on resources 
(Muradian 2013). The highly contextual nature of social values of ecosystems by 
resource users creates complexities for institutional governance. Social values 
incorporate elements of human preference, site specificity, and market variability. 
These elements affect how resources are allocated, and what trade-offs are involved. 
Mis-fitting institutions are unable to create adaptive governance systems that can 
respond to these dynamic functions and values. They may reduce the resilience 
capacity of SES and face weaknesses in policy implementation (Olsson et al. 2007). 
 
5.2.5 Implications for incentive-based institutions to manage ecosystem 
services 
 
How incentive-based mechanisms emerge has significant implications for their 
alignment and interplay. Local actors are more likely to understand and value 
incentives that are built on endogenous social norms and institutions (Clements 2010). 
Compliance to incentive-based mechanisms is more likely with local support. 
Incentive initiatives, which can draw on a community’s intrinsic motivation and 
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enable participation that helps to devise resource use rules, encourage cooperation 
(i.e. through collective action). These community-backed initiatives have the greatest 
effect in lowering resource extraction by individuals compared to top-down 
approaches (Travers et al. 2011).  
 
In any resource management scheme, there are opportunity and transaction costs. The 
degree to which assets can be redistributed for other uses without sustaining high 
costs – the asset specificity – generates trade-offs for both resource users and the 
ecosystem. Asset specificity becomes a function of the ‘economies of governance’ 
and can be affected by market variability (Muradian 2013). Where trade-offs produce 
negative outcomes (i.e. actions that impact adversely on, or increases the vulnerability 
of, a SES), maladaptation can arise (Tomkins et al. 2013).  
 
Motivation, and the recognition of responsibility to protect the environment, can be 
linked to existing social morals and norms. Introducing incentives, particularly 
financial pay-outs, to incite behaviours may induce changes in underlying social 
norms (Deci 1971, Ostrom 1998). The interplay resulting from incentive-based 
institutions may undermine (‘crowding out’) or reinforce (‘crowding in’) existing 
social norms and local rules that motivate pro-social cooperative behaviours 
(Muradian et al. 2010, Clements et al. 2010, van Noordwijk et al. 2012). This may 
work to either conserve biodiversity or destabilise intrinsic motivations within 
communities (Clements 2010, Bowles 2008, Rode, Gomez-Baggethun, and Krause 
2013, Vatn 2010b, Muradian et al. 2013). 
 
‘Crowding out’ of social norms by extrinsic incentives (often monetary incentives) 
can change the mind-sets and values within communities. It may alter individual 
moral responsibilities in favour of short-term economic gains (Bowles 2008, Rode, 
Gomez-Baggethun, and Krause 2013). In certain occasions, extrinsic incentives may 
have the opposite effect. They can strengthen and complement existing intrinsic 
motivation (i.e. ‘crowd in’) to protect the environment and managed resources. This 
can result from an institution or incentive, or local cultural preferences, which build 
on and enhance existing social norms. It also may lead to incentives enhancing social 
recognition. Incentives may be perceived as social rewards, and can use peer pressure 
and desire for social approval to promote compliance (Bowles 2008, Gachter and Fehr 
1999). 
 
The alignment of incentives-based governance is important to enable positive 
interplay with other existing institutions. It also fosters cooperation by communities to 
generate collective action. Building on existing institutions and underlying social 
norms linked to collective actions may reduce the effect of incentives ‘crowding out’ 
positive environmental motivations. The introduction of new institutions to 
communities, even with a good ‘fit’ and interplay, may still affect the communities’ 
evolving social identities, sustainability, and the equity and efficiency of resource use.  
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Incentive-based institutions based on economic market values of ecosystem services 
are complex to implement beyond theoretical realisation. The very nature of 
ecosystem services creates difficulties in their commoditisation and can lead to 
opportunistic behaviours by resource users. The level of cooperation of resource users 
is dependent on social and institutional dimensions, and the incentives used. 
Incentive-based institutions based on a hybrid form of governance systems may 
encourage greater community cooperation over individual gains (Muradian and Rival 
2012). This can be facilitated through underlying motivations, trust, monetary 
transfers, social norms, leadership, and penalties. The overall ‘fit’ of incentive-based 
mechanisms can be increased when built on these factors. This approach also allows 
greater and positive interplay with existing institutions to reduce transaction costs and 
the potential for ‘crowding out’ of intrinsic motivations. 
 
 
5.3 Research questions 
 
This paper aims to identify the importance of ‘fit’ for incentive-based institutions, 
using case studies on Lombok, Indonesia. It focuses on elements of ‘fit’ and ‘mis-fit’ 
in incentive-based institution emergence and design, and the realities of its 
implementation in practice. This has important implications for the application of 
such institutions and the current discourse surrounding PES. The principle research 
questions addressed in this paper are:  
 
1: Can the conditions under which incentive-based community institutions 
manage natural resources be predicted? 
 
2:   How do these institutions ‘fit’ social-ecological systems? 
 
3:  What is the relationship between the ‘fit’ of incentive-based institutions and 
environmental behaviours? 
 
4:  How can institutional ‘fit’ be incorporated into incentive-based approaches to 
conservation? 
 
 
5.4 Methods  
 
5.4.1 Study sites  
 
To identify elements of ‘fit’ of incentive-based institutions for communities, a 
comparative case study method and matching were used to select appropriate multiple 
case studies and controls (Yin 2003). Using villages and households as the units of 
analysis, the villages were selected according to the existence of incentive-based 
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institutions, and the controls were selected through matching. Different incentives 
were used in the sample villages, but they were selected to predict similarities and 
distinguishing characteristics between each group (incentive-based institutions and 
control) (Yin 2003). 
 
Six villages were used as case studies: Ledang Nangka, Gerami, Lebah Suren, Lebah 
Sempaga, Gitek Demung, and Gangga. These were chosen due to local incentive-
based institutions that manage natural resources in three villages: Gangga, Ledang 
Nangka, and Lebah Suren. Gangga, in north Lombok, relied on traditional adat – 
awiq awiq, or customary laws, which underpin social norms to motivate cooperative 
behaviours. Created in a village forum, these traditional Sasak cultural laws are often 
more accepted than official Indonesian law. They enable community groups to protect 
the forest from illegal logging, ensure habitat around the spring is not deforested, and 
punish non-compliance.  
 
In Ledang Nangka, central Lombok, a local water management group, BUMDES 
(Badan Usaha Milik Desa - Village Owned Enterprises), used the local mosque to 
motivate positive environmental behaviours and ensure that people adhered to rules. 
Drawing on the community’s strong religious behaviour, the mosque played a key 
role in communicating water management policies by influencing individual and 
community action. Payments were made to the mosque, which then distributed 
finances to the water user group, BUMDES, for environmental management activities 
like tree plantation (and for the mosque itself), and the communication required to 
promote communal activities and outcomes.  
 
Lebah Suren, in west Lombok, is part of the Dodokan payment programme, where 
upstream community groups tender applications for funding to reforest HKm, (Hutan 
Kommunicasi – Community Production Forest) from a consumer tax. IMP (Institut 
Multi Pihak), an intermediary stakeholder group, managed the scheme. This group 
consisted of the Forestry Department, community representatives, and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs). Payments to enable restoration of deforested 
land were made to one group of farmers within the community during 2011. 
However, despite no payments being made since, some respondents claimed, “we do 
not need the money anymore,” as replanting had already occurred. 
 
The remaining three villages were selected as appropriate matched controls for 
household surveys against which the impacts of incentive-based community 
management could be measured. The villages were Gerami, Lebah Sempaga, and 
Gitek Demung. Matching was used as much as possible to provide estimates of 
outcomes in otherwise similar communities that did not manage their natural 
resources through incentivised management schemes (Pattanayak 2009, Ferraro and 
Pattanayak 2006, Ravallion 2005, Heckman and Navarro-Lozano 2004). The 
communities were chosen due to their comparative altitude within the same 
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watershed, proximity to incentive-based community management villages (thus 
experiencing the same environmental resource pressures), and the comparative 
population sizes, water issues, and socioeconomic status. The application of matching, 
in reality, is difficult and bias is often unavoidable. The method presents a number of 
assumptions that, in seeking comparative variables, may simplify complex underlying 
processes and dynamics between, and within, villages (Ravallion 2005). This case 
study used comparative variables that were based on observations over a short period 
of time. It is, therefore, difficult to accurately determine comparative variables under 
these circumstances. Bias will remain from a poorly-understood reality (Clements 
2012). The use of a quasi-experimental approach, however, aimed to minimise as 
much as feasibly possible such bias in control selection (Ferraro and Pattanayak 
2006). 
 
To prevent confusion between incentive-based and control villages during the analysis 
and discussion, the communities will be numbered as per Table 5.2. Each ‘pair’ of 
incentive-based and matched control village will be labelled with the same number. 
 
Table 5.2. Incentive-based (IB) and control (C) villages surveyed and names used 
during analysis and discussion. 
 
Village Name  
Lebah Suren IB1 
Lebah Sempaga C1 
Ledang Nangka IB2 
Gerami C2 
Gangga IB3 
Gitek Demung C3 
 
 
 
5.4.2 Survey methods 
 
To identify elements of the institutional ‘fit’ of incentive-based institutions, household 
surveys and focus groups were conducted of poverty status and natural resource use. 
There was a focus on water, livelihood strategies, and perceptions of environmental 
benefits and institutional governance. Two survey methods were used: (1) Household 
surveys of economic status, natural resource use, livelihood strategies, and 
perceptions of household benefits from the environment; and, (2) Informal qualitative 
focus group discussions around economic status, water and resource use, and resource 
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management through focus groups and key informant interviews. Data was collected 
with the objective of identifying key community characteristics that were more likely 
to generate elements of institutional ‘fit’ as per Table 5.1. 
 
Household interviews lasted approximately 60 minutes and roughly 30 households 
were sampled per village, with 171 surveys in total. Surveys and focus groups were 
conducted with the assistance of a trained social researcher from the University of 
Mataram, and questions were translated into Sasak (the indigenous language), where 
necessary. For training purposes and to evaluate the questionnaire, pilot surveys were 
trialled and focus group discussions were undertaken prior to data collection. Data 
collection took place between June and September 2012.  
 
Focus groups and informal interviews with key informants were conducted separately. 
They enabled qualitative discussions around natural resource use, the impacts of 
incentive or other environmental management, drivers of water availability and access 
change, and key livelihood strategies. Triangulation was used, where possible, 
between household questionnaires, focus groups, and key informant interviews to 
substantiate findings and reduce potential bias. Ten focus groups were conducted in 
total within all six villages (five male, four female and one mixed group). Where 
feasible, male and female focus groups were conducted separately. However, time 
constraints because of the harvest season and Ramadan only allowed time for a mixed 
sex (Gitek Demung) and male only (Gerami) discussions in two control villages.  
 
To prevent fatigue, individuals for each group were different from those previously 
interviewed in the pilot studies. Group discussions, however, were difficult, especially 
among female groups. Often, one individual dominated the discussions, making it 
difficult for others to add their own answers. Village heads would often be close by to 
the discussions, which may have reduced the respondent’s desire to speak freely for 
fear of speaking out of turn. To overcome this, focus groups were kept small to allow 
for greater participation. Village heads also would be distracted with the researcher’s 
request to obtain village census information to prevent their contribution to 
discussions, where possible. 
 
5.4.3 Wealth analysis 
 
Ranking wealth status can be used to group households on the basis of their wealth, 
incomes, and other local perceptions of affluence (Chambers 1994). There are 
numerous methodologies that can be used to find a proxy of wealth, such as the Basic 
Necessities Survey and Demographic and Health Survey (Rutstein and Johnson 2004, 
Filmer and Pritchard 2001). Such methods use indicators such as household assets, 
education level occupation, household expenditure, and housing characteristics to 
determine household’s relative socioeconomic status.  
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Income and expenditure, however, are difficult and time-consuming variables to 
measure accurately. Many respondents will not know the figures as an annual sum 
due to multiple income sources, or, more likely, they will try to hide it from 
interviewers. Measuring expenditure is equally difficult. Finding a proxy of wealth 
through net assets and services can be used as a reliable and measurable quantity of 
household economic status (Rutstein and Johnson 2004, Filmer and Pritchard 2001). 
Asset measures and proxies of wealth, however, do not always account for short-term 
economic and wellbeing fluctuations, so levels of vulnerability also need to be 
captured (Moser 1998).  
 
The pilot study and early focus group discussions indicated that due to easy access to 
credit and price fluctuations across Lombok, an asset index for all case studies would 
be difficult to standardise. It emerged in discussions that house size was often linked 
to wealth status. For this study, a composite wealth proxy was developed using house 
size as a substitute for wealth indication. This was used under the assumption that the 
greater the wealth, the larger the house constructed. Houses in the villages were built 
in a similar format, construction style, and room size. The similar construction 
enabled ease of assessment of house size. House size was therefore used as a proxy 
for wealth ranking in the analysis when comparing variables between control and 
incentive based institutions. 
 
5.4.4 Analysis 
 
Qualitative and quantitative analysis identified conditions under which incentive-
based institutions emerged, ‘fit’ the SES, and how the institutions were perceived by 
communities through individuals’ environmental values and behaviours. The 
perception of issues about resource availability at household level were analysed 
through the ranking of environmental values, issues facing household water supply, 
and awareness of current management regimes. Baseline data was not available for 
the villages prior to incentive-based institutions implementation. But respondents’ 
perceptions of the environmental and social conditions, which enabled incentive-
based institutions to emerge, were analysed. Perceptions focused on issues that 
affected household water supply, and respondents’ understanding of historical and 
current resource governance. The ‘fit’ and interplay between institutions, and how this 
may impact incentive-based institutional outcomes, were analysed through 
respondents’ understanding of the resource regime, perceptions of wealth, and an 
environmental-benefit ranking. 
 
Where appropriate, all data was coded and, using STATA 12.0, NVIVO and Excel, 
analysed statistically, transforming data where necessary. Data of continuous 
variables that were normally distributed were analysed with parametric tests. Rank 
and categorical variables with ‘distribution free’ data were analysed with non-
parametric tests (Fowler, Cohen, and Jarvis 1998). All statistical tests were two-tailed 
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and had a probability value of 0.05. Critical probability values quoted as follows: 
‘***’=p<0.001, ‘**’=p=<0.01, ‘*’p=<0.05, and ‘>0.05’= Non-significant (p=≥0.05) 
(Fowler, Cohen, and Jarvis 1998).  
 
 
5.5 Results 
 
5.5.1 Can the conditions under which incentive-based community 
institutions manage ecosystem services be predicted? 
 
Environmental management, including incentive-based rules, emerged for multiple 
reasons across all of the communities. Both social and ecological factors underpinned 
the reasons that fostered particular incentive-based governance arrangements. A large 
proportion of respondents themselves did not know why resource governance had 
emerged (36.14 % in incentive based management, and 25.36 % in control 
communities), and incentive-based approaches to management varied across the 
survey communities. These approaches included monetary incentives, the use of 
traditional laws, or religious beliefs. 
 
In IB1, an external intermediary, IMP, introduced economic incentives to compensate 
for landowner opportunity costs to restore forest on the slopes of Mount Rinjani. This 
was initiated to protect the water supply to downstream communities who pay 
USD $1 per month tax towards the initiative. The intermediary consisted of INGOs, 
community representatives, and the Department of Forestry. The programme provided 
financial payments for one farmer group in 2011 to replant trees to conserve the upper 
catchment. Programme decisions, development goals, and payment implementation 
were made by IMP, which controlled which community group within the watershed 
received payment, and which areas of forest were restored. Payments were 
conditional on replantation of deforested land and the development of economic 
activities, as compensation for livelihood lost to reforesting the land. Payments were 
no longer received after 2010, as the IMP allocated these on an annual basis, 
following community application. The criteria for which was unclear to community 
members. 
 
The community-led programme in IB2 was initiated by the local government to 
reduce community conflict over access to water resources. A local water company, 
BUMDES, was established to manage water infrastructure for household water 
supply. This involved the development of a piped water network to households and 
the mosque, and the building of a community embung (reservoir). Monthly payments 
made to BUMDES maintained the system, managed the programme, and conserved 
the forest around the spring. This involved reforestation and protecting the area from 
agricultural encroachment. Non-compliance was punished through fines. 45 % of 
community payments to BUMDES were retained by the mosque, which played a 
5:  Incentive-based institutional ‘fit’ 
-144- 
central role in communicating the programme activities and budget during Friday 
prayers. Nearly all community members attended Friday prayers. The conservation 
and management of water resources were therefore perceived by many to be 
associated with the mosque, and therefore the Islamic faith. Social morals related to 
Islam indirectly encouraged community practices to protect the environment, and 
comply with water management. 
 
In IB3, traditional cultural laws, awiq-awiq, promoted social norms that determined 
and controlled individual and collective behaviours. These were used to provide 
incentives for the conservation of forest areas under threat from degradation and 
deforestation. This aimed to protect the water source that provided household and 
agricultural water for the village, as well as for villages downstream in the lower 
catchment. Awiq-awiq protected the forest around the spring, and also developed 
informal rules over water use, management of water infrastructure, and the resolution 
of conflict over access to, and availability of, water resources. Members of the 
community placed great importance on awiq-awiq and its role in community function 
and cooperation. Mutual obligation was a key element of traditional cultural laws. 
This provided intrinsic incentives for community members to adhere to social norms 
surrounding natural resource use, which punished the non-compliant with fines or 
social exclusion 
 
Both incentive-based and control communities surveyed faced water resource issues 
of varying degrees of severity, particularly during the dry seasons. Responses to 
determine the frequency of water resource issues may have been biased because the 
period of data collection was during the dry season, when water stress was high. 
Nonetheless, respondents’ experiences of water issues appeared to be determined by 
their position on the island and within the watershed.  
 
Mount Rinjani has significant impact on rainfall distribution. Communities north of 
Mount Rinjani experienced less rainfall throughout the year. Communities in the 
upper watershed catchments were more likely to have access to springs than 
communities within the plains below. Beyond the impact of monsoons, access and 
availability of water varied throughout the year depending on location of respondents 
– upstream versus downstream, those closer to the water source versus those further 
away – and the infrastructure available to obtain water resources.  
 
Experiences of environmental stress, in this case, water availability and access, which 
generated intra- and inter-community conflict, were a key factor in communities 
developing incentive-based institutions. Communities with incentive-based 
management experienced low water availability and high levels of soil erosion during 
the rainy season. Control communities, while also experiencing these issues, were 
affected to a lesser extent. They were, however, impacted more through irregular 
water flow to their communities. For incentive-based managed communities, low 
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water availability appeared to develop into conflict between community members, 
which was not observed in control communities. Respondents in incentive-based 
managed communities spoke of access to limited resources: “There are too many 
households to support with the water”, IB1; “The embung [community reservoir] is 
too small to provide for everyone so it is difficult to get water”, IB2; and, “The 
community destroys the forest and disturbs the spring”, IB3. Conflict over resources 
appears to have driven the initiation of management, either within the village, as per 
IB2 and IB3, or via third party implementation in IB1. 
 
To resolve the conflict over access to water resources, household water infrastructure 
was developed. That involved either building more embungs (IB2) or developing a 
piped water network to households (IB1, IB2, and IB3). Household water sources 
were significantly related to whether communities had incentive-based management 
(χ2=33.216, d.f.1, p***). Respondents in these villages (IB1, IB2, and IB3) appeared 
to have greater access to infrastructure, mainly from piped systems (68.89 % overall)  
(Figure 5.1). Embung reservoirs were only used in IB2 (26.67 % of respondents in 
this village). This is likely due to BUMDES’ project development and the village 
location on the lower slopes of Mount Rinjani. Embungs were used more frequently 
in the lower catchment. Use of wells (59.34 %) for household water was observed in 
all villages, except IB2 and IB3. Use of springs was higher for control villages 
(29.67 %) and those positioned at higher altitude.  
 
 
Figure 5.1. Differences in household water sources between incentive-based 
management and non-incentive based management communities (n=171). 
 
It was unclear whether differences in water source infrastructure occurred solely as a 
result of incentive-based management, or whether they had developed from earlier 
government programmes to install piped access to water in the 1980s. This 
government-backed development had occurred in IB2, IB3, and C3. IB2 received 
funding to build a reservoir from UNICEF in 1978. The communities in IB3 and C3 
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were involved in a central government programme in the early 1980s to improve 
access to water via reservoirs and pipes. Infrastructure was already established in 
these communities. The infrastructure provided access to some members of the 
community, though for many, access to infrastructure was shared between groups of 
households. IB2’s pipe system had developed through the long-standing incentive 
programme. The neighbouring village of C2 still relied heavily on wells, which “often 
caused sickness,” female respondent, C2. IB1’s pipe infrastructure had been 
established collectively as a community, while neighbouring C1 still relied on springs 
for household supply. 
 
The mere experience of conflict over household water resource issues was not a 
sufficient driver for incentive-based management to emerge in communities. The 
analysis indicated that existing institutions, social norms, and socio-economic 
conditions influenced whether incentive-based institutions were likely to emerge. 
These communities appeared to have the ability and collective awareness to address 
natural resource issues. They also had adaptive capacities to manage resource-use 
behaviours. This was observed in higher levels of socioeconomic status, greater 
community awareness of environmental issues, and respondents’ perception of 
community responsibility towards behaviours and the environment. Incentive-based 
management appeared to enable community capacity to address water resource 
conflict, and initiate and implement conflict resolution. 
 
Cluster analysis was applied to differentiate between socioeconomic variables of 
households. It focused on land area owned, education level, wealth proxy, and 
reliance on natural resources. There was no significant difference between wealth 
proxies in communities with incentive-based institutions and control villages 
(t=1.481, d.f.160, p>0.05). However, time in education was significantly related to 
incentive-based management. Respondents in incentive-based institutions villages had 
more years in education (t=2.814, d.f.166, p**), with an average of 6.95 years 
compared to 5.35 years for the control villages. There was no significant difference 
between in reliance on natural resources between incentive-based management and 
control villages (38.85 % and 34.14 % respectively). Reliance on natural resources 
appeared to be related more to location than management type. Area of land owned 
was not significant between communities with incentive-based management and 
control villages, with only 10 % of all respondents owning land in urban IB2. 
Incentive-based communities owned less land than control villages (ρ=0.058, n=80, 
p**).  
 
Respondents also were asked to consider who they believed was responsible for the 
protection of the environment. Community awareness of environmental responsibility 
played a role in the development of community action. Village government was 
perceived to have the greatest power over environmental management decisions 
across all communities, although this was greatest in control villages. As such, 
respondents from control villages perceived rules over natural resources to have 
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emerged following government programs (41.89 %), or through new village 
leadership (6.76 %) (Figure 5.2). Comparatively, incentive-based management was 
perceived to have emerged following conflict over resource access (12.20 %), greater 
community awareness of environmental protection (25.61 %), or improvements to 
household water flow (13.41 %). The recognition by these communities of their 
collective responsibility to develop management initiatives to resolve conflict was 
observed by the respondents themselves (11.11 % overall; 16.67 % in IB3, 13.33 % in 
IB1, and 3.33 % in IB2). This is reflective of the community-led management 
schemes that already provided incentives for behaviours in these villages.  
 
 
Figure 5.2. Respondent explanation of drivers of natural resource governance 
(n= 171).  
 
Incentive-based management communities appeared to have a higher awareness of 
environmental issues that affected their livelihoods. They also placed a greater value 
on non-use benefits associated with the environment. Incentivised management had 
developed to use this awareness and intrinsic value to influence positive 
environmental behaviours within the community. It should be noted that these 
responses might have been influenced by the nature of questions asked in the 
questionnaire. More than three quarters of respondents in all survey communities 
were aware of existing rules that managed resource use or controlled access, although 
this was significantly higher in incentive-based communities (ρ=4.097, n=164, p***). 
There was also a significant difference between incentive-based communities and 
control villages’ perception of benefits from the natural resources; for Wellbeing (ρ =-
0.1699, n=147, p*); Wildlife (ρ=-0.1699, n=147, p***); Water retention (ρ=-0.3086, 
n=147, p***); and, Recreation (ρ =-0.2977, n=147, p***). The non-economic benefits 
perceived from natural resources incentive-based communities may have led to a 
higher value overall placed on the environment. A higher value may also therefore 
have driven action to manage the environment more sustainably.  
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5.5.2 How do incentive-based institutions ‘fit’ social-ecological systems? 
 
Elements of institutional ‘fit’ were developed from Table 5.1. These elements focused 
on mechanisms within institutions that indicated greater alignment. These were: 
Bridge organisations, Leadership, Focus of resource management, Timing of 
institution, and Adaptability. Institutional case studies were determined to indicate 
‘fit’ or ‘mis-fit’ according to the presence or absence of these elements (Table 5.3). 
 
Table 5.3. Elements of institutional ‘fit’ for each of the six case studies (incentive-
based and control) in Lombok. (++ High level of fit, + Fit, - Mis-fit, -- High mis-fit, 
+/- Unclear, likely fit, -/+ Unclear, likely mis-fit). Based upon elements of fit in 
Table 5.1. 
 
Fit Element Case Studies 
Incentive-based 
institutions 
Control 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
Bridging organisations  -- ++ ++ -- -- + 
Leadership - ++ ++ -/+ -/+ +/- 
Resource management focus - +/- +/- -/+ -/+ +/- 
Timing +/- + + -/+ - + 
Adaptability - + ++ -/+ -/+ +/- 
 
Bridging organisations between local actors and communities with other 
institutions 
 
All communities had existing institutions and institutional arrangements that managed 
natural resources, enabled societal norms, and created an adhesive community social 
system. Many respondents were involved in multiple institutions. These ranged from 
farmer groups and community youth groups to the adherence to traditional beliefs and 
active religious practice. Village institutions encompassed a number of different types 
of associations such as youth groups and women’s groups. Religious institutional 
involvement was understood to be the active practice of religious activities. Farmer 
institutions were active groups of individuals that supported agricultural production. 
Traditional institutions were denoted as adhering to aspects of awiq-awiq, the 
traditional Sasak culture. As such, respondents’ involvement in these institutions 
varied according to their occupation, i.e. farmers within farming groups, etc. 
 
Involvement in institutions did not necessarily denote high participation in decision-
making. For the purpose of this study, participation was defined as being a member of 
5:  Incentive-based institutional ‘fit’ 
-149- 
an institutional group (village or farming), or adhering to the belief system and norms 
of an institution (religious and traditional). Institutional involvement generated 
community networks and indicated involvement in cooperative activities. Within the 
three incentive-based institution communities, participation in institutional activities 
was significantly higher across all existing institutional groups than within the control 
communities (χ²=12.58, d.f.4, p**). Higher involvement in institutional activities, 
especially in institutions that drove incentives, may have enabled a great ‘fit’ of 
incentive-based management. By building on existing institutions that played a strong 
role in community activities and creating local values, incentive-based management 
enabled closer alignment of institutional management and social norms.  
 
Religious institutions dominated many of the institutions, which was reflective of 
Lombok’s strong religious heritage. Respondent participation in religious institutions 
was highest in IB2. This is indicative of the strength of religious belief in this 
community, and the influential role of the local mosque. The use of the mosque to 
motivate compliance to protect the environment built on the strength of Islamic social 
norms in the community, “We do not want to be bad Muslims,” respondent, men’s 
focus group IB2. The incorporation of social norms into incentive-based management 
built trust for the institution. The involvement in religious institutions was far greater 
in this community compared with neighbouring community C2. In C2, focus group 
respondents spoke of a lack of overall water management, of individuals ‘stealing 
water’ from the reservoir in IB2 to sell in C2, and of poor water quality as, “Other 
villages have better management than here,” questionnaire respondent C2. No 
respondent in C2 spoke of the role of the mosque in water management. This suggests 
that the use of religion to provide incentives for water conservation in IB2 is highly 
specific to that community. 
 
Traditional socio-cultural norms, specifically Sasak awiq-awiq, existed across all the 
communities. For some communities, like IB3 and C3, the influence of awiq-awiq on 
community and individual behaviours was more evident. “It’s our whole system of 
life,” respondent, focus group C3. “Awiq-awiq has been here a long time, since our 
ancestors. It isn’t written down, but only [those] within our community take notice,” 
village head, IB3. The incorporation of socio-cultural norms into incentives, or the 
development of incentives from socio-cultural norms, motivated cooperation for 
collective behaviours towards the forest and water systems. This included the 
protection of a 50m forest radius around the spring, the refusal to participate in illegal 
logging, and the maintenance of the local pipe infrastructure. Socio-culturally-driven 
incentives appeared to enable greater community participation in decision-making, 
particularly in IB3. In this village, regular community gatherings were held to 
determine rules about how the environment was to be managed. High levels of 
participation in decision-making through awiq-awiq mechanisms in both IB3 and C3 
provided strategies that bridged management institutions and the local communities 
and actors, and enabled the management of their social interaction.  
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When incentive-based management was developed from, or connected to, existing 
institutions, bridging was higher. There was a greater awareness of the institution, 
increased participation in decision-making, a higher level of trust, and a broader 
understanding of community requirements to meet compliance. This was evident in 
both IB2 and IB3, but less so IB1. In this village, bridging between incentive-based 
initiatives and the community was weak. There was little awareness, trust, or use of 
the economic incentives to motivate behaviours. Respondents in IB1 who received 
payments did not always link incentives with environmental behaviours. They 
believed the payments either were aimed: “To increase my income,” and that “There 
are no major changes,” questionnaire respondents IB1. Only a small group within the 
community received payments. The economic-incentivized institution appeared to be 
considered quite separate to the community, “We have no interest or pay attention 
to them [IMP stakeholder group]. “We are busy with our own work,” respondent, 
women’s focus group. “I haven’t met the government or even know about the 
government,” “What we have here [in IB1] is enough,” respondents, men’s focus 
group. Other small, community-led informal institutions to protect the production 
forest and water sources were in existence in IB1. However, the overall economic-
incentive based institution appeared to be misaligned with local objectives and needs. 
 
Leadership 
 
High levels of community cohesion and strong leadership – through village heads or 
local imams – played a key role in generating community trust in, and driving 
development of, incentive-based institutions. This was observed in all incentive-based 
institutions in the three surveyed communities. Key individuals created links between 
local actors and institutions, and generated trust and understanding between 
community members. IB2 and IB3 had strong leaders that were trusted by their 
communities. These leaders (an imam, the head of PAMDES, and a village leader) 
were relied on by the community to resolve conflict and make decisions, “He is a 
respected commander,” focus group respondent describing IB3 village head. They 
also facilitated the flow of communication between incentive-based institutions and 
the community. This generated high public awareness of the institutions. The 
connection between leaders, communities, and institutions was particularly evident 
with the transparent nature of the institution in IB3, where information was dispersed 
via the imam. 
 
In IB1, there was a respected village head, but the leadership was not linked to the 
incentive-based program. Instead, it was connected to the encouragement of collective 
activities. Self-organized collective activities were seen throughout the communities. 
This was done through group maintenance of pipe infrastructure, clearing of irrigation 
channels to reduce pollution, and planting seedlings in forest areas around springs. In 
C3, there were strong individuals who encouraged environmental governance, but 
conflict between them led to community distrust. “If there is not drinking water, the 
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village head would not care or help,” respondent C3. A lack of transparency in 
governance and village finance also generated anger. “Where is the money going?” 
respondent C3. This situation eventually led to the head of water governance being 
driven out of the village at the peak of the dry season in September, 2012. Leadership 
in both C1 and C2 was not strong in relation to environmental institutions. This was 
likely due to their newly-established status as villages, as they separated from larger 
villages in 2011 as part of regional government policy. 
 
Resource management focus 
 
The scale of an institution is fundamental to the issue of its ‘fit.’ All institutions 
within this study were implemented on a small, localised scale. This small scale 
generated difficulties in ascertaining environmental outcomes of governance beyond 
the availability of local resources such as water. For example, it would be difficult to 
determine the impact of institutions on wider ecosystem services on Lombok from 
these studies sites. The research showed that institutions in IB2 and IB3 ‘fit’ their 
local ecosystems. The institutions in these communities enabled greater access to, and 
availability of, water for household use without too narrow controls over specific 
resources. For all control villages, ‘mis-fit’ was evident. Continued conflict over 
access to, and limited availability of, water resources indicated that environmental 
governance was insufficient to address mechanisms driving resource use. In IB1, 
despite incentives, the institution was focused on restoring only a small area of forest 
within the community as part of a wider watershed-wide reforestation programme. 
The specific control of this resource did not address the social and ecological drivers 
of localised resource use. 
 
Timing 
 
Institutional implementation varied across the survey communities. For the incentive-
based institutions in IB2 and IB3, the timing of governance was in response to 
conflict over natural resources. IB2’s incentive-based institution was established in 
1993 at the height of intra-village water conflict. The long-term solution to develop 
infrastructure for household water provision had enabled households’ greater access 
to water resources. Resource governance had since been responsive to social and 
ecological drivers. It met water needs, and protected forest around the spring. In IB3, 
implementation of an incentive-based institution to manage water resources had 
enabled ecosystem services governance. Since the development of pipe infrastructure 
in the 1980s, this governance had established greater household water access, and 
motivated the protection of the forest ecosystem.  
 
Governance was not always able to respond within a time frame to manage ecosystem 
services. Conflict remained with villages downstream, particularly with C3. IB3 had 
control over the entire upstream pipe infrastructure. This impacted downstream 
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communities’ water supply. “Gangga [IB3] think they own the pipes;” and, “They 
[IB3] are selfish,” respondents C3. Deforestation had mostly been conducted by 
outsiders and occurred following the government’s decentralisation policies. Since 
then, deforestation activities had slowed in the region. Institutional governance was 
also not fully aligned with the social and ecological drivers of ecosystem change. 
 
For IB1, an incentive-based institution was implemented to respond to deforestation, 
but was short-term in approach and objective. Economic incentives were only given 
to a small group within the community in 2011. This focused on replantation of 
specific deforested areas and economic compensation for opportunity costs. Payments 
were only made for one year. The time span of this response was slow in affecting 
ecosystem changes and, once replantation had occurred, it was limited to providing 
incentives for social conservation responses. 
 
Adaptability 
 
For the purpose of this study, an institution’s adaptability was interpreted as its 
capacity to adapt to both abrupt and slow environmental and social changes. It also 
had to resolve conflict. Incentive-based institutions in both IB2 and IB3 had feedback 
mechanisms, through which response to changes in both social dynamics and 
environmental shocks (e.g. droughts or floods) could be made. In IB3, management 
was continually adapted according to social and environmental needs. For example, 
during times of low water availability, community discussions would be held to 
determine a schedule to allow all households to obtain some water at set times during 
the day. This allowed households equal access to limited water supplies. If damage to 
pipe infrastructure had occurred, which often happened following flooding, the 
community was gathered to delegate teams to clear pipes, and to resolve water access 
issues. In IB2, high transparency in how water resources were governed encouraged a 
continual review of institutional management. For example, population growth in the 
community has increased demand on water resources. In response, the incentive-
based institution is in the process of building a second embung, or reservoir. The 
Head of BUMDES, the incentive-based institution, also said that, “We need to find 
another spring if the [current] reservoir is not enough.” This capacity to respond to 
social and environmental changes has enabled this institution to adapt with the 
dynamic SES. 
 
The short-term nature of the incentive-based institution in IB1 limited its adaptability. 
The distance between beneficiaries (downstream water users) and providers (IB1) 
heightened respondents’ detachment to the institution. Despite the presence of IMP, 
the intermediary stakeholder group, there was limited capacity to adapt to localised 
environmental and social changes. The watershed scale of the institution, and the 
short time frame of payments (one year), gave few opportunities to respond, or adapt 
to, feedbacks within the SES. 
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5.5.3 What is the relationship between the ‘fit’ of incentive-based 
institutions and environmental behaviours? 
 
Incentive-based institutions had a varied impact on environmental behaviours across 
the case studies. Most respondents felt that incentives were necessary to motivate 
positive environmental behaviours within their community, although this was stronger 
in incentive-based management communities (z=2.554, n=171, p**). Many felt that it 
should be “an earning source for extra income,” (both incentive-based management 
and control village respondents). Others felt that it served as compensation for 
“damage in the future” (IB1 and IB2). Some were concerned that those who received 
monetary payments would become “corrupt” (IB3) and that payments had the 
potential to “make the community lazy,” (IB3) when they “should have the 
motivation to conserve the environment already,” (C1, IB1, and IB2). The extent of 
institutions’ effect on attitudes to, and perceptions of, their environment was also 
observed. Respondents in incentive-based management villages had a higher 
perception of how their activities benefited people outside of the community (z=-
4.495, n=152, p***).  
 
Collective action was strongest in incentive-based managed communities. It was often 
linked to existing institutions, which were underpinned by social norms and cultural 
values – “It is something we have always done,” questionnaire respondent IB3. 
Across all of the incentive-based institution villages and in C3, collective activities, 
such as maintaining pipes, clearing irrigation channels, and planting trees, took place. 
“If pipes are above ground, everyone has to protect them. If deforestation occurs 
around the spring, we are all obliged to plant [trees],” village head, IB3. Collective 
activities were driven by strong leaders, such as an imam or village head, but were 
conducted on the basis of intrinsic motivation for cooperation. 
 
‘Crowding in’ (i.e., the use of incentives that built upon intrinsic existing motivation 
such as religious, cultural, and traditional norms) was evident in the incentive-based 
institutions. The use of existing motivations, such as awiq-awiq in IB3 and the 
attendance of the mosque in IB2, to encourage cooperation with positive 
environmental behaviours led to greater participation as many did not “want to be 
bad Muslims”  (respondent, IB2). In IB1, a lack of interest in wider community 
support of economic incentives (“We do not need to get paid to protect the 
environment,” respondents IB1) may be reflective of the community’s limited 
participation in the scheme’s implementation. Payments were made following a 
group’s application to IMP, although the criteria for payments were unclear. The 
community had little involvement (except through wider village representatives in 
IMP) in making decisions about how payments and seedlings were used. Despite 
these limitations, other underlying motivations for positive environmental behaviours 
and collective action remained. This was observed in the collective work to protect 
piping infrastructure and the forest around the spring. For many people in IB1, it was 
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felt that their community was strong and cohesive, and there was an assumed notion 
to work together to protect village from “outsiders stealing resources” such as timber 
and crops. Many felt that “To protect what we need does not require an incentive;” 
“To maintain the environment gives me comfort [sense of wellbeing];” and, “Why 
do we need any reward to guard our own needs?” respondents, IB1. That suggested 
that IMP’s economic incentives had not ‘crowded out’ these social norms. 
 
Low community cohesion also was observed in both C1 and C3. These were newly-
established villages, which had been recently separated in 2011 from larger villages as 
part of regional government policy. As a result, their capacity to self-organise and the 
overall level of cohesion appeared to be still developing. In C3, there were low levels 
of trust between the village administration and the community, despite the presence of 
an environmental management regime. As such, some respondents said there was a 
lack of transparency in how community activities were carried out.  
 
 
5.6 Discussion 
 
The incentive-based institutions used in this study illustrated a variety of approaches 
to govern ecosystem services. Not all of these institutions aligned with the SES in 
which they functioned. Key to community compliance and participation in both 
decision-making and implementation was whether the institution was driven by the 
community themselves, or had been imposed by external organisations, such as 
NGOs. Incentives had less impact on behaviours when they had been imposed by 
organisations external to the community, as observed in IB1. In IB1, little importance 
was placed on the incentive-based institution due to the irregular nature of the 
payments and the small group of beneficiaries. Land-use behaviours were more likely 
to be the result of other existing institutions. Greater ‘fit’ of incentive-based 
institutions was illustrated in IB2 and IB3, where incentives emerged within a 
localised context and built on existing social norms.  
 
All of the communities within this study were influenced by the wider political, 
economic, cultural, social, and biophysical contexts of Lombok and Indonesia. 
Interplay with other institutions in these contexts was important to determine 
institutional ‘fit’. Greater interplay, and ability for institutions to adapt to local 
contexts, also generated greater resilience to changes in SES interactions. For IB1, 
lower interplay of the incentive-based institution within the local context was 
reflected of the limited impact of the economic incentives on sustainable land-use 
behaviours, and low participation and involvement in decision-making. This was 
likely a result of a lack of connections between the incentive-based institutions and 
existing formal and informal institutions. Despite the lack of institutional 
interdependence in IB1, gaps in governance were not apparent as these existing 
institutions functioned through collective action, awiq-awiq, and local legislation.  
5:  Incentive-based institutional ‘fit’ 
-155- 
5.6.1 Do incentives ‘crowd in’ or ‘crowd out’ motivation? 
 
Two of the incentive-based institutions in this study (IB2 and IB3) used incentives 
that built on the communities’ ability to self-organise and cooperate, as well as social 
norms that motivated communal behaviours. This reinforced intrinsic motivations for 
collective behaviours (i.e. crowded in), and therefore ‘interplayed’ with existing 
institutions and underlying social values. In contrast, economic incentives used in IB1 
did not appear to have significant effect on land-use behaviours. As such, they could 
neither be defined as ‘crowding in’ or ‘crowding out’ existing local motivations. 
Monetary incentives did not undermine intrinsic motivators, but nor did they 
necessarily complement them (van Noordwijk et al. 2012, Bowles 2008, Rode, 
Gomez-Baggethun, and Krause 2013). This observation may be a reflection of only a 
small group within the IB1 community benefited from financial incentives. Where 
benefits are unequal, a focus on community-centred objectives was difficult, as 
individuals focused on short-term economic gains. Further research would be required 
to confirm the impact of these economic incentives on underlying motivations within 
IB1.  
 
In all case studies, it was apparent that respondents were aware of a need to protect 
the environment, and to create rules to regulate its use. All of the case studies had 
experienced issues over access to, and availability of, water resources. In control 
villages, these were recognised to have been, or were in the process of being, 
addressed by government programmes. In incentive-based institution villages, there 
was a significant recognition of the community’s responsibility to resolve 
environmental issues. This awareness appeared to drive social motivation for 
environmental behaviours that promoted collective action across the case studies. In 
particular, IB2 and IB3 appeared to have harnessed individuals’ motivation for 
specific conservation needs. This suggested a ‘crowding in’ of intrinsic social norms, 
which highlighted the significance of existing social meanings to enable ‘fit’ of 
incentive-based institutions. There was no evidence to indicate that incentive-based 
mechanisms were crowding out social norms (although that this did not confirm that 
the phenomenon had not occurred). That was true even in the case of IB1, where the 
incentives were implemented by an outside organisation. This study suggests, 
however, that designing incentives that are built on underlying, existing motivations 
may enable ‘crowding in,’ (i.e. reinforcement) of pro-conservation behaviours and 
improve compliance. 
 
It should be noted that this analysis was conducted without baseline data, which may 
have identified further implications of this form of governance. Communities without 
clear incentive-based mechanisms also exhibited similar social norms and community 
morals to communities with incentive-based mechanisms. Community activities in 
control villages were often conducted for social benefit, although these were not used 
specifically to provide incentives for behaviours that protected the environment. 
Control communities also appeared to lack strong leadership and the ability to self-
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organise cooperative action. Yet the communities’ mere existence could provide a 
strong platform on which to build future incentive-based management schemes to 
govern natural resources.    
5.6.2 Implications for PES theory - Incentives for collective action 
 
Pirard (2012), from his own studies on Lombok, notes that perhaps a specific type of 
PES may be emerging from the original “beneficiary pays principle.” Certainly no 
community in this study fulfilled the criteria for compensatory conservation 
interventions (Table 5.4) (Wunder 2006a, b). Village management of resources was 
neither all incentive-based, nor completely non-incentive-based. While Lombok 
illustrates a number of key characteristics of PES schemes, none of the communities 
fulfil all of the definitions described in literature.  
 
 
Table 5.4. Five PES Criterion and degree of compliance for each of the three 
incentive-based institutions case studies in Lombok (++ High compliance, + 
Compliant, - Non-compliant, -- High non-compliance, -/+ Unclear, likely non-
compliant, +/- Unclear, likely compliant).  
 
PES Criterion Incentive-based Institution Case 
Studies 
(IB1) Lebah 
Suren 
(IB2) Ledang 
Nangka 
(IB3) Gangga 
1. Existence of 
voluntary contracts 
+ -- -- 
2. User pays principle +/- -/+ -/+ 
3. Conditionality + -- -- 
4. Directness + - - 
5. Additionality - -- -- 
 
 
The incentive-based institutions within this study do appear to be focused on 
conservation of ecosystems and greater equity in access to, and availability of, 
resources. It is misleading to label these ‘incentive-based’ in the traditional PES 
context. Muradian’s (2012) argument that incentives are determined by their social 
value, and are conditional on the culture and context, may be a more applicable 
approach in this instance. These social values and norms underpinned cultural and 
religious activities in IB2 and IB3 (and to an extent IB1, although not directly related 
to the incentive-based institution). They also provided a degree of incentives for 
cooperative behaviours (Mosse 1997). This builds on earlier arguments in Chapter 4, 
that social norms drive collective action. 
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What does this mean for future definitions of PES and their relation to collective 
action? While definitions of, and criteria for, PES and PES-like mechanisms are 
important for their wider implementation, it is unlikely that all of these criteria will be 
met when applied in the realities of local contexts (Muradian and Rival 2012, 
Muradian 2013). It may therefore be more appropriate to understand and/or 
implement PES or PES-like incentives as incentives for collective action that are built 
on existing institutions and social norms.  
 
There was a low level of commodification of ecosystem services within these 
incentive-based schemes, even in IB1’s monetised scheme. Rewards appeared instead 
to give social recognition and acceptance, and became moral norms that induced other 
users to follow similar practices. This suggests that strong intrinsic motivations can 
drive behaviours, which are not dependent on external stimuli (Muradian and Rival 
2012, McAfee 2012). The schemes that appeared to be better aligned to their 
communities in IB2 and IB3 had emerged from within the communities themselves, 
rather than driven by external organisation. These schemes built on the strength of 
existing institutions, and ‘crowded in’ intrinsic motivations to strengthen collective 
activities. 
 
While some may argue that these case studies fulfil few, if any, of the PES criteria as 
documented by Wunder (2005, 2006, 2008), they do provide insights into the role of 
incentives and rewards in managing ecosystem services. The incentives presented in 
the research have social meaning and conveyed different information between 
beneficiaries and users (Muradian and Rival 2012). IB2 and IB3 relied on intrinsic 
motivation to drive behaviours, and demonstrated low commoditisation and 
additionality of ecosystem services. In contrast, the case study of IB1 was driven by 
external stimuli, which included outside beneficiaries, high additionality, and 
significant degrees of commoditisation.  
 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
 
How can institutional ‘fit’ be incorporated into incentive-based approaches 
to conservation? 
 
The findings in this paper are very specific to the context of Lombok. Nonetheless, 
they add to the wider debate about incentive-based institutions influence on 
communal behaviours and collective action, and the reality of their practical 
implementation. It is evident that the ‘fit’ and ‘interplay’ of institutions are necessary 
and important factors to consider when implementing incentive-based management of 
ecosystem services. The provision of incentives that strengthen natural resource 
governance, and create benefits for and empower local communities is valuable for 
conservation. However, this study highlights the importance of understanding local 
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social, cultural, economic, and political contexts that influence individual and 
communal behaviours. In particular, the inclusion of socio-cultural dimensions in 
ecosystem valuation and development of incentives is essential to enable ‘fit’ and 
strong ‘interplay’ between existing institutions and social norms. This may prevent 
underlying social motivation to be ‘crowded out.’ On Lombok, individual perceptions 
and values of the environment were highly dependent on their socio-cultural 
backgrounds, rather than financial outcomes. Social and cultural values should 
therefore be considered as important as economic values when creating incentive-
based management approaches.  
 
Closer alignment of incentives, and institutional function, with these local socio-
cultural values is essential for any mechanism that seeks to alter human behaviours. A 
more holistic understanding of values is paramount to determine the true value of 
ecosystem services. It can therefore reflect the perceived benefits and implicit desires 
of individuals, and their contribution to the wider community through collective 
action. SES resilience is likely to be strengthened by greater interplay between a 
community’s socio-cultural dynamics and collective action, and the wider institutional 
context. Stronger institutions based on this approach are more likely to be able to 
adapt to shocks and slow rates of change.  
 
One management institution does not ‘fit’ all contexts. The implementation of more 
hybrid governance structures may be more appropriate when they incorporate social 
norms, values, and dynamics, which are themselves culturally determined. When 
considering these local contexts and dynamics, it is suggestive that the application of 
strict incentive-based criteria is unlikely to be met. A focus on fulfilling this specific 
criteria and emphasis of only economic environmental values may reduce the 
likelihood of institutional ‘fit.’ The implementation of incentive-based institutions 
with greater ‘fit’ can, therefore, be fostered when societal values that promote 
collective behaviours for sustainable natural resources use are also incorporated. 
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6 Efficiency and equity implications of 
changes to the Brazilian Forest Code, 
Código Floresta, for landowners and 
ecosystem service provision in the 
Amazon frontier, Mato Grosso, Brazil 
 
 
 
6.1 Abstract 
 
Complex processes drive changes in land use, which are governed by institutions that 
influence landowners’ decisions about their environment. The regulation of land use 
within private properties in Brazil under the country’s Forest Code has been subject to 
recent reform. Although these changes aim to balance forest protection with 
opportunities for agricultural expansion, the efficiency and equity outcomes of the 
reformed legislation remain unpredictable. This study analysed the impact of Forest 
Code reform on compliance, land-use decisions, and ecosystem services within Alta 
Floresta, Mato Grosso. Spatial analysis of changes in land use and land cover was 
conducted to examine to what degree properties of different sizes complied with 
requirements after the policy revisions. Levels of deforestation in the region between 
2002 and 2011 were extremely high, and compliance with the Forest Code was low. 
The vast majority (95.7%) of deforestation has taken place on large properties. Yet 
the reformed Forest Code has offered an amnesty to abate ‘environmental debt,’ 
which has generated disproportionate benefits for large landholders. To reach 
compliance under the revised Forest Code, significant restoration of deforested areas, 
or the uptake of Environmental Reserve Quotas, must occur. Large landowners with 
the capacity to purchase these offsets may benefit from the more lenient requirements 
of the reformed forest legislation compared with small landowners. This unequal 
outcome can lead large landowners to believe that further legislative changes will lead 
to increased amnesty for future illegal deforestation. More stringent enforcement is 
therefore required to fully implement to Brazil’s Forest Code. 
 
6.2 Introduction 
 
The use of regulation by governments can have a direct impact on landowners by 
helping to create incentive structures needed to manage land-use change. The effects 
of legislation, however, are unpredictable (de Koning 2014). Complex political, 
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social, economic, and ecological issues influence individuals' decisions about 
agricultural land use. To understand these interlinked relationships, it is important to 
monitor the practical implementation of regulation when assessing land-use outcomes. 
It also is paramount to understand the elements – political, social, and economic - that 
determine land-use decisions. This study contributes to the existing discourse around 
these issues by analysing the impact of Brazilian forest regulation reform on 
landowner compliance, land-use decisions, and ecosystem services. It also contributes 
to the wider discourse around the relationship between natural resource management 
policy and the reality of its practical implementation. 
 
The Brazilian Amazon’s highly biodiverse ecosystem plays an important role in 
providing and maintaining essential ecosystem services at local, regional, and global 
scales (de Souza, Miziara, and Junior 2013).  The protection of native vegetation, 
however, must be weighed with the competition from pressure to convert land for 
agricultural expansion. The total extent of deforestation in the southern and eastern 
region of the Amazon has created an “arc of deforestation” in what is currently the 
world’s most prolific land use frontier (Morton et al. 2006). The conflict between 
human land use and efforts to protect the ecosystem influences the ecosystem’s 
resilience to disturbance, forest fragmentation, carbon storage, hydrological services, 
biodiversity and soil resources, and regional and global climate patterns (Portela and 
Rademacher 2001, Sparovek et al. 2010). Deforestation similarly has significant 
implications for policy controls, landowners’ decisions, and ecosystem services 
function.  
 
The ability of policy to reconcile agricultural demands for land with efforts to halt 
forest loss is fraught with difficulty. Many policies in Brazil have focused on 
conserving forests within protected areas. Yet with approximately 53% of Brazil’s 
native vegetation located on private properties, policies also must provide incentives 
for forest protection that are focused towards private landowners (Soares-Filho et al. 
2014, Stickler et al. 2013). To meet these challenges, policy approaches in Brazil have 
attempted to regulate land conversion and conserve forests within private lands 
through the Brazilian Forest Code (FC). The regulation’s effectiveness to govern 
landowner’s decisions and to reduce deforestation, however, remains limited (Stickler 
et al. 2013, Munroe and Muller 2007).  
 
Deforestation in the Amazon is fundamentally linked to rural land-use systems. It is 
driven by complex social, ecological, political, and economic processes and 
interactions. These rural land-use systems and the historical patterns of agricultural 
settlement and conversion determine the rates of forest protection or extraction from 
the Amazon region (Michalski, Metzger, and Peres 2010). Government land 
settlement programs in the 1970s encouraged agricultural development in the 
Amazon. Over the subsequent 40 years, many small-scale properties have 
consolidated into large-scale mono-croplands and cattle ranches (Morton et al. 2006). 
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Currently, large-scale properties represent just 10% of all properties, but account for 
nearly 75% of the total agricultural land (Lapola et al. 2014).  
 
The conversion of land to meet growing agricultural demands has led to high regional 
variability in deforestation rates (Rosa, Souza, and Ewers 2012, Rudel 2005b, Lapola 
et al. 2014, Bowman et al. 2012). Economic objectives aimed at maximizing profits 
have influenced deforestation behaviour. As a result, deforestation is highly spatially 
correlated with human population, roads, and rainfall seasonality across the Amazon 
(Michalski, Metzger, and Peres 2010). Within the “arc of deforestation,” pressure on 
forest areas for cattle ranching and monoculture cropland expansion is relatively high 
(Aguiar, Camara, and Escada 2007, Fearnside 2005, Laurance et al. 2002, Michalski, 
Metzger, and Peres 2010). Since 2004, however, the overall annual average 
deforestation in the Amazon region has almost halved from ~18,000km2 (1990-2004) 
to ~10,000km2 (2005-2012) (Lapola et al. 2014, Boucher, Roquemore, and Fitzhugh 
2013). The decline in annual deforestation is partly due to the impact of the global 
economic recession on agricultural markets, and more stringent Brazilian government 
regulation (Rosa, Souza, and Ewers 2012). 
 
Studies by Michalski et al (2010) and Oliveira-Filho and Metzger (2006) suggest that 
property size is the main driver of deforestation in Alta Floresta within the ‘arc of 
deforestation,’ where this study was conducted. Different deforestation spatial 
patterns also have been created depending on the ‘deforestation agent:’ small 
landholders versus large agricultural businesses (Rosa, Souza, and Ewers 2012). 
Property level financial returns play a significant role in determining land-use 
activities (Vosti et al. 2003). Due to limited land area and financial capital, small 
landholders (defined by the Brazilian government as farms ranging in size up to 
200 ha) often adopt diversified production systems of shifting cultivation and cattle 
ranching for subsistence and income (Pacheco 2009). In contrast, large landholders 
have access to larger amounts of capital, agro-industry subsidies, and greater 
livelihood security. This ensures higher agricultural productivity, which allows large 
landholders to out-compete small-scale farm productivity. A gradual increase in the 
number and total area of large-scale farms reinforces this inequality in land ownership 
and related environmental benefits (Lapola et al. 2014). 
 
Livelihood options are limited for small-scale farmers, as nearly 40% of them lack 
secure property titles. They also receive less financial and institutional support 
compared to large landholders. This lack of financial and institutional support 
increases small-scale farmers’ susceptibility to changes in governance and in the 
wider economy. To meet subsistence needs, small-scale farms often enter a cycle of 
deforestation, and opt for short-term economic benefits over long-term ecological 
sustainability (de Souza, Miziara, and Junior 2013, Godar, Tizado, and Pokorny 
2012). Land clearing from small-scale farmers, for example, accounted for 73% of 
total deforestation in 2009 (an increase from 30% in 2002) in Mato Grosso, compared 
to 2.5% from large landowners (a decrease from 17% in 2002) over the same period 
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(Rosa, Souza, and Ewers 2012). The increase in overall annual deforestation within 
small-scale properties also suggests that they, not large landholders, may bear the 
burden of forest policy reform. The impact of reform, therefore, could further 
constrain their livelihoods and aggravate opportunity costs. 
 
Deforestation creates fragmented forest patches (Skole and Tucker 1993, de Filho and 
Metzger 2006). This fragmentation has multiple impacts on ecosystem services for 
both global and local stakeholders. Loss of forest accounts for an estimated 20% of 
global carbon emissions (Trivedi et al. 2009), biodiversity loss (Fearnside 2005, 
Summers 2008), reduced productivity through soil erosion and nutrient depletion 
(Foley et al. 2005, Calder 2005), and unknown impacts on the provision of water for 
both agriculture and human consumption (Sweeney et al. 2004, Mann et al. 2012).  
 
As productive areas for agriculture, riparian habitats are facing increased pressure 
from agricultural expansion (Sparovek et al. 2010). The deforestation of riparian 
forests, including buffering stream and river channels, reduces the overall habitat for 
biodiversity. It similarly has a direct impact on watershed structure and functionality 
(Sweeney et al. 2004). Loss of riparian habitats also can compromise ecosystem 
function and the ability of that ecosystem to process water pollutants. The loss can 
subsequently impede the downstream transport of pollutants and sediment (Sweeney 
et al. 2004, Summers 2008, Hayhoe et al. 2011). This change can affect hydrological 
cycles across multiple scales. 
 
The effect of ecosystem services on water flow is complex and site specific. It results 
in misconceptions surrounding the links between ecosystem function and riparian 
forest cover (Wunscher, Engel, and Wunder 2008). In large-scale basins, such as the 
Amazon, multiple types of land use and vegetation can create difficulties in 
differentiating the hydrological impacts of land cover change (Costa, Botta, and 
Cardille 2003b). Studies of small-scale catchments indicate that modifications in land 
cover have significant implications for ground permeability, seasonal distribution of 
water, and soil nutrient cycles. They also can alter both abiotic and biotic properties 
(Hayhoe et al. 2011, Locatelli and Vignola 2009). After the conversion of tropical 
forest to pasture, the balance between infiltration, evaporation, and runoff of the area 
can be affected, which may impact the total water yield. Such changes can disrupt the 
hydrological cycle of drainage basins (Brando, Coe, Defries, and Avzevedo 2013). 
 
The economic value of these ecosystem services is reflective through benefits to 
human welfare and wellbeing (Raudsepp-Hearne et al. 2010). The majority of 
ecosystem services, however, are non-marketable, public goods such as nutrient 
cycling, carbon sequestration, and watershed retention. Their economic value is often 
external to the market system, and can lead to inefficient resource allocation and 
extraction (MA 2005, Goulder and Kennedy 2011, Landell-Mills and Porras 2002). 
Sweeney et al (2004) argue that if the true value of riparian forests through the 
services they deliver relative to forest-derived products is acknowledged, individuals’ 
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economic behaviour may change. They suggest that deforestation of riparian habitats 
for agricultural profit can be reduced through incentives. Effective incentives for 
landowners can encourage ecological management to avoid the potential costs of 
riparian forest ecosystem loss (Walker et al. 2013). 
 
“Without compliance, however, rules are meaningless”, (Keane et al. 2008). 
 
Regulation of economic motives and rational choices over land-use decisions can not 
solely drive positive environmental behaviours to maximize utility and conservation. 
To achieve and maintain landholder compliance, punishment – and awareness of the 
risk of punishment – is vital (Andrighetto and Villatoro 2011).  
 
Enforcement behaviour assumes that compliance with the norm is dependent on the 
probability of detection and the severity of any punishment. The effect of punishment 
is determined by: 1) Trade-offs between the potential economic benefit of non-
compliance and following prescribed behaviours; 2) The cost imposed when caught; 
and, 3) The deterrence of future offences (Becker 1968). Individuals with a high 
dependence on resources often bear significant economic and social costs (Keane et 
al. 2008). To foster compliance, positive environmental behaviours should be more 
cost effective compared with potential rule breaking. Individuals must make trade-
offs between the perception of likely detection, the severity of punishment, the 
enforcement of rules, and any immediate short-term gains of non-compliance (Keane 
et al. 2008, Leader-Williams and Milner-Gulland 1993).  
 
Compliance creates varying trade-offs for different land users. Incentives to comply 
with land-use regulation, therefore, is highly contextual. It depends on landowners’ 
socioeconomic status, livelihood, tenure, and land cover (Duchelle et al. 2013). Land-
use regulations to shape landholder behaviour must be site specific, and are critical for 
the governance of forests (Stickler et al. 2013).  
 
This paper seeks to understand the impacts of regulation reform on land-use outcomes 
in the Brazilian Amazon. This is important to understand the drivers of compliance, 
and how regulation can therefore achieve efficient and equitable forest conservation 
(Borner et al. 2014). Since the emergence of rapid deforestation in the Amazon in the 
early 1990s, the Brazilian government has implemented numerous conservation 
initiatives. These include protected area expansion and restricted access to credit in 
critical municipalities (aimed at reducing capital for deforestation activities). The 
initiatives also include regional legislation to combat deforestation, offset rapid 
agricultural expansion, and place pressure on large agribusinesses (Rosa, Souza, and 
Ewers 2012, Rudel 2005b). The Forest Code (FC) was introduced as the primary 
instrument to regulate deforestation within private landholdings. Significant policy 
changes were introduced in the policy in 2012 that have had large impacts on land 
use, forest cover, and the livelihoods of smallholders. 
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6.3 Brazilian forest protection legislation 
 
6.3.1 Original Forest Code 
 
The original 1965 Forest Code (FC), Código Florestal, legislation had become de 
facto environmental law by the 1990s (Soares-Filho et al. 2014). It was intended to 
extend the protection of natural forest cover beyond federal and state protected areas, 
and Indigenous Lands (Terras Indígenas) to include private agricultural lands. 
Approximately 68.34% of natural vegetation in Brazil remains in private 
landholdings. The FC aimed to protect these forests, and required landholders to set 
aside a proportion of their forested land as Legal Reserves (LR). They also had to set 
aside forests along riparian areas (streams, rivers, and headwaters) as Areas of 
Permanent Preservation (APPs) (Sparovek et al. 2010, Brannstrom et al. 2012, 
Stickler et al. 2013, Soares-Filho et al. 2013, 2014).  
 
APPs include Riparian Preservation Areas (RPAs), steep slopes, and hilltops that 
protect hydrological functions and prevent soil erosion. Both APPs and LRs require 
private landowners to set aside a proportion of their property as forest. APPs are 
defined by their geographic location adjacent to headwaters and water bodies (RPAs) 
or at high elevation. By maintaining natural vegetation cover and preventing soil 
erosion along steep slopes, APPs aim to protect riparian habitats. For the purpose of 
this paper, only the riparian forest requirements of the APP legislation were included. 
Other APP provisions, including steep slope set-aside, are irrelevant in the Alta 
Floresta region due to the local topography. LRs have no geographic definition, but 
require a proportion (determined by biome and vegetation type; For Alta Floresta, this 
was 80%) of all private properties to be maintained as forest (Table 6.1). Some 
productive use is allowed under LR legislation, but clear cutting of primary forest is 
not permitted.  
 
6.3.2 Why change the Forest Code? 
 
FC restrictions on land have led to significant opportunity costs for farmers. They 
often perceive the legislation as a barrier to agricultural development (Sparovek et al. 
2010, Stickler et al. 2013, Soares-Filho et al. 2013, 2014). The enforcement of 
legislation, however, has proven difficult. Remote landholdings, variation in regional 
requirements, and confusion over FC implementation have led to non-compliance by 
large and small landholders. The result of this non-compliance is a large legal deficit 
of forest areas (Sparovek et al. 2010). The FC has therefore been ineffective in 
conserving natural vegetation.  
 
The achievement of full compliance under the 1965 FC would “require radical 
changes” in agricultural practices (Sparovek et al. 2010). The high costs of these 
agricultural changes were estimated to have considerable social and economic 
consequences. Heavy legislative restrictions on land use resulting from any reforms 
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may encourage deforestation in other locations. This ‘leakage’ could occur to satisfy 
the economic pressure to convert primary forest for agriculture and timber production. 
It also could help compensate for lost agricultural revenue due to the restoration of 
existing deforested land. A lack of clear tenure of large, legally-unprotected areas in 
regions such as the “arc of deforestation” may also increase land vulnerability to 
agricultural expansion (Sparovek et al. 2010). The risk of ‘leakage,’ therefore, may 
undermine any environmental benefits that arise from enforcing compliance. 
 
An influential lobby (including small- and large-scale farmers) has driven efforts to 
reduce the legal requirements of the FC. The campaign has focused, largely, on the 
perception that compliance would invoke a significant economic burden on cattle 
ranches and large mono-croplands. The ecological benefits, such as increased 
connectivity, carbon storage, and improved hydrological services, of maintaining the 
forest to meet compliance have been side-lined for the perceived economic benefits 
from forest conversion for crops and livestock, i.e. non-compliance under existing FC 
rules (Stickler et al. 2013).  
 
6.3.3 A revised Forest Code for Brazil – Who benefits from a deforestation 
amnesty? 
 
Despite this political reality, “controversial revisions” to the FC were implemented in 
October, 2012 (Soares-Filho et al. 2014). A reduction in set-aside requirements for 
LRs and APPs, and an introduction of CRAs (Cota de Reserva Ambiental, or 
Environmental Reserve Quota, Article 66), have created an “amnesty” for small- and 
large-scale farmers (Table 6.1). The amnesty includes a lower legal requirement for 
set-aside forest on properties that has enabled a pardoning of historical illegal 
deforestation prior to 2008 (Arima et al. 2014). This action has reduced overall 
environmental debt – i.e. non-compliance – for all private properties across Brazil.  
 
The revised FC differentiates between conservation requirements (LR and APPs) and 
restoration. The reforestation requirements for deforested land are key to determine 
the new levels of compliance under the new FC. Properties may be compliant with 
their own set-aside forest cover, but land deforested prior to 2008 may still require 
reforestation to become fully compliant. APP restoration is mandatory in narrower 
buffers, and cannot be compensated for through forest restoration in other locations.  
 
LR restoration of deforested land, however, may be conducted on the property or 
through CRAs. CRAs are legal titles to land with intact native vegetation that can be 
traded to offset LR environmental debt on one property for surplus forest on another 
(Soares-Filho et al. 2014). The creation of an economic value for native vegetation is 
aimed at creating a market that, according to estimates, could abate 56% of all of 
Brazil’s LR debt (Bonell and Bruijnzeel 2004, Soares-Filho et al. 2014). 
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Table 6.1. Changes in Forest Code requirements for Areas of Permanent 
Preservation and Legal Reserve protection of natural forest vegetation for 
landholders in Brazilian Amazonia. Proportion of property area set aside land 
applies to most of Legal Amazonia, including Alta Floresta. Some regions may 
have different requirements, depending on biome type and county economic 
profile. 
 
 Property size Original 
Forest Code 
New  
Forest Code* 
Forest Protection 
APP - Headwaters All 50m 15m 
APP – Rivers/ Streams </= 100ha 
30-50m 
5m 
>100ha-200ha 8m 
>200ha-400ha 15m 
>400ha 20m 
APP – Large rivers >50m 
wide 
All 50-500m 200m 
LR >400ha 80% 50%** (80%) 
 <400ha 80% 100% of 2008 
forest cover 
* Narrower buffers apply to land converted before 2008 only – if conversion 
did not occur, riparian forest remnants remain protected up to 500m, 
depending on river width. 
**For properties where deforestation occurred after 2008, LR requirements 
under the new FC remain 80% off property size 
LR reforestation  
Deforested land before 2002 All 
Restore or 
compensate 
Amnesty if at 
least 50% was 
preserved 
Deforested land 2002-2008 <400ha Amnesty 
Deforested land 2002-2008 >400ha Restore or 
compensate 
Deforested land 2008-2011 All Restore to 
2008 levels or 
compensate 
 
There are multiple implications of the reformed FC for both large and small 
properties. To regulate land use, legislation is dependent on its clarity, the perceived 
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cost of compliance, the strength of enforcement, and the values placed on the 
environment. The variation of requirements for different property sizes and in 
deforestation histories in Brazil has created ambiguity in what is required from 
individual landowners: The timing of historical deforestation and size of property, for 
example, determines restoration requirements.  
 
From an economic perspective, a proportional forest set-aside, in terms of LRs and 
APPs under the new FC, will incur an opportunity cost for all properties. Yet, the 
policy is likely to have greater implications for smaller properties, which are limited 
by factors such as land type, a lack of CRA offset land, alternative livelihood 
opportunities, and financial capital. To reduce these limitations, the cost of 
maintaining riparian areas through APPs should be largely incurred by large-holdings, 
which contain a greater number of riparian habitats. The FC reforms therefore lower 
the opportunity cost of environmental requirements. By relaxing set-aside 
requirements, the reforms can reduce many of those previously technically non-
compliant large properties.  
 
FC reforms also have had environmental impacts. The reduction of forest set-aside 
requirements exposes a larger extent of forest to legal clearance. It also increases the 
likelihood of habitat fragmentation, which is expected to be more severe within small 
properties because of their lack of ecological and financial resources. Studies by Prist, 
Michalski, and Metzger (2012) suggest that fragmented forest landscapes affect 
habitat species richness and increase edge effects. The loss of forest also impacts the 
provision of ecosystem services, including reduced forest carbon storage in biomass, 
increased run-off from lower evapotranspiration, and changes in regional climate 
patterns (Lima et al. 2013, Foley et al. 2007). 
 
The political lobbying to drive changes and reforms in the FC has been significant. 
Many of the lobby perceived earlier the FC legislation to be a barrier to agricultural 
development. Their influence to reduce FC requirements also may have spread the 
understanding within landowners that future law amendments could further dilute 
compliance, or at least compliance deadlines may be extended in the future. There 
also is a belief that future legislation may be even more lenient, therefore weakening 
landholder incentives to comply with the new FC (de Souza, Miziara, and Junior 
2013). 
 
 
6.4 Research questions 
 
1:  How have the changes in the Forest Code policy affected land-use decisions of 
small and large properties? 
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2: What impact have the property-scale levels of deforestation during the period 
2001-2011 had on compliance levels from the 2012 Forest Code legislation 
changes? 
 
3: What are some of the impacts of the reforestation requirements of 2012 Forest 
Code legislation on the land-use decisions of large and small landowners? 
How can Environmental Reserve Quotas be used to address these legal 
requirements?  
 
 
6.5 Methods 
6.5.1 Study Region 
 
Figure 6.1 Map locating Alta Floresta municipal district in Mato Grosso State, Brazil. 
 
The study region focused on the municipal district of Alta Floresta, in Northern Mato 
Grosso, Brazil (Figure 6.1). Alta Floresta was chosen as a model landscape where the 
relationship between environmental compliance costs and property size could be 
examined. The area comprised of 897,292 ha, in which 2767 rural properties were 
examined, that ranged in size from 0.90 to 33,519 ha.  Landscape configuration in this 
area of the Amazon included small properties that were uniformly situated close to the 
main town. The region also included extensive cattle ranches that still retained large 
forest patches (Oliveira-Filho and Metzger 2006, Peres and Michalski 2006). Fire has 
been used extensively to maintain pastures and agricultural plots. Large-scale 
deforestation in the area began in the early 1980s after the Brazilian Federal 
Government started programs to develop roads and agricultural resettlements 
(Oliveira-Filho and Metzger 2006, Peres and Michalski 2006). The current spatial 
distribution of primary forest between properties in the municipal county was unlikely 
to be the result of pre-existing differences in land cover, but instead related directly to 
historical and current land-use strategies. 
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A set of eight cloudless QuickBird images with a 10m resolution from 2008 were 
used in the study, with all data projected on UTM 21S (datum SAD69). Band 3 (0.63-
0.69µm), band 4 (0.76-0.90 µm), and band 5 (1.55-1.75 µm) were used to classify the 
images using IDRISI as forest, pasture, scrubland, bare ground, and water. Visual 
distinction between land cover categories was facilitated by the image’s high-
resolution.  
 
Ground-truthing of property boundaries was conducted by the municipal 
administration of Alta Floresta in 2008-2011 to determine property polygon size and 
geographic position. Spatial analysis of actual and expected land cover was conducted 
to determine the extent and patterns of forest set-aside compliance for all properties 
across the entire size spectrum. Expected forest set-asides that were identified as 
pasture, scrubland, or bare ground were considered to be non-compliant, and the area 
was calculated as environmental debt. Total LR and APP compliance was then 
calculated from the extent of environmental for all properties to determine the impact 
of FC changes. 
 
The time period of deforestation is an important element to determine APP and LR 
requirements under the new FC. The Brazilian Space Agency’s PRODES project 
(www.obt.inpe.br/prodes) provides a yearly inventory of deforestation across the 
Brazilian Amazon with a pixel-size resolution of 60m.  Deforestation polygons from 
PRODES for the period 2002-2008 and 2008-2011 were overlaid on the Quickbird 
land cover mapping to calculate the area of deforestation. This additional data served 
as ancillary data to the time of deforestation in the monotemporal, high-resolution 
images. There are limitations and greater margins of error when using images from 
different satellite sources with different resolutions. For the purpose of this study, 
however, it was important to identify properties where active deforestation had 
occurred both after 2001, and after 2008. This analysis enabled FC requirements to be 
determined under both the old and new FC legislation. It also allowed for the cost of 
reforestation to meet compliance under the new FC to be estimated. 
 
6.5.2 Wealth proxy 
 
Alta Floresta holds one of the largest municipal scale bovine stocks in Brazil 
(~920,000 head of cattle in 2012), and cattle ranching accounts for more than 95% of 
the total land-use revenue in the region. This study used cattle herd size, predicted 
from active pasture area within each property, as a proxy for property wealth. This 
was based on interview data obtained from 114 geo-referenced properties across the 
Alta Floresta county. Total pasture area was both estimated from Quickbird images 
and verified in situ by local landowners. Despite some variance in pasture quality, 
pasture area explained 86.7% of local cattle herd size. Cattle stocking densities at 
these properties also were consistent with the mean density across the entire county 
(2.07 head per hectare of pasture: M. Medeiros, unpublished data). Cattle herd size-
6:  Efficiency and equity implications of changes to the Brazilian Forest Code 
 -176- 
per-property was used to estimate the property-scale economic implications of the 
costs and benefits of managing ecosystem services, fulfilling FC obligations, and 
generating revenue. 
 
6.5.3 Calculating reforestation costs 
 
Property-scale reforestation costs estimated in the study, in terms of erecting fences 
along riparian buffer strips or actively planting tree seedlings, are not necessarily 
mandatory. Landowners may choose to reforest or simply allow natural vegetation 
succession to take place. This paper used reforestation costs to provide an indication 
of landowners’ cost-benefit behavioural choices under the FC requirements. 
Economic information from property-scale interview data by UNEMAT (2008) was 
used to calculate the total cost of full reforestation to meet compliance. This included 
the costs of reforestation labour (USD $2,499.25 per ha) and erecting fencing around 
riparian strips (USD $3,475.19 per km of stream) to prevent cattle overgrazing and 
trampling.   
 
6.5.4 Data analysis 
 
A spatially-explicit General Linear Mixed Model (GLMM) was used to model level 
of legal compliance within properties. This multivariate analysis tested the 
relationship of both fixed and random effects on landowners’ compliance responses. 
Where necessary, data was log-transformed to control for non-normal distribution 
(Osbourne 2002). The explanatory variables considered were property size, a proxy of 
wealth (predicted number of cattle per property), and distance to Alta Floresta. 
Environmental variables considered included forest cover, stream length, and 
headwater density. To avoid pseudo-replication, forest area, stream length, and 
headwater density were modelled as random effects, and property size, wealth and 
distance to Alta Floresta were modelled as fixed effects (Bolker et al. 2009). This 
spatially-hierarchical model was deemed most suitable to analyse properties within 
hydrological basins and to control for pseudo replication All GLMMs were 
undertaken in Stata 12.0. Coefficients from the GLMM indicated the significance and 
direction of each independent variable on compliance outcomes (Armsworth et al. 
2009, Bolker et al. 2009). This significance was measured by two-tailed z-statistical 
tests with a probability value of 0.05.  
 
 
6.6 Results 
 
For the purpose of this study, private properties less than 400 ha were considered to 
be small landholdings. These properties made up 93.60% of landholdings examined 
within the study, covering 123,195.65 ha. In contrast, large landholdings (greater than 
400 ha) covered 370,567.79 ha, in total. As of 2012, the municipal county of Alta 
Floresta consisted of 505,553.5 ha (56.3 %) of forest cover, 52.2 % of which 
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(263,955.7 ha) was within the private landholdings that were examined in this study 
(14.35 % within small properties and 85.65% within large properties). For riparian 
areas, 54.87 % of the total stream length (6.692.6 km) and 59.58 % (4,930) of 
headwaters in Alta Floresta were located in the properties within this study. This 
geographical data has had significant implications for understanding riparian forest 
habitat protection requirements under the FC for these properties. Levels of 
compliance were analysed for properties under both the original and reformed FC. 
Deforestation rates between 2002 and 2011 were then included, and levels of 
compliance under the reformed FC recalculated to determine the impact of 
deforestation on policy outcomes. 
6.6.1 Amnesty – How significant are the changes in the Forest Code? 
 
Compliance under the original FC was low for both APPs and LRs (Table 6.2, Figure 
6.2, and Figure 6.4), with a mean compliance of 52.10  % and 31.93 %, respectively. 
The lack of compliance created a high ‘environmental debt’ of deforested land across 
Alta Floresta, particularly within small properties. Under the new FC, with reduced 
requirements for legal set-asides and riparian buffers, significant increases in 
compliance have occurred across the municipal county and property sizes. 
 
Table 6.2. Requirements and compliance under the old and new Forest Code for 
Area of Permanent Preservation and Legal Reserves on private properties. All 
areas in hectares (ha) (n=2766). 
 
 Requirement  Actual 
Cover 
% Compliance Debt  Surplus 
Overall Mean 
APP       
Old FC 38,766.88 26,213.44 67.62 52.08 12,550.85 0.00 
New FC 23285.98 18,717.29 80.38 58.15 4,568.69 5,375.28 
LR       
Old FC 396,631.83 132,676.12 66.55 31.93 132,676.12 12,802.22 
New FC 223,163.74 263,955.71 100.00 99.13 -17,373.52 55,906.15 
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Figure 6.2. Property compliance (%) 
under the old Forest Code for Legal 
Reserve requirements. 
 
Figure 6.3. Property compliance (%) 
under the new Forest Code for Legal 
Reserve requirements. 
 
Figure 6.4. Property compliance (%) 
under the old Forest Code for Areas of 
Permanent Preservation requirements. 
 
Figure 6.5. Property compliance (%) 
under the new Forest Code for Areas of 
Permanent Preservation requirements. 
 
Under the new FC, there was a complete compliance for LR  (Figure 6.3), and an 
increase to 80.38  % compliance for APPs (Figure 6.5) within Alta Floresta,. It should 
be noted, however, that overall compliance includes surplus forest areas and that some 
properties are still yet to reach full LR compliance. Nonetheless, this increased 
compliance has reduced overall environmental debt for both LR and APPs. It also has 
increased forest ‘surplus’ – forest land that exceeds set-aside requirement areas -- that 
can be legally deforested within LRs under the new FC.  
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Figure 6.6. Area of Permanent Preservation 'environmental debt' across property 
sizes under the old and new Forest Code (n=2766). 
 
Under the new FC, there is a significant reduction in environmental debt for APPs 
from 33.38 % to 19.62 % (Figure 6.6). Yet, the proportion of debt reduction under the 
new APP requirements decreases as property sizes increases. Properties less than 
400 ha have seen an 81.35 % reduction in APP debt. For properties greater than 
400 ha, this debt has only been reduced by 48.82 %. 
 
 
Figure 6.7. Legal Reserve 'environmental debt' across property sizes under the 
old and new Forest Code (n=2766).  
 
Environmental debt for LR under the new FC also has reduced significantly (Table 
6.2 and Figure 6.7). For small properties below 400 ha (excluding one property that 
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deforested land after 2008), LR environmental debt is virtually zero. This is reflective 
of the new LR amnesty for all farms under 400 ha, which are only required to retain 
forest that was left standing after 2008. Any deforestation that occurred on these 
farms prior to 2008 was not required to be reforested, as it did not count as part of 
individual properties’ environmental debt. All farms over 400 ha have stricter 
requirements to retain 50 % of forest cover, or 80 % if they continued to deforest after 
2008.  
 
Table 6.3. GLMM to determine factors influencing environmental debt under the 
old and new Forest Code. Z value in brackets (n=2766). 
 
Variable Debt under Old FC Debt under New FC 
APP LR APP LR 
Property size (ha) >0.05 
(0.48) 
*** 
(4.66) 
*** 
(-4.63) 
*** 
(-6.89) 
Forest (ha) *** 
(-4.89) 
*** 
(-94.52) 
*** 
(-4.47) 
*** 
(-75.55) 
Bovine density *** 
(30.40) 
*** 
(215.63) 
*** 
(24.41) 
*** 
(40.86) 
Distance to Alta Floresta *** 
(-2.81) 
*** 
(3.83) 
*** 
(2.55) 
*** 
(5.18) 
Stream length *** 
(6.99) 
*** 
(5.48) 
>0.05 
(1.44) 
*** 
(14.01) 
Headwater density *** 
(3.63) 
>0.05 
(0.35) 
>0.05 
(1.29) 
*** 
(-1.40) 
 
Critical probability values quoted are represented as follows: ‘***’=p<0.001, ‘**’=p=<0.01, 
‘*’p=<0.05, and ‘>0.05’= Non-significant (p=≥0.05) (Fowler, Cohen, and Jarvis 1998). 
 
For both APPs and LR set-asides, ‘environmental debts’ have decreased significantly 
under the new FC. Property size, forest area, and wealth (bovine density) are 
significant determinants of APP and LR environmental debt (Table 6.3). Stream 
length and headwater density are, however, not significant in determining APP 
environmental debt. For APPs, environmental debt under the new FC shows greater 
association with bovine density than stream length or headwater density. Smaller 
properties, in particular, have increased their compliance following a reduced set-
aside forest requirement. The influence of bovine density on environmental debt also 
is strongly associated with LR debt. 
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6.6.2 Amnesty levels under the revised Forest Code 
 
Changes under the new FC have enabled an amnesty of environmental debt for certain 
properties. Previous environmental debt under the old FC, which is now met through 
lower set-aside requirements, has absolved some areas of historical deforestation. The 
changes have enabled an amnesty of 63,514.42 ha (100 % of old LR debt) for 
properties less than 400 ha. They also have allowed for an amnesty of 43,411.75 ha 
(61.68 % of old LR debt) for properties greater than 400 ha (Table 6.4 and Figure 
6.7). Larger properties with forest areas that exceeded LR requirements can therefore 
legally deforest a surplus of 55,906.15 ha. Consequently, for larger properties, the 
total amnesty area for LR environmental debt is much greater than that for APP 
environmental debt (48.82 %). In contrast, there is no surplus of LR land for smaller 
landholders.  
 
Table 6.4. GLMM to determine amnesty of environmental debt under the new 
Forest Code. Z values in brackets (n=2766). 
 
Variable APP LR 
Property size (ha) *** 
(6.71) 
*** 
(15.15) 
Bovine density *** 
(13.48) 
*** 
(5.28) 
Distance to Alta Floresta *** 
(-7.36) 
>0.05 
(0.65) 
Stream length *** 
(10.82) 
>0.05 
(0.86) 
Headwater density *** 
(3.18) 
>0.05 
(0.46) 
 
Critical probability values quoted are represented as follows: ‘***’=p<0.001, 
‘**’=p=<0.01, ‘*’p=<0.05, and ‘>0.05’= Non-significant (p=≥0.05) (Fowler, Cohen, 
and Jarvis 1998). 
 
For both small- and large-scale properties, overall amnesty for previous LR 
environmental debt under the old FC was 106,926.17 ha, and 7,938.34 ha for 
historical APP debt. Amnesty for LR debt was positively associated with property 
size and bovine density, and therefore wealth (Table 6.4). The proportion of amnesty 
was greatest overall for properties less than 400 ha (61.68 % for LR and 81.35 % for 
APP). There was a high number of these small properties (2589 farms, 93.60 % of 
properties within the study), and the total amnesty area for all of these properties was 
significantly smaller (1.77 ha for APP and 24.53 ha for LR), compared with larger 
properties, which held more overall land.  
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Landholders closer to Alta Floresta town were significantly smaller, and amnesty 
increased for these properties closer. Properties larger than 400 ha had a mean 
amnesty of 18.96 ha for APP debt, and a mean amnesty of 245.26 ha for LR debt. 
Small properties, less than 400ha, had a mean amnesty of 1.77 ha for APP debt, and a 
mean amnesty of 24.53 ha for LR debt. This association suggests that large properties, 
with high wealth opportunities compared to small properties, have benefited greatly 
from an overall amnesty effect of reduced FC requirements They have received a 
greater immunity from historical non-compliance, and surplus LR area within these 
larger properties also has enabled further legal deforestation. 
 
6.6.3 Amnesty in the context of deforestation 
 
Since 2002, deforestation has 
continued rapidly in Alta Floresta, 
particularly within large properties. 
This has had implications for FC 
compliance. Between 2002-2008, 
162,592.97 ha of forest within the 
municipal county was deforested. A 
further 15,810.94 ha was felled 
between 2008-2011, although at a 
slower rate. Combined, this 
deforestation accounts for a loss of 
67.59 % of Alta Floresta’s forest 
during the nine-year period 
(Figure 6.8).  
 
Figure 6.8. Area (ha) of deforestation 
across properties in Alta Floresta between 
2002-2011 (n=2766). 
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While the new FC regulations led to 
a widespread amnesty for both 
large- and small-scale landholders, 
overall deforestation rates must be 
considered when discussing the 
implications of compliance under 
the new FC regulations. Compliance 
may appear to be significantly 
greater under the new 
requirements. Yet when the 
compliance associated with 
previous deforestation is included, 
the significant loss of overall forest 
provides a clear indication that the 
FC has had negative impact on 
private properties forest retention. 
Figure 6.9. Property compliance (%) to 
Legal Reserve requirements under the new 
Forest Code, after deforestation between 
2002-2011 (n=2766). 
Deforestation of 178,403.91 ha between 2002-2011 reduced overall compliance 
significantly from 100.00 % to 34.69 %, with a mean compliance of 86.80 % (Figure 
6.9), and an overall amnesty of 99,593.19 ha. Reforestation to meet LR compliance 
has only been 38,532.63 ha. Yet reforestation to restore lands deforested between 
2002-2011 accounts for 170,715.96 ha, and is required under the new FC. This is 
likely to have implications for the potential uptake of CRAs. Reforestation of such 
large areas of forest is likely to be unfeasible. CRAs may therefore be a more cost-
effective means to reach compliance. 
 
 
Figure 6.10. Legal Reserve ‘environmental debt’ across property sizes under the 
old and new Forest Code after deforestation is included (n=2766). 
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The high levels of deforestation that occurred during 2002-2011 are significantly 
correlated with larger properties greater than 400 ha (r2=0.2127, d.f.11, p***) (Figure 
6.10). During this period, large properties felled 170,715.96 ha of forest (48.07 % of 
their total property area). The impact of deforestation levels within these larger 
properties is evident in Figure 6.8 When deforestation is included under the new FC, 
environmental debt for properties greater than 1,059.97 ha began to exceed these 
landholdings’ previous debt under the old FC.  
 
Despite higher deforestation levels that generated larger environmental debts, large 
properties have gained a significant amnesty under the new FC LR requirements 
(Figure 6.11 and Figure 6.12). In contrast, smaller properties experienced lower levels 
of deforestation in the run up to the FC reforms. Properties of less than 400 ha felled 
only 7,687.95 ha (6.14 % of their total property area). But there has also been a large 
reduction in debt under the FC LR requirements, which generated a widespread 
amnesty. That includes a complete pardon for deforestation before 2008 for smaller 
properties.  
 
  
Figure 6.11. Amnesty area (ha) for 
environmental ‘debt’ on properties 
under the new FC LR requirements 
(n=2766). 
Figure 6.12. Amnesty area (ha) for 
environmental ‘debt’ on properties 
under the new FC LR requirements, 
with deforestation included 
(n=2766). 
 
6.6.4 Reforestation costs versus cattle revenue – Capacity for compliance 
 
The reforestation requirement to meet compliance for both LR and APPs is an 
important part of the new FC legislation. Because of more lenient FC requirements, a 
reduction in ‘environmental debt’ is evident across all properties. However, 
substantial deforestation between 2002-2011 means that landowners either have to 
restore forested lands to 2008 levels at their own expense, or utilize CRAs. This 
excludes deforestation on small properties (less than 400 ha) before 2008, which is 
pardoned under the new legislation. All deforestation after 2008, however, must be 
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restored across all property sizes. The relative capacity of landowners to address 
reforestation costs to meet compliance compared to their ability to obtain revenue 
from the deforested land for cattle grazing is determined by property size (Figure 
6.13).  
 
 
Figure 6.13. Reforestation costs versus total cattle revenue across property sizes 
(n=2766). 
 
Across the properties examined in this study, the total cost of reforestation to meet 
full compliance under the new FC is USD $579,704,624.19. This includes both costs 
for reforestation and fence erection to protect riparian forest habitat from cattle 
trampling and grazing. For small properties, the expense of reforestation 
(USD $14,617,512.74) is more than three times less than that of potential annual 
cattle revenue (USD $54,387,831.32). This difference implies that small property 
owners have the financial capacity to reforest land, and therefore are likely to become 
compliant through forest restoration. For large properties greater than 550 ha, 
reforestation costs begin to exceed annual cattle revenue. These increased costs may 
reduce the financial capacity and incentive for these properties to be meet restoration 
requirements. The likelihood of larger properties (greater than 400 ha) to restore 
forest may also be reduced due to the significant surplus of LR (10,941.82 ha) that is 
available for these properties. This excess forest land can either be legally deforested, 
or sold for CRA offsets. 
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For larger properties, the difference 
between restoration and annual cattle 
revenue costs is likely to reduce the 
incentive to comply with the new FC’s 
reforestation requirements (Figure 6.14). 
It may also increase the uptake of tradable 
CRAs as an economical option, which 
enables continued cattle grazing on 
deforested lands. Properties less than 
400 ha, however, have a much smaller LR 
surplus (2,208.92 ha) than large 
properties, which reduces their 
opportunity for future legal deforestation 
or to sell CRA offsets Figure 6.14. Reforestation costs for 
properties to meet compliance for 
restoration requirements under the 
new Forest Code (n=2766). 
 
6.7 Discussion 
 
6.7.1 Impact of changes in the Forest Code on land-use decisions 
How have the changes in the Forest Code policy affected land-use decisions of 
small and large properties? 
 
There are widespread implications from the changes in the new FC. The reformed FC 
requirements have significantly reduced APP and LR forest set-aside requirements for 
both small- and large-scale properties. This reduction has increased compliance by 
creating an amnesty for historical environmental debt. For APPs, the amnesty affected 
both small and large properties (creating a 48.82 % amnesty of previous debt), while 
there was a complete amnesty for small properties linked to LR debt. The increased 
compliance levels would suggest that the FC reform has altered the land-use decisions 
of both small and large properties. In one respect, it has increased the compliance of 
conservation of forests and riparian habitats by reducing the set-aside requirements 
for landowners.  
 
Riparian forest habitats are natural places that are under increased pressure in 
agricultural areas (Sparovek et al. 2010). This is evident in the Alta Floresta 
municipal county where agricultural expansion is forcing a choice between legal 
compliance, profit, and ecosystem function. The loss of forest to increase pasture 
areas appears to be more profitable than the preservation of forest and riparian 
habitats. The extent of deforestation during 2002 to 2011 indicates that the drivers of 
deforestation, particularly expanding agricultural development, remain in existence 
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(Keane et al. 2008, Leader-Williams and Milner-Gulland 1993, Rudel 2005b). While 
rates of deforestation slowed significantly after 2005 (comparing levels in the 1990s 
to 2005 levels), it is unclear whether the FC reforms will continue this reduction in 
deforestation, or completely reverse it (Schwartzman, Moutinho, and Hamburg 2012).  
What impact have the property-scale levels of deforestation during the 
period 2001-2011 had on compliance levels from the 2012 Forest Code 
legislation changes? 
 
There were significant differences in the level of deforestation between large and 
small properties during the period 2002-2011. This led to varying impacts of the 
reformed legislation on different property sizes. Small properties, for example, had a 
lower contribution to overall deforestation, and therefore environmental debt. In 
contrast, large-scale properties deforested 48.07 % of their total property area across 
Alta Floresta, which generated significant environmental debt. This historical 
deforestation, in particular within large-scale farms, has considerably reduced the 
compliance levels for these properties under the new FC. The reformed FC may be 
viewed as substantially lenient by some (Stickler et al. 2013). But it is clear that 
achieving complete compliance remains unlikely because the extensive loss of forest 
area will be unable to meet the new FC’s forest set aside requirements. The ecosystem 
benefits of the FC’s enforcement could therefore be seriously undermined by 
continued deforestation (Sparovek et al. 2010). 
 
High deforestation rates are indicative of a low economic value placed on standing 
forest areas. The short-term economic benefits of deforestation have fostered the 
expansion of cattle pasture. They also have outweighed the environmental cost of 
compliance (Sweeney et al. 2004). This is evident with large properties’ 
environmental debt. Despite more lenient requirements under the new FC, after 
deforestation is included, large landowners’ debt exceeds that of the stricter original 
FC. The reformed FC is therefore weak in its ability to alter economic behaviours for 
large private landowners to manage, and not exhaust, forest tracts (Tollefson 2011, 
Walker et al. 2013).  
 
The inclusion of deforestation in this analysis significantly lowers compliance levels 
across the properties. It also suggests that the reformed FC rules are ineffective for 
many landholders, and may drive further deforestation (Keane et al. 2008). This is 
emphasized by the significant amnesty of environmental debt for both APPs and LR 
under the new FC. Excluding deforestation, the amnesty is most significant for small 
properties. When deforestation is considered, however, in absolute terms, FC reforms 
enable a greater amnesty for properties larger than 400 ha, and those with higher 
bovine density and, therefore, greater wealth. This is because large-scale farms hold 
more overall land and, even with substantial deforestation, the reduced forest set-aside 
requirements pardon historic non-compliance. These large properties also have a 
greater surplus of forest land, which can legally be cleared or traded as CRAs. These 
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larger and wealthier properties benefit more from the FC change than smallholders, 
which do not have excess land to be either cleared or traded as CRAs.  
 
Economic behaviours to maximize utility are evident in landowners’ decisions to 
increase agricultural revenue through extensive deforestation (Angelsen 1999). This 
economic activity is, however, maximized at the expense of forest and hydrological 
ecosystem services. To enable environmental behaviours, compliance must be more 
cost effective than non-compliance. To deter future offences, enforcement measures 
and punishment must be more costly to landholders than their perceived benefits of 
deforestation (Leader-Williams and Milner-Gulland 1993). The effect of the political 
lobby in Brazil in campaigning Congress to reduce the original FC requirements was 
significant. The political campaigning also have given the perception to landowners 
that lobbyists can either drive future law changes, or that future legislation revisions 
will further reduce compliance requirements. Currently, positive environmental 
behaviours, i.e. compliance, are perceived to be of greater economic cost, particularly 
for large landowners, than non-compliant behaviours linked to agricultural expansion. 
What are some of the impacts of the reforestation requirements of 2012 
Forest Code legislation on the land-use decisions of large and small 
landowners? How can Environmental Reserve Quotas be used to address 
these legal requirements? 
 
To enable environmental debts to meet compliance under the new FC when 
deforestation is considered, significant restoration of forest needs to occur, 
particularly among large landholders. A landowner’s economic ability to deal with 
restoration requirements will largely determine the relative capacity and motivation to 
comply with regulations. For smallholders, forest restoration requirements are lower 
due to property size, lower deforestation levels, and the extent of LR amnesty. 
Consequently, the cost of restoration for small landowners is less than total annual 
cattle revenue for these properties, and therefore is financially viable.  
 
For large-scale properties, the cost of reforestation exceeds that of total annual cattle 
revenue when the extent of deforestation between 2002-2011 is considered. The 
impact of these reforestation costs may encourage landowners to not comply, or to 
take up CRAs (either selling or buying) to abate LR debt. By developing a tradable 
market, CRAs can alter landowners’ perceived economic value of forests (Soares-
Filho et al. 2014, Bonell and Bruijnzeel 2004). CRAs can be used to offset LR 
environmental debt from one property to another. The compensation for forest loss in 
one location by protecting forest in another location, however, may not always be 
effective or appropriate. The use of CRAs may penalize small property owners with 
limited surplus forest and capital opportunities to enter the market. The very notion of 
offsetting environmental debt through CRAs also may develop a perception that 
regulations can be bypassed and the market abused, while deforestation and large 
agribusinesses continues to expand. 
6:  Efficiency and equity implications of changes to the Brazilian Forest Code 
 -189- 
 
Despite their substantial deforestation levels, large properties appear to benefit from 
the significant amnesty in environmental debt. Lower forest set-aside requirements 
and optional offsetting to reach compliance allow large and wealthy properties to 
avoid punishment for environmental debts, while continuing to maximize agricultural 
profit. The use of CRAs to address compliance may prove to be more cost-effective 
for large landowners. Yet CRA offsets may increase the acceptance of deforestation 
activities, and give a perception that there are ways to avoid the new FC regulations.  
Protection of forests through regulation therefore requires greater equity in benefits 
and compliance for small-scale farmers. Nazareno (2012) argues that the FC reform 
would achieve neither forest conservation nor the sustainable development required to 
increase equality between small- and large-scale property owners. Nazareno’s 
research also found that compared to large-scale properties, the FC reforms generated 
little opportunity for small-scale properties to benefit from reduced provisions for 
forest protection. 
 
 
6.8 Conclusion 
 
While this paper focused on the municipality of Alta Floresta in Mato Grosso state, it 
is indicative of the wider implications of the new FC for much of Brazil’s forests and 
highlights the disparity between environmental policy and the reality of its practical 
implementation. While the amnesty, which followed a reduced LR and APP 
requirement for private property owners, is disproportionate across Brazil’s biomes, 
the message that it delivers to landholders – given the current rates of deforestation – 
is clear: Compliance can be optional. The creation of an amnesty for historical 
deforestation and non-compliance benefits large landowners, many of whom were 
involved in driving the policy revisions. This inequality is due to large landowners – 
with their property size and capital resources – had greater opportunities for previous 
illegal forest clearances compared to small landowners. 
 
Deforestation rates across Brazil prior to the FC reform may have slowed (in 
particular after 2005), but forest clearance nevertheless has continued. The extent of 
forest loss within Alta Floresta would suggest that, despite an overall decrease, the 
original FC was not successful in lowering deforestation rates within the region. The 
FC reforms attempt to increase the efficiency of land-use governance and to control 
deforestation behaviours. Yet, the reforms have increased the inequity of the policy 
with disproportionate benefits given to large landholders. These properties owners 
have obtained a significant amnesty and a greater financial capacity to buy or sell 
CRAs despite their deforestation activities before the FC reforms.  
 
The new FC may still not provide effective carrot-and-stick motivation to protect 
forests on private properties because it is still more profitable to convert forest to 
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cattle pasture, particularly for large landholders. More recent studies by Godar et al. 
(2014) suggest that large landholders may be altering their behaviour to continue 
deforestation, but in patches that are within the detection limits of satellite-based 
forest clearing monitoring systems such as INPE’s DETER (Detecção de 
Desmatamento em Tempo Real - Real-time System for Detection of Deforestation). 
The increased difficulties of detecting non-compliance and enforcing FC legislation 
under these circumstances may limit the effectiveness of the reformed policy and 
increase the marginal costs of reducing deforestation. Sufficient economic objectives 
that combine incentives for compliance, enhanced enforcement, and punishments for 
non-compliance are, therefore, required to motivate the management, not the 
exhaustion, of ecosystem services (Walker et al. 2013). 
 
Significant changes in agricultural practices, and more effective enforcement 
procedures that provide incentives for positive environmental behaviours, are 
necessary to successfully implement the new FC (Sparovek et al. 2010). Greater 
transparency, communication, and trust of forest governance may also enable wider 
acceptance by all landowners.  
 
This study shows that the governance decisions of the new FC are clear, but the 
policy’s implementation to manage ecosystem services remains elusive. Unless the 
true value of forest and riparian habitats at local, regional, and even global scales are 
recognised, environmental externalities cannot be accounted for. Short-term economic 
behaviours also will continue to exhaust ecosystem services. The potential return to 
higher deforestation rates under the reformed FC has been described by some 
scientists as “A recipe for Amazon dieback” (Thomas Lovejoy, Heinz Centre, 
Washington DC (Tollefson 2011). This renewed deforestation could create ecosystem 
responses from the substantial conversion of forest to savannah and resultant changes 
in local climatic and rainfall patterns.  
 
For the Amazon ecosystem, greater leniency in LR and APP requirements is likely to 
encourage further deforestation, create fragmented forest areas, and continue the 
transformation of riparian habitats into agricultural land. Without positive incentives 
and adequate punishments to encourage and reward compliance, coupled with greater 
equity in the treatment of those who have illegally cleared land, a “new wave” of 
deforestation is likely to occur (Tollefson 2011). This direct consequence of the 
policy reforms could compromise complex and dynamic ecosystem processes and 
functions (Sweeney et al. 2004), with, as yet, unknown impacts on biodiversity, 
carbon storage, and hydrological ecosystem services.  
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7    Conclusion 
 
 
 
Conservation interventions that use incentives to alter land-use behaviours have been 
heralded as an effective approach by which to control the use of natural resources. 
The outcomes of such approaches, however, are often unpredictable. There is a need 
to understand how these initiatives function in reality and whether they can be 
successfully implemented to promote both efficient conservation management and 
equitable resource distribution. This study applied a social-ecological (SES) approach 
to examine the ways in which incentives to manage ecosystem services can influence 
the equity and efficiency of natural resource use. It highlighted the difficulties of 
implementing mechanisms to motivate behaviours for the sustainable use of 
ecosystem services. This is particularly important when considering local contexts 
and dynamics, and the likelihood of non-compliance by actors.  
 
A mixed-methods approach generated both qualitative and quantitative data. The 
analysis provided insights into water and forest resource use behaviours on Lombok, 
Indonesia. It focused on the impacts of access and availability of resources, the equity 
implications of incentive-based institutions to manage land-use decisions and 
collective action, and how the management of positive incentives ‘fit’ local contexts 
to alter environmental behaviours and generate collective action. A further case study 
in Alta Floresta, Mato Grosso, Brazil provided a separate analysis of how changes in 
policy, which created negative incentives for land-use decisions, influenced local 
environmental behaviours. 
 
The use of conservation interventions, which alter incentives for land-user decisions 
and environmental behaviours, has been widely implemented in recent years. 
Incentives are, however, neither a ‘Panacea or Pandora’s box,’ (Tomich et al. 1998). 
Their application as an efficient means to conserve resources and provide more 
equitable benefits has been promoted in both developing and developed countries. 
Despite this widespread use, there is a need to understand how the implementation of 
these incentives fulfil efficiency and equity objectives, and whether the application of 
incentive-based institutions are appropriate ways to alter land-use behaviours within 
the complex reality of the real world. 
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7.1 Concluding section structure 
 
This section summarises the overall findings of the empirical research papers. The 
theoretical implications of these conclusions, particularly the use of an ecosystem 
services approach and the debate surrounding collective action versus economic 
rationale to provide incentives, are then considered. The consequences for policy 
implementation and, often, unpredictable outcomes, and the management of land-use 
behaviours for ecosystem services provision are also reviewed. Lastly, the limitations 
of this study and recommendations for future avenues of study are discussed. 
 
7.2 Summary of results 
 
The structure of this thesis entails that the main empirical findings are specific to each 
research paper. However, the respective chapters contribute to the wider argument 
regarding the relationship between incentives and pro-environmental behaviours 
within a SES context. The synthesis of the results therefore summarises the 
contribution of each paper in answering the main research questions, as set out in 
Chapter 1. 
 
7.2.1 Implications of water stress on Lombok, Indonesia 
 
There are multiple challenges in the governance of water resources. This is due to the 
extent, nature, and complexity of water-related conflict, security, and institutional 
cooperation. For island ecosystems like Lombok, sustainable water governance is 
vital to manage finite water resources. The access to, availability, and allocation of 
water are major constraints for agriculture, livelihoods, poverty, and wellbeing. It is 
therefore important to understand the dynamics of water resources and resource users 
for any management to be effective. Chapter 3 examined the biophysical, socio-
economic, and institutional determinants of household water supply for communities 
across Lombok. Significant variation in water resource availability and access was 
observed, with an irregular distribution of water resources between seasons and 
villages. Large population densities, in particular, drove the demand for water 
resources, and which sectors of society competed for them. For rural communities, far 
from urban settlements, this resulted in limited domestic water infrastructure. 
 
Water management on Lombok is currently supply-driven. This focused on improving 
infrastructure to increase the supply of and access to water resources. For marginal 
communities, the high cost of acquisition of, or connection to, household water 
infrastructure led to a societal scarcity of water resources. A more sustainable and 
equitable use and allocation of water resources may be developed, however, from a 
demand driven perspective through end-use efficiency. This is likely to improve 
access to water infrastructure for rural communities, and reduce the acquisition effort 
for household water supply. The findings from this chapter furthers our understanding 
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of the issues for the management of water resources on island ecosystems, and the 
barriers that biophysical and institutional settings, and infrastructure, pose to 
sustainable household water provision (Hophmayer-Tokich and Kadiman 2006). The 
findings also highlight the contextual and unpredictable nature of water scarcity. This 
has implications for the implementation of water management, which should be 
developed from an understanding of the ‘messy’ reality of communities and 
ecosystem functions on the ground, and should integrate their multiple and, often, 
competing goals. 
 
This study suggests that inadequate access to water and relevant infrastructure can 
have significant implications on the time available for economic development and 
agricultural activities. Household water acquisition effort, however, may not be the 
single determinant of agricultural revenue. The agricultural sector on Lombok is a 
high consumer of water resources. Further research into the extent and impacts of 
agricultural water use would be useful to determine livelihood impacts of household 
and agricultural water resources (Rijsberman 2006). 
 
7.2.2 Exploring the relationships between incentive-based 
management, collective action, and social equity: Protecting 
hydrological services on Lombok, Indonesia 
 
Chapter 4 addressed how the local institutions, which control resource users and the 
resource system, are central to determining the condition of ecosystem services. All of 
the communities within this study were influenced by the wider political, economic, 
cultural, social, and biophysical contexts of Lombok and Indonesia. They highlighted 
the variation in, and trade-offs between, equity and efficiency that are central to 
incentive-based interventions. Institutional design, which matched local contexts and 
existing power relations, were important in determining equity in ecosystem services 
management.  
 
Other studies (Vatn 2010b, Vatn 2010a, Gachter and Fehr 1999, Fehr and Falk 2002) 
have argued that economic rationale alone cannot predict environmental behaviours. 
The findings of this paper support this argument and further the understanding of the 
social drivers and communal institutions that affect environmental behaviours beyond 
merely maximising economic utility. On Lombok, communal local institutions based 
on social and cultural values, such as collective resource behaviours and customary 
laws, represented significant incentives to motivate pro-environmental behaviours. 
The findings of this paper suggest that incentive-based institutions had a more 
significant influence in altering land-use behaviours when built on existing social 
norms that motivated collective action. This supports theories of collective action by 
Mosse (1997, 2003) - that cooperative behaviours arise from moral conscience or 
social norms - and furthers the understanding of how collective action built on social 
norms can occur at local levels. 
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The communal local institutions that motivated pro-environmental cooperative 
behaviours generated greater autonomy over management procedures and the 
distribution of benefits. The risk of elite capture was evident across all case studies, 
and was reflective of the context-specific nature of institutional benefits and the 
political ecology of Indonesia. This emphasised the necessity for locally-driven and 
locally-targeted incentive-based institutions to enable the empowerment of local 
communities.  
 
7.2.3 How well do incentive-based institutions ‘fit’ the societal values 
of ecosystems on Lombok, Indonesia 
 
A variety of incentive approaches, including economic, religious beliefs, and 
customary laws, were examined in Chapter 5. They illustrated how different 
institutional signals were used to alter land-use behaviours. This paper examined 
elements of institutional ‘fit’ in relation to societal values in incentive-based 
institutional design. Key to the participation of communities in institutional decision-
making and their compliance to pro-environmental behaviours was the autonomy of 
the incentive-based institution’s development and management. Institutions that had 
higher community autonomy were, as a result, more closely aligned, and adapted to, 
social norms, cultural values, and existing institutional governance. Consequently, 
they had a greater impact on behaviours, and generated cooperation within 
communities for collective action. 
 
The findings of this paper contribute to the wider debate about the importance of 
institutional alignment to SES contexts. Ultimately, it is only through context-specific 
studies that the ‘fit’ of incentive-based institutions can be observed. This suggests that 
a universal application of incentive-based institutions based on a Coasean approach 
will produce different outcomes when implemented in different contexts.  
 
The case studies on Lombok illustrated the influence of these contexts and existing 
underlying institutions on collective action for communal pro-environmental 
behaviours. The inclusion of socio-cultural dimensions in ecosystem valuation and 
institutional development has critical implications for institutional ‘fit.’ For Lombok, 
socio-cultural backgrounds, rather than cost-efficiency outcomes, were significant in 
determining individual perceptions and values of ecosystem services. Incentives that 
were grounded within existing institutions and social norms were able to ‘crowd in’ 
intrinsic motivations for cooperation and pro-environmental behaviours.  
 
No single policy can ‘fit’ all contexts. Consequently, interventions such as Payments 
for Ecosystem services (PES) rarely resemble their theoretical form in practical 
application. This is a consequence of the fact that incentives are often ‘problem-
based:’ They are negotiated between various stakeholders, in the context of 
addressing specific problems for a specific SES. Outcomes are difficult to predict as 
7:    Conclusion 
 -201- 
context determines the success of individual incentive-based mechanisms. The 
implementation and adaptive management of incentives that have closer alignment 
with existing institutions, contexts, and societal values is therefore essential for 
institutional signals to influence collective land-use behaviours. 
 
7.2.4 Efficiency and equity implications of changes to the Brazilian 
Forest Code, Código Florestal, for landowners and ecosystem 
service provision in the Amazon frontier, Mato Grosso, Brazil 
 
Chapter 6 addressed the impact of incentives to alter land-use behaviours, which are 
determined by the trade-offs of landowners between the perceived economic benefit, 
the likelihood of detection, and the severity of punishment of non-compliance. This 
paper highlighted the disparity between policy application and the reality of its 
implementation with the effect of changes in forest policy on institutional signals that 
influenced land-use decisions and the conservation of riparian ecosystem services.  
 
The reduced requirements of the reformed Forest Code (FC) significantly lowered the 
forest protection requirements for landowners for both Legal Reserve and Areas of 
Permanent Preservation forest set-asides. This reduction has been viewed by some as 
substantially lenient (Stickler et al. 2013). Significant levels of deforestation between 
2002-2011 across Alta Floresta changed the efficiency and equity outcomes of the 
reformed FC. When these deforestation levels are considered, the amnesty level 
remained substantial, but the overall compliance under the reformed FC is 
significantly lower than compliance under the original legislation.  
 
Smaller, less wealthy landowners had a lower contribution to deforestation, yet the 
amnesty of their historic deforestation under the reformed FC was lower than larger, 
wealthier landowners. These larger landowners had a greater historic deforestation 
amnesty and surplus of forest, which they could legally clear or trade to offset non-
compliance. The cost of compliance for these larger landowners was far greater than 
the benefits they obtained from continued deforestation. This paper supports McAfee 
(2012)’s argument that the ‘incentive effect’ of institutions may not always generate 
equitable outcomes. Inequity of landowner benefits from policy reform outcomes may 
also encourage the perception that compliance is not cost-effective, and therefore it 
may drive further deforestation and ecosystem degradation 
 
The use of sanctions as incentives to motivate pro-environmental landowner 
behaviours did not in this case study appear to be sufficient to adequately explain 
land-use decisions. The implementation of the reformed policy to manage ecosystem 
services and reduce deforestation remains elusive. The findings suggest that 
environmental externalities have not been addressed and the degradation of ecosystem 
services imposed disproportional costs on the wider society. For Alta Floresta, weak 
incentives led to weak institutions. The ‘incentive effect’ of policy reform was 
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insufficient, both economically and in enforcement ability. This created an inefficient 
institution that appeared to be unable to motivate compliance, leading to a greater 
likelihood of further deforestation. Continued deforestation also could seriously 
undermine any ecosystem services benefits from the FC’s enforcement. 
 
 
7.3 Theoretical implications 
 
In this section the contributions of the research findings to theoretical debates are 
discussed. 
 
7.3.1. Valuation of ecosystem services 
 
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA 2005) has driven considerable research 
into the economic values of ecosystem services. This conceptual approach is useful to 
identify ecosystem service function and benefits. It also can identify their economic 
values, which can be integrated into decision-making to develop pragmatic solutions 
for conservation (Goulder and Kennedy 2011, Daily et al. 2009). The 
acknowledgement of the value of ecosystem services is an important factor to 
determine land-use behaviours. Landowners seek short-term benefits through land 
conversion or unsustainable resource use.  However, pure economic commodification 
of ecosystem services may exclude important drivers of land-use behaviours, which 
are often linked to underlying cultural values, social norms, customary laws, and the 
relationship between these values and other institutions (Hein et al. 2006, Oteros-
Rozas et al. 2013). 
 
This study highlights the benefits of using a SES framework (Ostrom 2009) to 
understand economic values of ecosystem services and the determinants of the 
processes that drive sustainable or harmful natural resource use. Multi-disciplinary 
approaches, such as SES, can examine relationships between social and ecological 
systems within the context of their social, political, and economic setting. This 
approach can reveal resource-user perspectives on ecosystem services and institutions 
that are used to govern their use. Consequently, a SES approach is beneficial to 
understand holistically the human responses to the dynamics of the SES context 
(Travers 2009). Incentives are, therefore, more likely to be accurately directed to alter 
these responses towards pro-environmental behaviours. Further research into the non-
economic values of ecosystem services, such as intrinsic use and non-use values, and 
option and existence values, would be useful to infer social and cultural importance of 
ecosystem services, and their contribution to motivating pro-environmental 
behaviours. 
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7.3.2. Framing human behaviour towards the environment 
 
Group behaviours do not always conform to theoretical or institutional arrangements, 
and outcomes are difficult to predict. Designing incentive-based institutions solely 
from theoretical perspectives may not provide the conservation and development 
outcomes that are sought. The findings from this thesis highlight the need to 
incorporate broader perspectives of human motivation to cooperate with communal 
environmental behaviours. Economic theory is often a key driver in the design of 
behavioural incentives. It is equally important, however, to include social, 
anthropological, and psychological theories to understand the foundations and social 
institutions behind behavioural motivation (Fehr and Falk 2002, Gachter and Fehr 
1999). 
 
7.3.3. The influence of collective action versus economic rationale on 
behavioural choices 
 
The use of incentive-based mechanisms to control land-use behaviours is built on an 
economic rationale that individuals act to maximise individual benefit. In providing 
an incentive that is greater than the benefit from detrimental environmental activities, 
these mechanisms aim to fulfil both conservation and development objectives. Where 
individual action cannot achieve common goals alone, Wade (1987) argues that 
collective action is more efficient. This was partially supported by the findings of one 
of the case studies on Lombok, where the implementation of the incentive-based 
institution was motivated by a desire to obtain greater efficiency in the provision of 
water resources and hydroelectricity. Compliance and participation in the initiative, 
however, was weak and had limited impact on behavioural choices. 
 
The findings from two case studies on Lombok, however, suggested that it was 
important to look beyond economic rationale when defining human motivation. These 
two case studies highlighted the implications of communal local institutions, such as 
awiq-awiq, religion, and social norms, to provide incentives for pro-environmental 
behaviours and collective action. Case studies in this context suggested that rationale 
choice alone could not predict or explain individual behaviours. This argument builds 
on Mosse’s (1997, 2003) debates that collective action is motivated by social norms 
rather than economic efficiency. Cooperative solutions to manage common pool 
resources appeared to be driven by a common moral conscience or the wider social 
norms of these communities. Incentives appeared to show a greater ‘fit,’ higher levels 
of participation, and compliance when built on these underlying drivers of communal 
social behaviour (Ostrom 1990, 2000). 
‘Crowding in’ and ‘crowding out’ 
 
The findings from the case studies on Lombok highlight the importance of interplay 
of incentive-based institutions with existing local institutions and their ‘fit’ to local 
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social, economic, biophysical, and political contexts. The complex and dynamic 
nature of SESs and the case studies meant that it was difficult to clearly define 
whether incentives-based institutions ‘crowded in’ or ‘crowded out’ existing intrinsic 
motivations. Monetary incentives did not undermine intrinsic motivators, but nor did 
they necessarily complement them (van Noordwijk et al. 2012). The findings from 
two of the case studies on Lombok, however, suggest that building incentives on 
communities’ existing social norms, and their ability to self-organise and cooperate, 
can reinforce intrinsic motivations for collective action, i.e. ‘crowd-in.’  
 
7.3.4. Methods to understand institutional theory and practical 
implementation 
 
This thesis used a diverse array of methods to try to understand how the theory behind 
incentive-based institutions function in practice to alter behaviours towards the 
environment. In particular, the use of spatial analysis was useful to understand large-
scale actor-specific implications of forest policy changes for small and large property 
owners in Alta Floresta. This method highlighted trade-offs between economic gain 
and conservation that could be examined under different policy designs. The use of 
this approach, however, may be limited due to the multiple factors involved in 
determining land use decisions by small and large landowners over such a large, 
heterogenetic landscape. Furthermore, recent studies suggest that large landowners, 
aware of the government’s deforestation monitoring system through satellite imagery 
may be adapting their behaviour to continue deforestation activities, but at a scale that 
avoids detection (Godar et al. 2014). The use of the method in this study provides an 
example of how spatial analysis can be used to illustrate the disparity of policy and 
the theories behind governance systems, as well as the reality of its implementation 
on the ground.  
 
 
7.4 Policy implications 
 
The results of the case studies in Lombok and Alta Floresta highlighted the 
difficulties in predicting and determining conservation and development outcomes of 
incentive-based institutions. The findings of this research, however, also have clear 
relevance and implications for the design and implementation of policies that use 
incentives as mechanisms to alter land-use behaviours. Each case study highlighted 
the often divergent realities between policy design and the complex world in which 
initiatives are implemented. The inherent inter-relations within a SES imply that any 
management of ecosystem services will create trade-offs between resource users and 
the resource system (Rodriguez et al. 2006). The design of policies to manage 
ecosystem services with incentives will also reflect these trade-offs. An 
interdisciplinary approach to the implementation of incentive-based institutions is 
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therefore essential to quantify these trade-offs and understand the drivers of human 
decision-making (Milner-Gulland 2011).  
 
7.4.1 Efficiency outcomes of incentive-based management 
 
The basic principle underlying incentive-based institutions is to enable greater 
economic and environmental efficiency for a more sustainable use of natural 
resources (Jack, Kousky, and Sims 2008). Yet, optimising the provision of one 
ecosystem service, or for one group of resources users, will result in trade-offs for the 
provision of other ecosystem services and for other resource users. It is also difficult 
to measure efficiency, particularly due to the context-dependent nature of what is 
understood to be efficient, and the complex processes and functions of ecosystem 
services (Pascual et al. 2010). Efficiency is often focused on costs and gains, with a 
focus on ecosystem services values and a more sustainable use of resources. 
However, it is also argued that to manage resources efficiently, social equity and 
intrinsic values of natural resources must also be taken into account.  
 
The findings of this study suggest that policy should look beyond economic efficiency 
goals in the application of incentive-based institutions. Efficiency outcomes of 
incentive-based management should not be confined to just short-term gains and cost-
effectiveness (Kosoy and Corbera 2010, Martin et al. 2014). They also must promote 
long-term changes in land-use behaviours. At the local level, long-term behavioural 
changes may be achieved through communal incentives to control land-use choices, 
and promote greater cooperation and collective action. Sustainable and efficient 
outcomes may therefore be dependent on the development of incentive-based 
institutions that include socio-cultural values, and that are able to increase cooperation 
and equity among resource users. 
 
7.4.2 Equity outcomes of incentive-based management 
 
Incentive-based managements, which are efficient in their use of natural resources, 
are not automatically equitable (McAfee 2012). While economic efficiency is clearly 
important in the design and implementation of incentive-based institutions, 
environmental behaviours are also driven by concepts and perceptions of social 
justice for both governance procedures and resource distribution (Martin et al. 2014, 
Kollmuss and Agyeman 2002). Policy should therefore have a specific focus on 
understanding historical and existing power relations, and social perceptions of 
equity.  
 
Multiple factors in the research’s case studies were found to have an impact on the 
equity of the distribution of benefits under incentive-based management. For Alta 
Floresta, landowners with greater capital were able to obtain greater level of benefits 
from the weak enforcement of with weak compliance incentives. On Lombok, the 
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case studies that were led by local institutions had a greater focus on the equity of 
outcomes than those led by external organisations, which appeared to have a greater 
focus on efficiency outcomes. Case studies on Lombok highlighted the importance of 
equity in procedures that enabled participation in decision-making. However, there 
was significant disparity between different incentive-based institutions in the 
redistribution of benefits and the empowerment of local people.  
 
The existence of social equity prior to incentive-based institution implementation was 
not determined to be a prerequisite for this management to function. On Lombok, 
existing social hierarchies showed an increased risk of the elite capture of benefits 
linked to incentive-based institutions. Yet when there was greater equity in decision-
making and control of natural resource management, the distribution of natural 
resource benefits was higher and compliance through collective action was more 
likely. 
 
Lower equity in procedural justice, such as through the implementation of external 
incentives, was found to weaken incentive-based institutions. Social equity in the Alta 
Floresta case study was adversely affected by institutional reforms of the local Forest 
Code. Landowner decisions to increase agricultural revenue through continued 
deforestation were illustrative of economic behaviours aimed at maximising utility 
(Angelsen 1999). In this case study, compliant behaviours were less cost effective 
than non-compliant behaviours. The negative ‘incentive effect’ of sanctions was also 
disproportionately felt by small landowners compared to large landowners. 
Consequently, the wealthier landowners captured greater benefits from their historical 
deforestation activities and the legislative reform because of their greater access to the 
financial benefits of non-compliance versus poorer subsistence farmers. 
 
Further research into the justice implications of incentive-based institutions would be 
necessary to identify local perceptions of what is ‘just’ in relation to resource access 
and availability, and institutional governance; and, how these views impact 
environmental behaviours in response to incentives.  
 
7.4.3 Institutional ‘fit’ 
 
The findings of this research illustrate that the institutional effectiveness of incentive-
based management is dependent on the SES context in which institutions function and 
on the environmental problem they wish to address. The ability of these institutions to 
‘fit’ these contexts is key to their ability to alter land-use behaviour. It is therefore 
essential for policy to understand how incentive-based institutions align with local 
contexts and values, and interplay with existing institutions.  
 
For Lombok, high community participation in decision-making, adaptive 
management of natural resources, high autonomy over incentive-based institutions, 
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and incentives that matched social norms and the resource, illustrated institutional 
‘fit.’ Community-led institutions, such as in Ledang Nangka and Gangga, used 
existing institutions and social norms to motivate collective action for pro-
environmental behaviours. These were more accepted by local communities and 
showed greater alignment with the local SES context than in communities where this 
approach was not taken. Incentives were grounded in underlying intrinsic 
motivations, such as religious beliefs and customary laws, and were used to ‘crowd 
in’ social norms.  
 
In contrast, institutional ‘mis-fit’ was illustrated in Lebah Suren and Alta Floresta, and 
proved to be ineffective in managing ecosystem services. In Lebah Suren, the 
implementation of incentives by an external organisation reduced interplay with other 
local institutions, had a narrow resource management focus, little adaptability, and did 
not encourage community participation in, or cooperation with, the institution. 
Consequently, social acceptance and ‘fit’ of this institution was weak and short-term. 
For Alta Floresta, negative incentives through sanctions were insufficient to alter 
land-use behaviours. The implementation of the reformed FC after significant 
deforestation reduced the strength of incentives to be able to change behaviours. 
 
Incentives to alter environmental behaviours need to be directly targeted at local 
providers within the context of a SES and resource management focus. Institutional 
structures that ‘misfit’ the resource and resource users that they aim to govern are 
unable to provide sufficient incentives to alter land-use behaviours. The 
implementation of external institutional structures may be inappropriate and 
insufficient in addressing environmental issues and local land-user needs. It is crucial 
to understand the context in which incentives aim to function so that appropriate 
policies can direct land use towards social goals, which also reduce environmental 
degradation. 
 
7.4.4 The ‘messy middle’ 
 
The findings from these case studies illustrate some of the reality of how incentive-
based institutions can function in practice. They highlight that the ‘messy’ world in 
which they are implemented makes it difficult to clearly attribute outcomes to the 
theoretical assumptions on which incentive-based institutions are designed. Human 
behaviour and ecological systems are determined by multiple and dynamic factors. 
Their management is typified by multiple and often competing goals. 
 
The ‘optimal design’ of policy should, therefore, be developed within the context in 
which it functions, taking into account the different perceptions, cultural backgrounds, 
social norms, and ecological dynamics of each SES. None of the case studies used in 
this thesis clearly adhered to Wunder’s (2005) PES criteria. Nonetheless, these 
findings are relevant for PES and incentive-based design. They move PES beyond its 
theoretical application to meet the realities of the complex world that is the 
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application of incentives. The use of these criteria and theoretical approaches such as 
political ecology and SES, can be useful in guiding understanding of SES dynamics. 
They can also help with the development of incentive-based institutions that are more 
likely to align with specific case study contexts. The application of incentive-based 
institutions, which are able to incorporate and adapt to the ‘messy middle’ and create 
a problem-centred approach may, therefore enable a greater ‘fit’ to the chaotic, 
unpredictable, and, often, poorly understood reality. 
 
 
7.5 Study limitations 
 
As with all research, there were a number of limitations that influenced the scope of 
this study, which need to be considered. These included potential methodological 
weaknesses when applying matching, cultural misunderstanding, and time constraints 
for surveys conducted on Lombok; and, margins of error in spatial analysis applied 
for both Lombok and Alta Floresta. The use of matching to select control villages in 
Lombok was a useful tool to create comparative case studies in which to analyse 
conservation and development intervention (Pattanayak 2009, Ravallion 2005). 
However, for the researcher to accurately match case study communities that were 
similar in every context except the intervention, a significant understanding of the 
SES was required (Clements 2012). In reality, this was not always possible or feasible 
within the limitations of the fieldwork and research time-scales. Consequently, 
matched variables could have been selected on a more practical basis rather than 
qualitative assessment. This may have limited the compatibility of control villages 
with the incentive-based institution case studies. 
 
In Lombok, due to time constraints, particularly during the month of Ramadan (July-
August 2012), respondents were often difficult to find and indicated frustration when 
responding to questions. It was decided that questionnaires would be conducted in the 
early evening, after iftar, the breaking of the fast. This ensured respondents could be 
located, were happier to answer questions in a more free manner, and that the research 
assistant could also observe Ramadan practices.  
 
The findings from the case studies in Lombok may also not necessarily be 
representative of the wider island population. Data was collected from households 
within a short time scale, which could limit the qualitative understanding of the 
complexities of SES and drivers of environmental behaviours. The findings may also 
have not considered the long-term impacts of such behaviours and system dynamics. 
A larger sample of populations in other villages would have helped to identify and 
calculate more generalised motivations for pro-environmental behaviours and 
collective action across the island.  
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On Lombok, interviews and questionnaires were conducted in Bahasa Indonesian, and 
translations into Sasak were made where necessary. Where possible, the influence of 
the researcher’s own perspectives and cultural differences on data was minimised. 
Some cultural understanding and influence, however, was unavoidable, and likely to 
have influenced the questions asked, the direction and theme of discussions, and the 
responses given. Gender issues and the impact of power relations were significant 
factors in obtaining responses. It was recognised that presence of a male research 
assistant and local power hierarchies were likely to have generated more conservative 
answers, in particular from female respondents. Some information and colloquial 
understanding may also have been lost in translation. 
 
Spatial analysis generated limitations for both the Alta Floresta and Lombok case 
studies. For Alta Floresta, the use of two differently sourced satellite images 
(QuickBird and LANDSAT-5/TM) with different resolutions and from different years 
increased the margins of error in the spatial analysis. For the purpose of identifying 
land-use behaviours in relation to deforestation rates, however, it was important to 
include both of these images. While images were classified using the same 
bandwidth, and projected on UTM 21S (datum SAD69), some margins of error were 
unavoidable. While ground-truthing to determine property boundaries had been 
conducted by the municipal administration of Alta Floresta, due to the number of 
properties surveyed (nearly 3,000), some overlap was also unavoidable. Due to the 
high resolution of the QuickBird image, classification of land cover was a complex 
and lengthy process, requiring multiple classifications. Some detail in forest type, 
such as the quality of forest, in particular along forest edges, may have been lost 
during this classification. 
 
A lack of baseline biophysical data and the small-scale nature of the Lombok case 
studies meant that it was beyond the scope of this research to determine whether 
outcomes, particularly those linked to the local environment, were specifically 
attributable to incentive-based institutions or other factors (Ferraro 2009). For 
Lombok, limited sources of available biophysical data did allow some spatially 
analysis. However, further collation and collection of this data would have been 
beneficial to obtain a more detailed understanding of the biophysical characteristics of 
natural resource distribution in relation to incentive-based institutions. While the 
findings of this study may be influenced by these limitations, nonetheless, it provides 
an important insight into the use of both positive and negative incentives to manage 
land-use behaviour, and will prove useful in future studies. 
 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
 
Rapidly growing populations, increased demands on limited natural resources, and 
climate change are driving a global loss of ecosystem services. Countries such as 
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Brazil and Indonesia are particularly vulnerable to the loss and degradation of forest 
and water ecosystem services due to the extensive conversion of natural forests into 
agricultural land. This has significant implications, in particular for the rural poor who 
are dependent on natural resources for their livelihood strategies. Complex social, 
economic, political, and biophysical processes influence natural resource-use 
decisions and land-use change. The creation of institutional incentive structures can 
therefore be used to govern resources required to directly impact land-use choices. 
 
Conservation interventions, which use incentives to alter behaviours that are currently 
detrimental to the continued provision of environmental services, have been perceived 
to be a ‘win-win’ for both conservation and rural development outcomes. These 
initiatives aim to reconcile the economic efficiency considerations of implementing 
conservation programs with the equity concerns of access to, and allocation of, 
benefits from natural resources. It is essential to understand how these institutions 
align to the SES in which they function, and how they influence the land-use 
decisions that they aim to change.  
 
The findings in this study support the idea that SES’s context – the biophysical, 
social, economic, and political dynamics – is highly significant in influencing 
environmental and institutional perceptions, and in determining land-use behaviours. 
Landowners are more likely to be compliant on the basis of these predictors within 
their SES context. In the real world, however, it is difficult to predict individual and 
communal behaviours from theoretical or institutional arrangements. This has 
implications for wider conservation outcomes, and the implementation of incentive-
based institutions in developing and developed countries. When designing and 
implementing incentive-based management of ecosystem services, it is important to 
understand the context of the SES in which the institution will act. These contexts will 
constrain or influence the institutional signals of mechanisms that determine the costs 
and benefits of different environmental behaviours for both individual and collective 
action. 
 
Appropriate incentives to control or alter these behaviours need to be built on these 
specific contexts. They must take into account social norms, economic rationale, and 
existing institutions. This study emphasises the need to consider non-economic values 
such as social and cultural norms, as well as underlying customs, if incentive-based 
institutions are to promote pro-environmental behaviours and local development 
goals. The identification of behavioural drivers beyond black-and-white economic 
rationale is important when incentives are aimed at altering behaviours for sustainable 
natural resource use. Inappropriate and misaligned incentives may have negative 
effects on environmental behaviours, create imbalances in power structures linked to 
resources, or further damage already vulnerable ecosystems. Local contexts, and the 
localised nature of drivers for collective behavioural change, should therefore be 
identified and incorporated into an incentive-based approach to ecosystem services 
management.  
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The type of incentives used to drive pro-environmental behavioural change is also 
important. This study examined the impacts of the ‘incentive effects’ of legislative 
sanctions, economic motivations, religious beliefs, and traditional customs on land-
use decisions.  Due to the complexities and dynamics of SES, the universal 
application of incentive-based institutions, such as Payments for Ecosystem Services 
(PES) criteria, is unlikely to be successful. The application of a ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
management intervention may be inappropriate in many local contexts. Incentives 
must be tailored specifically to the ecological resource, resource system, and local 
resource users. This will increase community participation, the social and overall ‘fit’ 
of an institution, as well as enable compliance to be perceived as a more cost effective 
(socially and economically) environmental behaviour. Local actors must consider 
these incentives to be more beneficial than non-compliant land-use behaviours that 
can be detrimental to ecosystem service provision. These factors are strong predictors 
of pro-environmental behaviours and institutional ‘fit.’ 
 
Ultimately, there is a need to balance the conservation of ecosystem services with the 
complexities of rural development and agricultural land use. Conservation 
interventions that seek to reconcile these often-divergent aims with the use of 
incentives are more likely to succeed if the underlying drivers of resource-use 
behaviours are fully understood, and the institutions to manage behaviours are aligned 
with the social and economic objectives of local resource users. Intrinsic motivation 
and localised priorities are paramount. This approach can incite greater ‘incentive 
effects’ that motivate pro-environmental behaviours, and increase the capacity of 
local actors to work collectively to sustainably use and manage their natural 
resources. “Incentives [do] matter” (Gneezy, Meier, and Rey-Biel 2011), but their 
application in the real world needs to be designed to incorporate the complexities of 
the realities of practical natural resource management to the theories behind them. 
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Appendix I  - Lombok-Wide Household Questionnaire 
 
INFORMATION TO BE EXPLAINED TO RESPONDENTS BEFORE THE 
INTERVIEW STARTS 
1. The purpose of this questionnaire is to independently understand livelihood 
conditions, and water use across Lombok, and to learn whether they are 
different across the island.  
2. Your participation in this study is optional; you do not have to participate if 
you do not want to. If you do agree to participate, you will have the right to 
refuse to answer any question that you do not want to discuss, and you can 
stop the interview at any time. Should you wish to withdraw your responses, 
you can do so up to 3 months after the interview. 
3. You name or any facts that could be used to identify you or your family will 
not appear in any documents resulting from this study. All of your answers 
will be held in strict confidence and cannot be traced back to you, your 
children or other household members. 
4. The information that you give may help guide the formation of policy that 
ensures both people and the environment are protected and managed. Once 
completed, the results from this study will be shared with you. 
ENNUMERATORS PLEASE NOTE: 
Questionnaire no:_________________________________ 
Interviewer Name:__________________________________ 
  
A Date of Interview  
B Village GPS Coordinates (DD MM SS)  
C HH ID  [Ennumerator initials/Number]  
D Village   
E Sub-village  
 
VERIFICATION OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
Supervisor Name : Lucy Garrett  Date :___________________________ 
Follow-up with ennumerator :____________________________________________ 
Interviewer initials (Date)  Supervisor initials (date) 
 
THE FOLLOWING ARE STANDARD CODES TO BE USED THROUGHOUT 
THE QUESTIONNAIRE : 
IF A RESPONDENT REFUSES TO ANSWER A QUESTION, PLEASE USE ‘999’ 
IF THE QUESTION IS NOT APPLICABLE, PLEASE USE ‘888’ 
IF THE RESPONDENT ANSWERS ‘I DON’T KNOW’, PLEASE USE ‘777’ 
IF THERE IS ANOTHER RESPONSE NOT LISTED, PLEASE USE ‘666’ FOR 
OTHER 
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Section A : Part 1 : Area Identification  
 
A.1.1.How many rooms does the house 
have? 
 
A.1.2.Location of Household in village 1=In or around the 
village centre 
2=Isolated 
Household 
 
 
Section A : Part 2 : Household Characteristics  
 
A.2.1. Name of respondent  
A.2.1.Is the head of household answering the questions? 1=Yes 
2=No 
A.2.2.Sex: 1=Male              2= Female 
A.2.3.Age:  
A.2.4.Occupation:  
A.2.5.Number of years in education:  
A.2.6.Marital status: 1=Never married  
2=Married 
3=Divorced 
4=Divorced and remarried 
5=Widowed 
6=Widowed and remarried 
A.2.7.What is the main religion/ belief 
system of the household? 
1=Islam 
2=Hindu 
3=Traditional 
4=Other 
A.2.8.What ethnicity does the household 
class themselves as? 
1=Sasak 
2=Balinese 
2=Sumbawa 
4=Other (Specify)______________ 
A.2.9.How many years has the 
household lived in this village (even if 
seasonally) 
1=Less than 1 
2=1-5 years 
3=5-10 years 
4=Over 10 years 
5=Always 
A.2.10.How many people live in this 
household? 
1=Men  
2=Women 
3=Children <16 years 
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Section A : Part 3 : Assets 
 
A.3.1. Do you own this house? 1=Yes 
2=No 
A.3.2.If NO Who does this house belong to?  
A.3.3. If NO Do you pay them rent? 1=Yes 
2=No 
A.3.4. Tick all that 
apply to this house: 
1=Grass/woven walls 
2=Mud brick walls 
3=Fired brick walls 
4=Earth floor 
5=Cement floor 
6=Tiled floor 
7=Grass/woven roof 
8=Zinc/ iron roof 
9=Tiled roof 
A.3.5.Please indicate 
the number of 
implements and other 
large household 
items that are owned 
by the household: 
 No. Units owned 
1=Car/ truck  
2=Motorbike  
3=Bicycle  
4=Buffalo  
5=Cows  
6=Goats  
7=Horses  
8=Chicken/ducks  
9=HP Cell phone  
10=Fishing boat and boat 
engine 
 
11=Fish pond  
12=Cart  
13=Plough  
14=Water tank  
15=Generator  
16=TV  
17=Radio  
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18=Other (specify)  
19=Other (specify)  
 
 
Section A : Part 4 : Livelihoods 
 
A.4.1. Of the following, which are the 3 most important sources of subsistence and cash for 
your household? 
1=Own farm activities 
2=Labour (farm and non-farm) 
3=Fishing (sea and fish ponds) 
4=Trader/ Merchant/ Sales 
5=Transport 
6=Tourism 
7=Construction 
8=Factory worker 
9=Educational professional/admin 
10=Health professional/admin 
11=Other professional 
12=Restaurant/bar/hotel 
13=Skilled trader 
14=Other source (specify) 
15=No other source 
16=No source 
A.4.1.Subsistence and cash sources 
1. 
2. 
3. 
A.4.2.Does this change during the wet and dry season?  1=Yes 
2=No 
A.4.3. If YES, What are the 3 most 
important sources of both subsistence and 
cash during the wet season? 
1. 
2. 
3. 
A.4.4. If YES, What are the 3 most 
important sources of both subsistence and 
cash during the dry season? 
1. 
2. 
3. 
A.4.5. Have your sources of subsistence and cash changed 
over the last 5-10 years? 
1=Yes 
2=No 
A.4.6. If YES, How?  
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A.4.7.For how many months can your household survive on 
from your sources of subsistence and cash? 
No. Months 
A.4.8.What do you do in other times?  
A.4.9.What do you spend money 
on? (Tick all that apply) AND can 
you out of this spending, what 
proportion of money you spend on 
this? i.e. if you spent half of your 
income on electricity =50% 
 % of spending 
1=School fees 
2=Food 
3=Water 
4=Electricity 
5=Medical bills 
6=Transport 
7=Other (specify) 
 
A.4.10.When something 
unexpected happens and you need 
money for it (e.g. funeral, 
accident), how are you able to get 
the money you need? 
1=Savings 
2=Loan 
3=Extra work 
4=Selling an asset 
5=Unable to fulfil the need 
6=Rely on family 
7=Other (specify) 
 
 
Section B : Part 1 : Land 
 
B.1.1.Do you have land to farm? 1=Yes 
2=No 
B.1.2.Do you: 1=Own land 
2=Rent land 
3=Share land with family 
4=Share land with others (not family 
5=Other (specify) 
6=Do not own/ rent/ share land 
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B.1.3.What land 
type is it? (Tick 
all that apply) 
1=Protected forest - HKm 
2=Protected forest – Adat 
3=Protected forest - HTI 
4=Protected forest – Special purpose (specify) 
5=Production forest – HKm 
6=Production forest – Adat 
7=Production forest – HTI 
8=Production forest – Special purpose (specify 
9=Non-forest irrigated cropland 
10=Non-forest non-irrigated cropland 
11=Other (specify) 
 
B.1.4. What 
agricultural 
practices/ crops 
do you grow? 
(Tick all that 
apply) 
1=Irrigated Rice 
2=Rain-fed rice 
3=Tobacco 
4=Agroforestry – Timber (specify) 
5=Agroforestry – NTFP (specify) 
6=Other crop (specify) 
7=Fish pond 
8=Inter-cropping 
9=Livestock grazing 
10=Other (Specify) 
B.1.5. How 
many harvests 
per year for 
these crops? 
Crop: No. Harvests/ year: 
B.1.6.Has the number of harvests per year changed in the last 5-
10 years? 
1=Yes 
2=No 
B.1.7.If YES, how?  
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Section B : Part 2 : Household Water 
 
B.2.1 What are the sources 
of water for your 
household consumption? 
(Domestic activities) 
1=Collect from spring 
2=Collect from community well 
3=Collect from shared well within compound 
4=Collect from personal well 
5=Collect from reservoir 
6=Collect from river 
7=Piped water to household 
8=Shared piped water with another household  
9=Own tank 
10=Community tank 
11=Other (Specify) 
 
B.2.2.If your household is connected to a piped water 
supply, for how long have you been connected?  
 
B.2.3.If your household is connected to a piped water 
supply, how many metres of piping do you own? 
Metres 
B.2.4.If your household is NOT connected to piped 
water, how far away is the nearest piping? 
Metres 
B.2.5.If you have to collect 
water from a source away 
from your house: 
B.2.6.How far do you have to collect it  
B.2.7.How many times per day do you collect it  
B.2.8.Who in the household collects it  
B.2.9.What is the quality of water for 
consumption? 
1=Very Good 
2=Good 
3=Moderate 
4=Poor 
5=Very poor 
B.2.10. Do you have to treat water (i.e.Boil, filter etc) prior to drinking? 1=Yes 
2=No 
B.2.11.Do you have access to/ supply of water for household consumption 
all year round? 
1=Yes 
2=No 
B.2.12.If NO, Why not?  
B.2.13.If NO,When this happens, how do you meet your Household water 
requirements? 
 
B.2.14.Has the availability of water for your household consumption 
changed over the last 5-10 years? 
1=Yes 
2=No 
Appendix I: Lombok-wide household questionnaire  
 
 -222- 
B.2.15.If YES, How?  
 
B.2.16.Do you pay for water for household consumption? 1=Yes 
2=N0 
B.2.17.If YES, how much do you pay on average per month? Rp 
B.2.18.If YES, Who do you pay?  
B.2.19.If YES, What do you pay for: 1=No. of Units used 
2=Access to water resources 
3=Both units used and access to water 
4=Other (specify) 
B.2.20.What is your opinion on 
paying for water for household 
consumption? 
1=Very good 
2=Good 
3=No opinion 
4=Bad 
5=Very Bad 
B.2.21.Why?  
 
 
Section B : Part 3 : Productive Activity Water Use 
I am now going to ask you about your productive activities, this includes all your 
farming, livestock and business activities. 
 
B.3.1 What are the sources 
of water for your 
household’s productive 
activities?  (non-domestic) 
1=Collect from spring 
2=Collect from community well 
3=Collect from shared well within compound 
4=Collect from personal well 
5=Collect from reservoir 
6=Collect from river 
7=Irrigation 
8=Rain-fed 
9=Piped water  
10=Own tank 
11=Community tank 
12=Other (Specify) 
 
B.3.2.If you have to collect 
water from a source away 
from your productive 
activities: 
B.3.3.How far do you have 
to collect it 
 
B.3.4.How many times per 
day do you collect it 
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B.3.5.Who in the 
household collects it 
 
B.3.6.Do you have access to/ supply of water for your productive activities 
all year round? 
1=Yes 
2=No 
B.3.7.If NO, Why 
not? 
 
B.3.8.If, NO. When this happens, how do you meet your productive 
activity water requirements? 
 
B.3.9.If NO, If you are 
unable to meet the water 
requirements for 
productive activities what 
do you do? 
1=Increased area of land farmed 
2=Decrease area of land farmed 
3=Switch to different crops 
4=Construct water supply infrastructure (including digging 
wells, piped water sources) 
5=Increase irrigation capacity 
6=Other (specify) 
B.3.10.Has the availability of water for your productive activities changed 
over the last 5-10 years? 
1=Yes 
2=No 
B.3.11.If YES, How?  
B.3.12.Do you pay for water for productive activities consumption? 1=Yes 
2=No 
B.3.13.If YES, how much do you pay on average per month? Rp 
B.3.14.If YES, Who do you pay?  
B.3.15.If YES, What do you pay for: 1=Units used 
2=Access to water resources 
3=Both 
4=Other (specify) 
B.3.16.What is your opinion on paying 
for water for productive activities? 
1=Very good 
2=Good 
3=No opinion 
4=Bad 
5=Very Bad 
B.3.17.Why?  
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Section C : Part 1 : Water Issues 
I am now going to ask you some questions relating to how your household is affected 
by water. 
 
C.1.1. What issues face your 
household relating to water 
(for both consumption and 
productive use?  
(Tick all that apply 
1=Low water supply in all seasons  
2=Low water supply in dry season only 
3=Irregular flow in all seasons 
4=Irregular flow in dry season only 
5=Water quality 
6=Pollution 
7=Flooding 
8=Erosion of soil 
9=Conflict with other users in the village 
10=Conflict with other users outside the village 
11=Changes in rainfall patterns 
12=Drought (unusual low water supply) 
13=Landslide 
14=No issues 
15=Other (specify) 
C.1.2. Why do you think 
these occur? 
Water issue  
(Link to Code from 
C.1.1.) 
Reason for occurrence 
 
 
C.1.3. How often do these 
issues occur? 
1=Daily 
2=Weekly 
3=Monthly 
4=Dry season only 
5=Wet season only 
6=Annually 
7=Rarely 
8=Never 
Water issue  
(Link to Code from 
C.1.1.) 
Frequency 
C.1.4.How do these effect 
your household 
consumption of water? 
Water issue  
(Link to Code from 
C.1.1.) 
Effect on household 
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C.1.5.How do these affect 
your productive activities 
and use of land? 
1=Grow different crops  
2=Built flood defences 
3=Built water infrastructure 
(irrigation, ground water 
well) 
4=Reduced the different 
types of crop (e.g. if planted 
rice and tabacoo, now just 
plant rice) 
5=Increased the different 
types of crop 
6=No affect 
7=Other (specify) 
Water issue  
(Link to Code from 
C.1.1.) 
Effect on productive 
activities and use of land 
 
 
Section C : Part 2 : Village Water Issues 
 
C.2.1. After rains, do streams: 1=Rise rapidly 
2=Get low 
3=Remain the same 
C.2.2.During dry periods, do streams/rivers 1=Disappear 
2=Get low 
3=Remain the same 
C.2.3.When was the last time flooding occurred in your village?  
C.2.4. When was the last time drought occurred in your village?  
 
 
Section D : Part 1 : Environmental management 
 
D.1.1. Are you aware of any environmental management in your village? 1=Yes 
2=No 
D1.2.If YES, Is that management: 1=Traditional laws 
2=Community management 
3=NGO management 
4=Local government management 
5=Regional government management 
6=Central government management 
7=Other (specify) 
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D.1.3.If YES, is your household paid to protect the environment? 1=Yes 
2=No 
D.1.4.What do you think of schemes that 
pay households to protect the 
environment? 
1=Very good idea 
2=Good idea 
3=No opinion 
4=Bad idea 
5=Very bad idea 
D.1.5. Why?  
 
 
Appendix III: Lombok environmental data 
 
 -227- 
Appendix II - Lombok Case Study Household Questionnaire 
 
INFORMATION TO BE EXPLAINED TO RESPONDENTS BEFORE THE 
INTERVIEW STARTS 
 
1. The purpose of this questionnaire is to independently understand livelihood 
conditions, and water use across Lombok, and to learn how different management 
affects these. 
2. When I talk about your livelihoods (Penghidupan) this includes all the ways in which 
you get food, earn cash, get resources from the land and forest that you use for your 
household. 
3. Your participation in this study is optional; you do not have to participate if you do 
not want to. If you do agree to participate, you will have the right to refuse to answer 
any question that you do not want to discuss, and you can stop the interview at any 
time. Should you wish to withdraw your responses, you can do so up to 3 months 
after the interview. 
4. You name or any facts that could be used to identify you or your family will not 
appear in any documents resulting from this study. All of your answers will be held in 
strict confidence and cannot be traced back to you, your children or other household 
members. 
5. The information that you give may help guide the formation of policy that ensures 
both people and the environment are protected and managed. Once completed, the 
results from this study will be shared with you. 
ENNUMERATORS PLEASE NOTE: 
Questionnaire no:_________________________________ 
Interviewer Name:__________________________________ 
A Date of Interview  
B HH GPS Coordinates (DD MM SS)  
C HH ID  [Ennumerator initials/Number]  
D Village   
E Sub-village  
 
VERIFICATION OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
Supervisor Name : Lucy Garrett  Date :___________________________ 
Interviewer initials (Date)  Supervisor initials (date) 
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THE FOLLOWING ARE STANDARD CODES TO BE USED THROUGHOUT THE 
QUESTIONNAIRE : 
IF A RESPONDENT REFUSES TO ANSWER A QUESTION, PLEASE USE ‘999’ 
IF THE QUESTION IS NOT APPLICABLE, PLEASE USE ‘888’ 
IF THE RESPONDENT ANSWERS ‘I DON’T KNOW’, PLEASE USE ‘777’ 
IF THERE IS ANOTHER RESPONSE NOT LISTED, PLEASE USE ‘666’ FOR OTHER 
 
Section A : Part 1 : Area Identification  
 
A.1.1.Location of Household in village 1=In or around the 
village centre 
2=Isolated 
Household 
 
 
Section A : Part 2 : Household Characteristics  
 
A.2.1. Name of respondent  
A.2.1.Is the head of household answering the questions? 1=Yes 
2=No 
A.2.2.Sex: 1=Male              2= Female 
A.2.3.Age:  
A.2.4.Occupation:  
A.2.5.Number of years in education:  
A.2.6.Marital status: 1=Never married  
2=Married 
3=Divorced 
4=Divorced and remarried 
5=Widowed 
6=Widowed and remarried 
A.2.7.What is the main religion/ belief 
system of the household? 
1=Islam 
2=Hindu 
3=Traditional 
4=Christian 
5=Other (specify) 
A.2.8.What ethnicity does the household 
class themselves as? 
1=Sasak 
2=Balinese 
2=Sumbawa 
4=Other (Specify)______________ 
A.2.9.Does the household live in the 
village permanently or seasonally 
1=Permanently 
2=Seasonally 
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A.2.10.How many years has the 
household lived in this village (even if 
seasonally) 
1=Less than 1 
2=1-5 years 
3=5-10 years 
4=Over 10 years 
5=Always 
A.2.11.How many people live in this 
household? 
1=Men  
2=Women 
3=Children <16 years 
 
 
 
Section A : Part 3 : Assets 
 
A.3.1. Do you own this house? 1=Yes 
2=No 
A.3.2.If NO Who does this house belong to? 1=Family 
2=Friend in village 
3=Friend outside village 
4=Other 
A.3.3. If NO Do you pay them rent? 1=Yes 
2=No 
A.3.4. Tick all that 
apply to this house: 
1=Grass/woven walls 
2=Mud brick walls 
3=Fired brick walls 
4=Earth floor 
5=Cement floor 
6=Tiled floor 
7=Grass/woven roof 
8=Zinc/ iron roof 
9=Tiled roof 
A.3.5.Please indicate 
the number of 
implements and other 
large household 
items that are owned 
by the household: 
 No. Units 
owned 
1=No. Rooms in house  
2=Car/ truck  
3=Motorbike  
4=Bicycle  
5=Buffalo  
6=Cows  
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7=Goats  
8=Horses  
9=Chicken/ducks  
10=HP Cell phone  
11=Fishing boat  
12=Boat engine  
13=Fish pond  
14=Cart  
15=Plough  
16=Water tank  
17=Generator  
18=TV  
19=Radio  
20=Other (specify)  
21=Other (specify)  
 
 
Section A : Part 4 : Livelihoods 
 
A.4.1. Of the following, which are the 3 most important sources of subsistence and cash for 
your household?  
1=None 
2=Regular Salary (eg teacher) 
3=Small business 
4=Wage labour (non-agricultural) 
5=Wage labour (agricultural) 
6=Own farm crop/ livestock production 
7=Harvesting natural products from the forest 
8=Grants/ loans from government or other organisations 
9=Remittances from abroad 
10=Loans 
11=Other (Specify) 
A.4.1.Subsistence and cash 
sources 
1. 
2. 
3. 
A.4.2.Does this change during the wet and dry season?  1=Yes 
2=No 
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A.4.3. If YES, What are the 3 
most important sources of both 
subsistence and cash during the 
wet season? 
1. 
2. 
3. 
A.4.4. If YES, What are the 3 
most important sources of both 
subsistence and cash during the 
dry season? 
1. 
2. 
3. 
A.4.5. What proportion of your cash and subsistence do you get from the 
land/ forest/ water? 
% 
 
A.4.6. What are the 5 most important products that you obtain solely from the river, land and 
forest? 
 
A.4.7. Can you rank these in importance for your health, your income, your food security and 
for your social cohesion with 0= not important to 5= very important. 
 
A.4.6.Products A.4.7. Ranking for 
Health Income Food 
Security 
Social 
cohesion/ 
strong 
community 
1.     
2.     
3.     
4.     
5.     
 
 
A.4.8.Are there ever times when your sources of cash and subsistence are 
not enough to cover your basic needs (food, water etc)? 
1=Yes 
2=No 
A.4.9.If YES, What do you when 
this happens? 
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A.4.10.What do you spend money 
on? (Tick all that apply) AND can 
you out of this spending, what 
proportion of money you spend on 
this? i.e. if you spent half of your 
income on electricity =50% 
 % of spending 
1=School fees 
2=Food 
3=Water 
4=Electricity 
5=Medical bills 
6=Transport 
7=Savings 
8=Other (specify) 
 
A.4.11.When something 
unexpected happens and you need 
money for it (e.g. funeral, accident), 
how are you able to get the money 
you need? 
1=Savings 
2=Loan 
3=Extra work 
4=Selling an asset 
5=Rely on family 
6=Other (specify) 
7=Unable to fulfil the need 
 
 
Section B : Part 1 : Land 
 
B.1.1. Do you have land to farm? 1=Yes 
2=No 
B.1.2. If YES, How much land do you farm? Ha  
B.1.2.Of this 
land farmed, 
what area is: 
1=Land owned by respondent (with land title) 
2=Rent land 
3=Share land with family 
4=Share land with others (not family 
5=Other (specify) 
6=Do not own/ rent/ share land 
ha 
B.1.3.If you own land did you 1=Buy it yourself 
2=Inherit it from your family 
3=Other (specify) 
B.1.3.What land type is it? (Tick 
all that apply) 
1=Protected forest  
2=Production forest 
3=Irrigated cropland 
4=Non-irrigated cropland 
5=Other (specify) 
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B.1.4. Is the land used for: 1=Mixed crops 
2=One crop only – specify 
3=Grazing/ fodder 
4=Left idle 
5=Rented by other households 
6=Timber 
7=Non-timber forest products (fruit, nuts etc) 
8=Fish pond 
9=Other (specify) 
 
 
B.1.5. Which plant crops have you grown/ harvested from the forest in the last year? 
 
B.1.5 B.1.6 B.1.7 B.1.8 B.1.9 B.1.10 
Crop type/ 
forest 
resource 
Proportion of 
land under this 
crop 
Yield/ year Income/ 
year 
% Sold % consumed 
in the 
household 
(Name) i.e. ¼, ½, ¾  KG Rp 
      
      
      
      
      
      
B.1.11. Who cultivates and 
harvests the crops/ forest 
resources? 
 1=Family/ Members of household 
2=Neighbour 
3=Hired labour 
4=Other (specify) 
B.1.12. Are these?  1= Men 
2=Women  
3=Children 
4=All 
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Section B : Part 2 : Household Water 
 
B.2.1 What are the sources 
of water for your 
household consumption? 
(Domestic activities) 
This includes drinking, 
cooking and bathing and 
washing 
1=Collect from spring 
2=Collect from community well 
3=Collect from shared well within compound 
4=Collect from personal well 
5=Collect from reservoir/ dam 
6=Collect from river 
7=Piped water to household 
8=Shared piped water to compound  
9=Own tank 
10=Community tank 
11=Get water delivered 
12=Other (Specify) 
 
B.2.2.If your household is connected to a piped water 
supply, for how long have you been connected?  
 
B.2.3.If your household is connected to a piped water 
supply, how many metres of piping do you own? 
Metres 
B.2.4.If your household is NOT connected to piped 
water, how far away is the nearest piping? 
Metres 
B.2.5.If you have to collect 
water from a source away 
from your house: 
B.2.6.How far do you have to collect it  
B.2.7.How many times per day do you 
collect it 
 
B.2.8.Who in the 
household collects it 
 
B.2.9.What is the quality of water for 
consumption? 
1=Very Good 
2=Good 
3=Moderate 
4=Poor 
5=Very poor 
B.2.10. Do you have to treat water (i.e.Boil, filter etc) prior to drinking? 1=Yes 
2=No 
B.2.11.Do you have access to/ supply of water for household consumption 
all year round? 
1=Yes 
2=No 
B.2.12.If NO, Why not?  
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B.2.13.If NO,When this happens, how do you meet your Household water 
requirements? 
 
 
B.2.14. 5-10 years ago, did you have access to/ supply of water for 
household consumption all year round?? 
1=Yes 
2=No 
B.2.15.If No, why not?  
B.2.16 How did you meet your household 
water consumption 5-10 years ago? 
 
B.2.17.Do you pay for water for household consumption? 1=Yes 
2=No 
B.2.18.If YES, how much do you pay on average per month? Rp 
B.2.19.If YES, Who do you pay?  
B.2.20.If YES, What do you pay for: 1=No. of Units used 
2=Access to water resources 
3=Both units used and access to water 
4=Other (specify) 
B.2.21.What is your opinion on 
paying for water? 
1=Very good 
2=Good 
3=No opinion 
4=Bad 
5=Very Bad 
B.2.22.Why?  
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Section B : Part 3 : Productive Activity Water Use 
I am now going to ask you some questions relating to water you use for all activities outside 
of your household. This includes farm activities, water for your livestock, for businesses. 
 
B.3.1 What are the sources 
of water for your 
household’s productive 
activities?  (non-domestic) 
1=Collect from spring 
2=Collect from community well 
3=Collect from shared well within compound 
4=Collect from personal well 
5=Collect from reservoir/ dam 
6=Collect from river 
7=Irrigation 
8=Rain-fed 
9=Piped water  
10=Own tank 
11=Community tank 
10=Other (Specify) 
B.3.2.If you have to collect 
water from a source away 
from your productive 
activities: 
B.3.3.How far do you have to collect it  
B.3.4.How many times per day do you 
collect it 
 
B.3.5.Who in the household collects it  
B.3.6.Do you have access to/ supply of water for your productive activities 
all year round? 
1=Yes 
2=No 
B.3.7.If NO, Why 
not? 
 
B.3.8.If, NO. When this happens, how do you meet 
your productive activity water requirements? 
 
B.3.9.If NO, If you are 
unable to meet the water 
requirements for 
productive activities what 
do you do? 
1=Increased area of land farmed 
2=Decrease area of land farmed 
3=Switch to different crops 
4=Construct water supply infrastructure (including digging 
wells, piped water sources) 
5=Increase irrigation capacity 
6=Other (specify) 
B.3.10. 5-10 years ago, did you have access to/ supply of water for 
productive activities all year round?? 
1=Yes 
2=No 
B.3.11.If No, why not?  
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B.3.12.How did you meet your productive 
activities water requirements 5-10 years 
ago? 
 
B.3.13.Do you pay for water for productive activities consumption? 1=Yes 
2=No 
B.3.14.If YES, how much do you pay on average per month? Rp 
B.3.15.If YES, Who do you pay?  
B.3.16.If YES, What do you pay for: 1=Units used 
2=Access to water resources 
3=Both 
4=Other (specify) 
B.3.17.What is your opinion on paying 
for water? 
1=Very good 
2=Good 
3=No opinion 
4=Bad 
5=Very Bad 
B.3.18.Why?  
 
 
Section C : Part 1 : Values  
 
C.1.2.Other than economic benefits, does the environment have any 
other importance? 
1=Yes 
2=No 
C.1.3.If YES, what are these?  
C.1.4. What are the main direct 
and indirect benefits of the 
environment to your household? 
 
C.1.6. Can you rank these in 
importance? i.e. 1=Very 
important, 5 =Least important 
C.1.5. Benefit C.1.6.Ranked 
importance 
1=Income  
2=Spiritual well-being  
3=Wildlife  
4=Water retention  
5=comfort (How?)  
6=Recreation  
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7=Food  
8=Protection from natural disasters  
9=Other (specify)  
C.1.7.Do you think the environment has any negative consequences 
for the people in your household? 
1=Yes 
2=No 
C.1.8.If YES, What are these and why?  
C.1.9.Whose responsibility do you think it is to protect the 
environment – water resources, forests, non-forest land? 
 
C.1.10.Why?  
 
 
Section C : Part 2 : Environmental awareness   
 
C.2.1 What is the greatest threat to the 
environment in your community? 
 
C.2.2. What currently is the most 
significant threat for: 
Water supply  
Comfort and wellbeing  
Forest  
Cash and subsistence  
C.2.3. Do you think your household and community are able to protect 
themselves from these threats? 
1=Yes 
2=No 
C.2.4.  How is your household and community able/ unable to protect 
themselves from these threats? E.g strong governance, diverse 
livelihoods, traditional knowledge 
 
C.2.5. Over the last 5-10 years what has been the most significant 
environmental change for your household? 
 
C.2.6. How has this affected your household?  
C.2.7.What do you think will be the biggest difficulty your household 
will face in the future? 
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Section C : Part 3 : Social capital and networks 
 
C.3.1.What are the existing institutions 
and community activities that exist in 
your community?  
1=Village management 
2=Religious 
3=Farmer Groups 
4=Traditional/ Adat/ Awig-Awig 
5=Other (specify) 
 
C.3.2.Which institution/ collective action are you a member of/ participate in? 
C.3.3 What is your degree of participation? 
 
Type of organisation or 
association 
C.3.2 C.3.3 
Member? 
(✓) 
Degree of participation (✓) 
1 Village management 1=yes 
2=No 
1=Representative 
2=Very Active 
3=Somewhat active 
4=Member but not active 
5=Not a member/ do not participate 
2 Religious 1=yes 
2=No 
1=Representative 
2=Very Active 
3=Somewhat active 
4=Member but not active 
5=Not a member/ do not participate 
3 Farmer Group 1=yes 
2=No 
1=Representative 
2=Very Active 
3=Somewhat active 
4=Member but not active 
5=Not a member/ do not participate 
4 Traditional/ ADat/ 
Awig-Awig 
1=yes 
2=No 
1=Representative 
2=Very Active 
3=Somewhat active 
4=Member but not active 
5=Not a member/ do not participate 
5 Other (specify) e.g. 
farmer group 
1=yes 
2=No 
1=Representative 
2=Very Active 
3=Somewhat active 
4=Member but not active 
5=Not a member/ do not participate 
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C.3.2.Why did they emerge?  
C.3.4.If you are not a member/ do not participate, why not?  
C.3.7. Can you rank the organisations in order of importance to your 
household? 
1 
2 
3 
 
 
Section D : Part 1 : Water Issues 
 
D.1.1. What issues face your household relating to water (for both consumption and 
productive use?  
1=Low water supply, 2=Irregular flow , 3=Water quality, 4=Pollution, 
5=Flooding, 6=Erosion of soil, 7=Conflict with other users in the village, 
8=Conflict with other users outside the village, 10=Changes in rainfall patterns, 
11=Drought (unusual low water supply), 12=Landslide, 13=No issues, 14=Other 
(specify) 
D.1.2. Why do you think these occur? 
D.1.3. How often do these issues occur? 
1=Daily, 2=Weekly, 3=Monthly, 4=Dry season only, 5=Wet season only, 
6=Annually, 7=Rarely, 8=Never 
D.1.4. How do these effect your household consumption of water? 
D.1.5. How do these effect your productive use/ non domestic use of water? 
D.1.6. What does your household do to reduce these effects on both household consumption 
and productive activity use of water? 
1=Planted different crops, 2=Built flood defences, 3=Built water infrastructure 
(irrigation, ground water well), 4=Reduced the different types of crop (e.g. if 
planted rice and tabacoo, now just plant rice), 5=Increased the different types of 
crop, 6=Let the soil rest,  
7=Harvested less, 8=Nothing, 9=Other (specify) 
 
Section D : Part 3 : Village Water Issues 
 
D.3.3.When was the last time a flooding 
event occurred in your village? 
 
D.3.4.When this happened, what did your 
community do in response? 
 
D.3.5. When was the last time a drought 
event occurred in your village? 
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D.3.6.When this happened, what did your 
community do in response? 
 
 
 
Section E : Part 1 : Environmental management 
  
E.1.1. Are there rules about how you use water and the environment in this 
community? 
1=Yes 
2=No 
E1.2.What are these? 
(Awig-Awig? Community Farmer Groups? Local government? NGOs? Protected 
areas? Limited harvesting of certain resources? Replanting trees?) 
E.1.3.Are there areas where you cannot use land or take out resources?  1=Yes 
2=No 
E.1.4. Where are these areas?  
E.1.5. Who decides how water and the environment is used in this community? 
E.1.6. What do you think about this? 1=Very good idea 
2=Good idea 
3=No opinion 
4=Bad idea 
5=Very bad idea 
E.1.4.Do people check if the community members are obeying the rules? 1=Yes 
2=No 
E.1.5.If yes, who checks?   
E1.6.Before the current rules and management began, how was the environment 
managed? 
 
E.1.7.Why did the current rules and management begin (i.e. new Head of Village, 
Government law, new environmental problem (illegal logging) or big event such as 
severe flood or storm)? 
 
 
 
E.1.8.Do 
people in your 
community: 
1= Voluntarily accept and participate/ adhere with these rules 
2=Forcibly accept and participate/ adhere to these rules 
3=Acknowledge but do not accept these rules, nor adhere to them 
4=Ignore existing rules but are aware of them 
5=Have no knowledge or awareness of these rules 
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E.1.9. If there is a sudden environmental problem, such as a landslide, 
storm or a severe drought, does the management of the environment 
change? 
1=Yes 
2=No 
E.1.10. If YES, How does it change? 
Who changes it? 
 
E.1.11. If NO, Why not?  
E.1.11.Do you think the rules about the environment and water in this 
village mean that people outside of the village benefit?   
1=Yes 
2=No 
E.1.12. If YES, 
How? 
 
E.1.13. Do you think it is necessary to provide an incentive/ reward to 
ensure that people protect and maintain resources? 
1=Yes 
2=No 
E.1.14. Why?  
E.1.15.Are you/ is your household involved in any schemes that use 
incentives such as money or seedlings to protect the environment? 
1=Yes 
2=No 
E.1.16. What do these schemes do  
E.1.17. What incentives or cash rewards do you receive?   
E.1.18. Who gives these incentives or cash rewards?  
E.1.16.What do you think of schemes that 
use incentives to protect the environment? 
1=Very good idea 
2=Good idea 
3=No opinion 
4=Bad idea 
5=Very bad idea 
E.1.17.Why?  
 
 
Section F : Part 1 : Wellbeing 
 
F.1.1.With your current access to land 
and other resources, do you feel you are 
able to provide a good life with all the 
necessities for you and your family? 
1=Very good life 
2=Good life 
3=Able to provide basic needs 
4=Occasionally unable to provide basic needs 
5=Regularly unable to provide even basic needs 
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F.1.4.In comparison to surrounding 
villages, how is the livelihood situation in 
this village? 
1=Much better off 
2=Slightly better off 
3=Same as other villages 
4=Slightly worse off 
5=Much worse off 
F.1.6.In comparison to other households, 
how is the livelihood situation here? 
1=Much better off 
2=Slightly better off 
3=Same as other households 
4=Slightly worse off 
5=Much worse off 
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Appendix III - Lombok Environmental Data 
 
Subvillage Watershed Area 
(km2) 
Altitude 
(m) 
Total 
population 
Population 
Density 
Distance 
to 
Mataram 
(km) 
Springs and rivers Area of ground 
water (km2) 
Distance 
to nearest 
spring 
(km) 
No of 
springs 
Spring 
density 
Total river 
length (km) 
Gangga Putih 85.74 1250 5782 67.44 4.45 2.12 2 0.02 97.70 85.74 
Lokotumping Putih 32.51 309 5200 159.95 5.27 12.58 0 0.00 30.04 32.51 
Gunung Kosong Jelatang 151.55 7 7782 51.35 2.15 1.45 24 0.16 72.30 151.55 
Pelangan Tengah/Gubug Bali Jelatang 184.45 21 6304 34.18 1.68 3.79 13 0.07 96.61 184.45 
Putit Dodokan  95.15 65 12477 131.13 10.29 4.11 2 0.02 25.21 95.15 
Batu Cangku Menanga 7.41 486 3939 531.23 1.71 1.91 1 0.13 24.27 7.41 
Mapakin Putih 93.19 1170 4529 48.60 10.15 10.64 1 0.01 33.68 79.97 
Bagik Rempung Dodokan  15.23 91 3347 219.71 3.28 0.38 2 0.13 23.94 15.23 
Lancing Jelatang 54.63 28 4402 80.58 5.00 7.59 2 0.04 28.64 54.63 
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Kabol Dodokan  25.25 68 3275 129.72 3.82 5.97 0 0.00 9.26 25.25 
Sebowo Jelatang 8.28 33 4057 489.71 4.15 7.34 2 0.24 11.41 8.28 
Salut Putih 66.15 850 3654 55.24 2.81 0.51 10 0.15 41.57 66.11 
Tanak Petak Daya Putih 9.83 750 4203 427.49 1.48 0.78 3 0.31 19.91 9.83 
Ampanbelak Menanga 25.81 49 10276 398.19 1.97 0.61 20 0.77 32.08 25.81 
Orong Menanga 16.58 107 9130 550.66 3.22 2.92 0 0.00 21.32 16.58 
Lengkok Menanga 5.04 48 3224 639.82 1.00 2.31 0 0.00 16.28 5.04 
Lepak Menanga 6.62 156 4793 724.43 1.24 0.85 0 0.00 0.52 6.62 
Lebah Suren Dodokan  16.01 650 2500 156.14 3.36 2.03 2 0.12 24.11 16.01 
Medas Dodokan  5.58 136 7203 1291.67 1.46 2.67 0 0.00 18.77 5.58 
Kuranji Bangsal Dodokan  5.90 775 3625 614.04 1.69 3.71 0 0.00 28.68 5.86 
Malimbu Putih 56.77 800 8155 143.64 7.90 4.37 0 0.00 30.34 56.77 
Baga Dodokan  5.17 300 4176 808.33 4.98 1.02 1 0.19 6.94 5.17 
Gegekliko Dodokan  15.74 488 4720 299.94 2.70 1.00 5 0.32 22.28 15.74 
Embung Dodokan  10.61 117 6667 628.66 1.43 6.33 0 0.00 25.40 10.61 
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Lilin Dodokan  19.91 41 9500 477.15 0.66 0.58 2 0.10 43.46 19.91 
Kebon Baru Dodokan  19.23 260 4979 258.92 5.15 2.99 2 0.10 37.73 19.23 
Bagik Dodokan  7.51 326 5415 720.81 0.94 3.33 0 0.00 15.67 7.51 
Ledangnangka Menanga 12.64 500 7319 579.02 3.20 0.81 2 0.16 33.45 12.64 
Lajut Dodokan  6.08 139 3743 615.70 2.36 2.58 0 0.00 16.66 6.08 
Sondo Dodokan  14.84 118 8300 559.35 1.89 6.37 11 0.74 37.15 14.84 
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Subvillage Land cover area (km2) Distance 
(km) to 
Managed 
Forest 
Managed 
Forest 
%Managed 
Forest Cover 
Length of 
irrigation 
channels (km) 
% of paddy 
field 
Total 
Forest 
Settlement Agroforestry 
plantation 
Paddy 
area 
Farmland Other Total 
area 
Gangga 76.22 0.35 5.73 0.24 1.38 2.07 85.74 0.00 51.14 0.60 0.00 0.00 
Lokotumping 29.25 0.35 2.49 0.78 0.42 0.00 32.51 0.67 5.23 0.16 0.00 0.02 
Gunung Kosong 32.71   0.00 19.85 98.99 151.55 2.16 62.25 0.41 0.00 0.00 
Pelangan 
Tengah/Gubug Bali 
77.88 1.09 1.40 0.00 8.07 96.00 184.45 0.00 101.56 0.55 0.83 0.00 
Putit 9.38   0.00 0.00 85.77 95.15 2.38 27.38 0.29 39.00 0.00 
Batu Cangku 1.09 0.17 1.79 0.00 4.37 0.00 7.41 1.42  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Mapakin 44.09 0.93  0.00 5.36 42.82 93.19 0.84 76.03 0.82 0.00 0.00 
Bagik Rempung 0.14   7.55 13.10 1.99 15.23 11.18  0.00 10.95 0.50 
Lancing 0.00   0.78 17.08 37.55 54.63 0.12 15.26 0.28 33.87 0.01 
Kabol 1.57 0.99  0.00 11.04 11.64 25.25 0.33 8.29 0.33 0.00 0.00 
Sebowo 0.00   0.00 1.67 6.61 8.28 10.56  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Appendix III: Lombok environmental data 
 
 -248- 
Salut 26.06 0.96 2.79 1.41 30.02 6.31 66.15 5.18 25.38 0.38 0.00 0.02 
Tanak Petak Daya 0.00 0.45 0.68 4.53 4.82 3.88 9.83 8.80  0.00 0.00 0.46 
Ampanbelak 0.00 0.82 6.19 1.92 11.14 7.65 25.81 6.60  0.00 0.00 0.07 
Orong 0.00 0.65 10.98 5.80 3.37 1.58 16.58 12.84  0.00 0.00 0.35 
Lengkok 0.00 0.21 1.87 0.00 0.00 2.96 5.04 17.61  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Lepak 0.00   0.00 1.00 5.61 6.62 13.66  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Lebah Suren 4.43  2.86 0.17 0.82 7.89 16.01 0.42 7.05 0.44 3.91 0.01 
Medas 0.00 0.00 0.25 5.54 3.95 1.37 5.58 8.19  0.00 9.23 0.99 
Kuranji Bangsal 0.00   3.74 5.14 0.76 5.90 8.39  0.00 34.45 0.63 
Malimbu 27.71 0.11 1.70 0.30 9.00 18.25 56.77 1.22 24.10 0.42 0.00 0.01 
Baga 0.00   4.50 2.75 2.41 5.17 12.81  0.00 48.84 0.87 
Gegekliko 11.43   0.92 0.00 4.31 15.74 3.37 5.08 0.32 13.35 0.06 
Embung 0.00 0.59  6.80 7.82 2.20 10.61 8.80  0.00 0.00 0.64 
Lilin 4.23 0.63 1.63 6.36 11.00 2.41 19.91 0.82 2.20 0.11 51.32 0.32 
Kebon Baru 17.58 0.07  0.32 1.57 0.01 19.23 2.03 5.75 0.30 8.33 0.02 
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Bagik 0.00   7.51 0.17 7.34 7.51 14.83  0.00 0.00 1.00 
Ledangnangka 0.00 0.11 7.08 0.02 0.00 5.45 12.64 7.26  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Lajut 0.00   4.16 6.08 0.00 6.08 14.32  0.00 59.32 0.68 
Sondo 0.00 0.10  14.80 14.74 0.00 14.84 12.31  0.00 46.67 1.00 
 
 
 
Appendix III: Lombok environmental data 
 
 -250- 
 
Subvillage Rainfall No of 
dry 
months 
No. of 
wet 
months 
Soil 
drainage 
types 
Min 
(mm) 
Max 
(mm) 
Average 
(mm) 
 
Gangga 400 3000 1700 4-9 0-7 3 
Lokotumping 800 1200 1000 4-9 0-7 3 
Gunung Kosong 400 3000 1700 4-10 0-7 3 
Pelangan Tengah/Gubug Bali 400 3000 1700 4-10 0-4 1 
Putit 500 3000 1750 3-9 0-7 3 
Batu Cangku 1000 3500 2250 0-11 0-6 3 
Mapakin 800 1200 1000 1-8 0-11 3 
Bagik Rempung 500 3000 1750 3-9 0-7 3 
Lancing 400 3000 1700 3-9 0-7 3 
Kabol 400 3000 1700 3-9 0-7 3 
Sebowo 400 3000 1700 3-9 0-7 3 
Salut 800 1200 1000 0-11 0-11 3 
Tanak Petak Daya 800 3000 1900 4-9 0-6 1 
Ampanbelak 400 1000 700 4-9 0-6 2 
Orong 400 2500 1450 3-9 0-7 2 
Lengkok 400 2500 1450 3-9 0-7 2 
Lepak 400 3000 1700 3-9 0-7 2 
Lebah Suren 1000 2500 1750 3-8 0-6 2 
Medas 1000 2500 1750 3-8 0-6 3 
Kuranji Bangsal 400 1700 1050 6-10 0-4 1 
Malimbu 800 1200 1000 4-9 0-11 3 
Baga 400 3000 1700 3-9 0-7 2 
Gegekliko 400 3000 1700 1-8 0-6 2 
Embung 400 3000 1700 3-9 0-7 2 
Lilin 400 4000 2200 6-10 0-4 1 
Kebon Baru 400 1700 1050 0-9 0-10 3 
Bagik 400 3000 1700 3-9 0-7 2 
Ledangnangka 500 3000 1750 3-9 0-7 2 
Lajut 500 3000 1750 3-9 0-7 3 
Sondo 500 3000 1750 3-9 0-7 3 
 
 
